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Modern courts and commentators have had trouble distinguishing the kinds of
decisions that require “judicial” power from the adjudicative tasks that Congress can
authorize administrative agencies to perform in the course of “executing” federal law.
In a prior article (Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
559 (2007)), I sought to explain traditional doctrines on that topic. For much of
American history, Congress could authorize executive-branch agencies to administer
and dispose of “public rights” belonging to the federal government or the people
collectively, and Congress also could give agencies conclusive authority with respect to
the administration of “privileges” that federal law gave private individuals or entities.
But the political branches did not have similar sway over vested private “rights.” Only
true courts could conclusively determine either that a private person had forfeited such
rights or that the claimed rights had never vested in the person to begin with.
In my earlier article, I referred to the category of “franchises”—special powers or
perquisites that the government gave private people who, in turn, did something of
value for the public. Because no one had a vested right to be granted a franchise in
the first place, I lumped franchises together with privileges. That taxonomy may have
influenced the Supreme Court’s analysis of patents in Oil States Energy Services
v. Greene’s Energy Group (2018). But the story is actually more complex. In the
nineteenth century, once the government granted a franchise, private rights normally
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were thought to vest in the franchisee. That idea aﬀected constitutional doctrine with
respect to a wide array of legal interests, including not only patents but also corporate
charters, the power to operate ferries and toll roads, and more.
This Article explores the concept of franchises and their interaction with
American-style separation of powers. In the process, it illuminates historical
understandings of the public/private distinction, unearths new evidence about the
constitutional status of patents, and sheds light on the traditional roles of each branch
of government.
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INTRODUCTION
Article III of the Constitution vests what it calls “[t]he judicial Power of
the United States” in courts that enjoy structural protections against political
inﬂuence—courts staﬀed by judges who “shall hold their Oﬃces during good
Behaviour” and whose compensation “shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Oﬃce.”1 But Article III does not spell out the types of
governmental decrees that require judicial power, as opposed to the decrees
that Congress can authorize administrative agencies to make in the course of
helping to execute federal law. That line is important to American-style
separation of powers, but it has proved diﬃcult to draw.
In 2007, I published an article explaining the framework that lawyers and
judges used for this purpose throughout much of American history.2 That
framework relied on the traditional distinction between “public rights” and
“private rights”—a distinction that Ann Woolhandler and I had already
explored in related contexts.3 Of course, I was not the ﬁrst to note that the
various branches of government play diﬀerent roles when diﬀerent types of
legal interests are at stake, or that the distinction between public rights and
private rights is an important aspect of those diﬀerences. Justice William
Brennan had emphasized that distinction in cases about Congress’s power to
authorize adjudication outside the Article III courts,4 and modern scholars
had also examined the distinction’s history.5 Still, I took the distinction more
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007).
See generally Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 689 (2004) (discussing the distinction’s relevance to traditional ideas about the proper parties to
lawsuits); Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015
(2006) (discussing the distinction’s relevance to constitutional limits on “retroactive” legislation).
4 See Granﬁnanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-56 (1989); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-72 (1982) (plurality opinion). Earlier, Justice White’s
majority opinion in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S.
442 (1977), had likewise invoked the concept of “public rights,” but in my view it botched the
analysis. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 602-05.
5 The seminal article is Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From
Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765 (1986).
1
2
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seriously than most law professors did,6 and I suggested that it is more
embedded in separation-of-powers doctrines than people realized.
In the ensuing years, what I called the traditional framework has become
more prominent. Various scholars with an interest in originalism have
embraced it to distinguish the kinds of legal claims that Congress can commit
to administrative agencies from the kinds of legal claims that trigger the need
for “judicial” power.7 On the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas has
also deployed the framework repeatedly in this context.8 Most recently, his
majority opinion in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC9 used the framework to uphold the administrative cancellation of a
patent pursuant to procedures authorized by Congress. The Court reasoned
that a patent is a “public franchise” granted by the government, and the
Constitution does not prevent Congress from qualifying such grants by
reserving a power of administrative reconsideration.10
I am honored and gratified by the reception of my earlier article. Precisely
because people have paid attention to it, though, I feel a responsibility to correct
something that I got wrong—or at least did not adequately qualify—and that
risks affecting the future course of doctrine. Contrary to a passing suggestion in
the article, what nineteenth-century lawyers called “franchises” were capable of
vesting in private individuals or entities in such a way as to become full-fledged
private rights. When granting franchises, though, legislatures could indeed
structure them in such a way as to avoid this result. As we shall see, the story of
“franchises” thus relates to what scholars have correctly identified as two of the
most important open questions about the framework discussed in my earlier
article: (1) how to classify the kinds of legal interests that modern statutes

6 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern
Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 204 (“By invoking a dichotomy between so-called ‘public’ and
‘private’ rights, [Justice Brennan’s opinion in Northern Pipeline] has introduced (or, perhaps more
accurately, reintroduced) a standard wholly unwarranted by constitutional language, history, policy
or theory.”); see also James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of
the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 665 (2004) (“Scholars have been especially unkind to the
public rights category . . . .”).
7 See, e.g., William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1540-47 (2020);
Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 417-23 (2017). For a nonoriginalist’s
wise comments (and measured assessment of doctrinal evolution), see Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction
Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 36-47, 55 (2019).
8 See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2185 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); Sessions v.
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1246 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
135 S. Ct. 1932, 1964-66 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 171-72 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574
U.S. 318, 344 n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
10 See id. at 1373.
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create11 and (2) the extent to which Congress can use its other powers to extract
waivers of the right to judicial adjudication of vested private rights.12
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I brieﬂy summarizes the historical
framework. Part II examines where “franchises” ﬁt in that framework. Part
III focuses speciﬁcally on patents for inventions.
I. A SUMMARY OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRAMEWORK
My earlier article relied on two key distinctions. First, it contrasted legal
interests belonging to the government (or to the people in their collective
capacity) with legal interests belonging to private individuals or entities.13
Second, within the latter category, it contrasted private “rights” (of the sort
that even the legislature could not abrogate once they had vested in a private
person) with mere “privileges” (which belonged to private people only so
long as the legislature allowed them to exist).14
Those distinctions were centrally important to the doctrine of “vested
rights,” which Edward Corwin once described as “the underlying doctrine of
American Constitutional Law” before the Civil War—a doctrine so
foundational that, without it, “there would [not] have been any Constitutional
Law” at all.15 Under general principles of constitutional law (common to both
the Federal Constitution and the constitutions of the various states),16 only
certain kinds of legal interests were thought to be capable of “vesting” in
private individuals or entities in such a way as to trigger this doctrine. Those
legal interests could be described under the categories of life, liberty, and
property—categories corresponding to the kinds of individual rights that
Lockeans believed would exist even in the state of nature and that allegedly
supplied the basic rationale for creating government in the ﬁrst place.17 Rights
to life and physical liberty were said to be vested in individuals from birth,
11 See Baude, supra note 7, at 1578-79; see also Adam Mossoﬀ, Statutes, Common Law Rights, and
the Mistaken Classification of Patents as Public Rights, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2591, 2598-99, 2602-15 (2019)
(noting that interests should not automatically be classiﬁed as privileges simply because they are
created or secured by statutes, and applying this point to patents).
12 See Baude, supra note 7, at 1579; John Harrison, Public Rights, Private Privileges, and Article
III, 54 GA. L. REV. 143, 179-216 (2020).
13 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 566.
14 See id. at 566-72.
15 Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247,
255 (1914).
16 Cf. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General
Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1283 (2000) (noting that except where the constitution of a
particular state specifically established an idiosyncratic rule, federal courts often applied “a presumptive
set of one-size-fits-all principles of state constitutional interpretation based on a variety of sources,
including the consensus of other state courts resolving similar questions, prior interpretations of
analogous federal constitutional provisions, as well as various domestic and foreign treatise writers”).
17 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 567.
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and to remain vested unless a particular individual was duly adjudged to have
forfeited them.18 Property moved around more, but the capacity to acquire
property was thought of as a natural right19—and when a private individual
or entity did indeed acquire legal interests that counted as real or personal
property (including various rights acquired by contract), those interests too
triggered the doctrine of vested rights.20
As applied in the nineteenth century, the doctrine of vested rights limited
governmental power in various ways. Of course, the doctrine did not prevent
statutes from regulating how people used their property or identifying
circumstances in which property would be deemed to be abandoned,
transferred from one person to another, or forfeited to the government.21
Likewise, statutes could deﬁne crimes and authorize sentences that could
include loss of property (monetary ﬁnes), loss of liberty (imprisonment), or
loss of life (capital punishment). But whatever the scope of various
legislatures’ powers to establish rules according to which people could lose
their rights to life, liberty, or property, the doctrine of vested rights restricted
the temporal eﬀect of those rules. Throughout the nineteenth century, the
doctrine operated as a limit on retroactive legislation, and it also helped to
deﬁne what counted as retroactivity.22
That aspect of the doctrine reﬂected broader principles about the
separation of powers. In general, neither “legislative” nor “executive” power
was capable of acting directly upon vested rights and legally divesting them
(or authoritatively declaring that they had been divested in the past).23 Thus,
only a court—a body with “judicial” power—could validly adjudge someone
guilty of a crime and sentence him to pay a ﬁne, to serve a term in prison, or
to be executed. Likewise, if someone claimed to be the owner of the type of
legal interests that counted as vested rights to property, only a court could
declare authoritatively (in a way that would have preclusive eﬀects in later
litigation) that the property actually belonged to someone else.

18 See, e.g., EDWIN E. BRYANT, THE OUTLINES OF LAW 218, 220 (Madison, Democrat
Printing Co. 1895); 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 203, 205 (Boston, Charles
C. Little & James Brown 1838).
19 See, e.g., MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 4 (“[A]ll persons have a natural right to life, liberty
and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry . . . .”).
20 See generally WILLIAM G. MYER, VESTED RIGHTS: SELECTED CASES AND NOTES ON
RETROSPECTIVE AND ARBITRARY LEGISLATION AFFECTING VESTED RIGHTS OF PROPERTY
(St. Louis, Gilbert Book Co. 1891).
21 Cf. Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2464-67 (2016)
(discussing early state and federal forfeiture statutes); id. at 2512-13 (discussing recording statutes,
laws about the abandonment of property, and adverse possession).
22 See James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property
and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 103-11 (1993); Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1023-27.
23 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 568-70.
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Some state constitutions said relatively little about the characteristics of the
state’s courts. But the Federal Constitution restricted the kinds of entities that
could exercise what Article III calls “[t]he judicial Power of the United States.”24
Given those restrictions, Congress could not confer “judicial” power upon the
typical administrative agency.25 As a result, Congress could not authorize such
agencies to make binding determinations that a private individual or entity had
acted in such a way as to forfeit vested private rights (or that such rights had
never vested in the individual or entity in the first place).
By contrast, within the limits of its enumerated powers, Congress could
and did authorize executive oﬃcials or administrative agencies to dispose of
legal interests that did not ﬁt the template of vested private rights. For
instance, Congress could authorize “land oﬃces” in the executive branch to
surrender the public’s rights in land owned by the federal government, and to
determine which private claimants met the statutory criteria for purchasing
or being given this land. To the extent that no private person’s vested rights
were yet at stake, Congress could give the land oﬃce conclusive authority to
determine which rival claimants met the statutory criteria and to distribute
the land accordingly.26 Likewise, Congress could revise the statutory criteria
at any time before private rights actually vested.27
To apply this framework, people had to draw distinctions that were not
dictated by formal logic. For instance, the framework depended crucially on
the diﬀerence between a mere expectancy and a vested right, but doctrines
about the moment at which a legal interest vested were inevitably somewhat
arbitrary.28 Likewise, it was not always obvious whether a license should be
regarded as a vested property right or a revocable “privilege”29—and as
Professor Charles Reich famously suggested, the same might be said of an
anticipated stream of income.30
Still, modern ways of talking have made the traditional framework seem
less coherent than it actually was. Take the Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlas
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See Nelson, supra note 2, at 575-77.
See id. at 577-78; see also Lewis v. Lewis, 9 Mo. 183, 188 (1845) (explaining this point on the
ground that “[t]he United States is the owner of the public lands, and can dispose of it on such
terms, and in such manner, as seem ﬁt”); Harrison, supra note 12, at 172-73 (linking “the nineteenth
century system of executive adjudication” to the idea that “public rights were ownership interests of
or controlled by the government” and “[a] core function of the executive is to exercise the proprietary
rights of the government itself according to law”).
27 See, e.g., Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 187, 192-93 (1870).
28 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 579 (illustrating this problem with doctrines about purchase options).
29 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 740 (1964) (noting the important
consequences that ﬂowed from this distinction).
30 See id. at 787 (“It is time to see that the ‘privilege’ or ‘gratuity’ concept, as applied to wealth
dispensed by government, is not much diﬀerent from the absolute right of ownership that private
capital once invoked to justify arbitrary power over employees and the public.”).
24
25
26
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Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.31 The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 had established a mechanism for
imposing civil penalties on employers who violated the Act or its
implementing regulations. If an inspector representing the Secretary of
Labor found violations in a workplace, the inspector would issue a citation to
the responsible employer and could propose a monetary penalty for each
violation.32 An employer who contested either the citation or the proposed
penalties could trigger an adjudicative process before an administrative
tribunal, but the tribunal’s ﬁnal order would be subject only to appellate-style
review in a federal circuit court.33 As the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) noted, this arrangement was unusual at the time:
“Under most money penalty statutes, the penalty cannot be imposed until the
agency has succeeded in a de novo adjudication in federal district court,
whether or not an administrative proceeding has been held previously.”34
Nonetheless, ACUS urged other agencies to “consider asking Congress to
grant them such authority,”35 and the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in
Atlas Roofing held that employers facing civil penalties did not have a
constitutional right to have the relevant factual disputes be resolved by a jury.
In Justice White’s words,
At least in cases in which “public rights” are being litigated—e.g., cases in
which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights
created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact—the Seventh
Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factﬁnding
function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the
jury would be incompatible.36

As shorthand for the category of “cases in which ‘public rights’ are being
litigated,”37 people soon started referring to “‘public rights’ cases.”38 To this
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 8–10(a), 84 Stat. 1590, 15981601; see also id. § 17(a)–(d), 84 Stat. at 1606 (establishing a maximum penalty of $1,000 per violation against
employers whose violations are not willful or repeated and who correct the violation in a timely fashion).
33 See id. §§ 10–11, 84 Stat. at 1601-03.
34 Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 72-6: Civil Monetary Penalties as a Sanction
(Dec. 14, 1972), as reprinted in 38 Fed. Reg. 19,792, 19,793 (July 23, 1973).
35 Id.
36 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450.
37 Id.
38 See Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault on
the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1978). This locution arguably traces back to the
following dictum in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856):
31
32

[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that
the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
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day, the Supreme Court continues to refer to “the ‘public rights’ category of
cases” when discussing doctrines about administrative adjudication.39
The problem with this way of talking is that the distinction between
public and private rights is a way of classifying legal interests, not entire cases.
In Atlas Roofing, for instance, public rights were indeed at stake on one side—
but because the government was imposing monetary sanctions, private
property rights were at stake on the other side. A case that pits public rights
against private rights is no more a “public rights case” than it is a “private
rights case,” and the idea that it must be classiﬁed as one or the other is bound
to make the traditional doctrine seem hopeless.40
To see the clunkiness of the modern vocabulary, consider the standard
criminal case. As leading commentators observe, “[c]riminal cases have always
been treated as ‘private rights’ cases, . . . and there seems to be no doubt that
an administrative agency may not directly impose criminal punishments.”41 But
criminal cases have the same structure as the dispute in Atlas Roofing: again,
public rights (represented by the prosecutor) are pitted against the defendant’s
rights to life, liberty, or property.42 It is arbitrary to call this structure a “private
rights case” in one context and a “public rights case” in the other.
The way out of this puzzle is to think more granularly about the legal
interests at stake in these cases, and about who is in charge of those interests.
If someone violates a federal criminal statute, Congress can surrender the
relevant public rights without going to court; Congress can simply repeal the
statute retroactively. By the same token, Congress can put prosecutors in the
executive branch in charge of whether to bring charges and whether to accept
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.
Id. at 284; see also id. (referring to “this class of cases”); cf. Nelson, supra note 2, at 586-90 (discussing
Murray’s Lessee). Still, references to “public rights cases” did not become popular among either judges
or commentators until modern times. In Westlaw’s database, the earliest judicial opinion to use that
phrase is Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 740 F.2d 1262, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated,
473 U.S. 922 (1985), reinstated on remand, 770 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
As a category for use in analyzing administrative adjudication, the phrase “cases involving ‘public
rights’” also made its debut after Atlas Roofing. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (plurality opinion); Peick v. Pension Beneﬁt Guar. Corp., 539 F.
Supp. 1025, 1061 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aﬀ ’d, 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983); Marshall v. Parking Place, Inc.,
No. 76-73, 1978 WL 1610, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 31, 1978).
39 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F.
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 353-58 (7th ed. 2015) (likewise describing differences between
the doctrines applicable to “public rights cases” and the doctrines applicable to “private rights cases”).
40 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 246-51 (1990) (concluding that the category of “public rights cases”
is “so manipulable” as to be “meaningless”).
41 FALLON ET AL., supra note 39, at 358.
42 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 605.
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a plea bargain on behalf of the public. Indeed, the Constitution itself
empowers the President to grant a pardon even after a defendant has been
convicted. But while the political branches are in charge of the public rights at
stake in a criminal prosecution, they cannot unilaterally dispose of the
defendant’s private rights. Just as Congress cannot itself make a binding
determination of guilt and authoritatively sentence a defendant to prison,43
neither can Congress authorize an agency in the executive branch to do so.
Under the framework that prevailed in the nineteenth century, the same would
have been true in cases like Atlas Roofing. While Congress could have denied
certain “privileges” to a defendant based on an administrative determination
of wrongdoing, the monetary penalties in Atlas Roofing operated against the
employer’s property rights and therefore would have required an opportunity
for proceedings in a true court—and the appellate-style review authorized by
Congress probably would not have been good enough.44
II. WHERE DO “FRANCHISES” FIT?
In my initial article describing the nineteenth-century framework, I
lumped so-called “franchises” together with “privileges.”45 Others have now
done the same.46 But while I stand by the rest of my taxonomy, my reference
to “franchises” was too casual. It is true that what nineteenth-century lawyers
called “franchises” were granted by the government, and legislatures had
broad discretion over whether to grant them and to whom; generally
speaking, no one had a vested right to obtain a franchise in the ﬁrst place. It
is also true that states and the federal government issued franchises to serve
public ends, and that franchises were subject to correspondingly more public
regulation than other enterprises. Once granted, though, many legal interests
that were called “franchises” could amount to vested rights under the
nineteenth-century framework.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting bills of attainder).
See Nelson, supra note 2, at 604 n.189 (arguing that Atlas Roofing misused precedents such as
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909)); id. at 602-05 (concluding that Atlas
Roofing “made signiﬁcant inroads upon the traditional framework,” though noting that those inroads
are limited in two ways: (1) Atlas Roofing does not apply to the standard criminal case in which life
or liberty is at stake and (2) even when public rights are pitted against vested property rights, Atlas
Roofing probably applies only where Congress has authorized appellate-style review in a true court).
45 Id. at 567.
46 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373-78 (2018);
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1246 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis
Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 171 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574
U.S. 318, 344 n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Harrison, supra note 12, at 184 (citing my article for
the proposition that “[i]n the nineteenth century system, franchises remained subject to modification by
the government that granted them, absent a genuine contract to the contrary”).
43
44
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A. “Franchises” in the English Legal Tradition and in Nineteenth-Century
America
In the English legal tradition, the term “franchise” was tied up with the
royal prerogative—a concept that defies easy summary but that embraced
various powers, immunities, and other perquisites belonging to the king.47
Some aspects of the prerogative were nondelegable (meaning that the king
could not confer them upon anyone else),48 but the king could give or sell others
to people of his choosing. The interests created by such royal grants were called
“franchises.” Thus, Blackstone defined a “franchise” as “a royal privilege, or
branch of the king’s prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject.”49
Elaborating on this definition in the 1790s, Stewart Kyd explained that “the
word ‘franchise’ means a royal privilege in the hands of a subject, by which he
either receives some profit, or has the exclusive exercise of some right.”50
Because the king’s prerogative covered myriad topics, Blackstone
observed that “[t]he kinds of [franchises] are various, and almost inﬁnite.”51
The word “franchise” derived from a French term for “liberty,”52 and it had
long been used to refer to diverse exemptions that the king could confer upon
a subject—such as exemptions from taxation, or from obligations of personal
47 The prerogative has been understood in different ways at different times. See W.S. Holdsworth,
The Prerogative in the Sixteenth Century, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 554-62 (1921) (observing that “[d]uring
the Tudor period . . . there was . . . a great development of legal doctrine as to the position of the king and
as to the nature and extent of his prerogative,” and summarizing some of the key ideas); see also Edward
Gerald Gingold, The Seventeenth Century Constitutional Crises: Causes and Consequences, 25 CHITTY’S L.J.
191, 191 (1977) (describing “the nature and limits of the royal prerogative” as “the central issue” in the crises
of the seventeenth century). For discussion of the prerogative as of the mid-eighteenth century, see 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *240 (subdividing the king’s prerogatives into “such as regard,
first, the king’s royal character; secondly, his royal authority; and, lastly, his royal income”); id. at *240-80
(covering the first two categories); id. at *281-337 (covering the third category); see also Julian Davis
Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1223-28
(2019) (summarizing Blackstone’s list of the varied powers and privileges that the king enjoyed under the
rubric of the prerogative). For discussion of the prerogative today, see generally GAIL BARTLETT &
MICHAEL EVERETT, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 03861: THE ROYAL
PREROGATIVE (2017), https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03861/SN03861.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GZQ-LDWF].
48 See Holdsworth, supra note 47, at 558-59.
49 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37. Henry Finch had provided essentially the
same deﬁnition a century and a half earlier. See HENRIE FINCH, NOMOTEXNIA 38b (London,
Society of Stationers 1613); see also JOSEPH ASBURY JOYCE, A TREATISE ON FRANCHISES 1-2
(1909) (noting that Finch’s deﬁnition was “adopted and followed substantially by Blackstone, Chitty,
and Cruise” (footnotes omitted)).
50 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 14 (London, J. Butterworth
1793); see also id. (noting that the word “franchise” was sometimes used in a broader sense to encompass
“every political right which can be enjoyed or exercised by a freeman,” including “the right of voting
at elections” and “the right of being tried by a jury,” but endorsing the narrower definition).
51 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37; accord FINCH, supra note 49, at 39a.
52 Franchise, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009); cf. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *37 (“Franchise and liberty are used as synonymous terms . . . .”).
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service, or from restrictions on hunting in the king’s forests.53 But the word
was also used to refer to more aﬃrmative rights and powers that the king
could grant, including the power to levy and collect certain types of taxes or
tolls54 and rights in property that otherwise would go to the king.55 Likewise,
Blackstone observed that “[i]t is . . . a franchise for a number of persons to
be incorporated, and subsist as a body politic, with a power to maintain
perpetual succession and do other corporate acts.”56
After the United States became independent, American lawyers continued
to use the word “franchise,” but they recast it to avoid references to the king’s
prerogative or to royal grants. Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in
1839, for instance, Chief Justice Roger Taney defined franchises as “special
privileges conferred by government upon individuals, and which do not belong
to the citizens of the country, generally, of common right.”57 He added: “It is
essential to the character of a franchise that it should be a grant from the
sovereign authority, and in this country no franchise can be held which is not
derived from a law of the state.”58 James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law
provided both a similar definition (“certain privileges conferred by grant from
government, and vested in individuals”) and a similar account of how
franchises were created (in the United States, “whoever claims an exclusive
privilege . . . must show a grant from the legislature”).59
Kent emphasized that many of the categories of franchises granted in
England had no relevance in the United States. In his words, “Corporations, or
bodies politic, are the most usual franchises known in our law.”60 But apart from
granting the franchise of corporate status, legislatures also conferred various
other special privileges upon individuals or entities that proposed to serve the
public in some respect. For instance, although private people normally were
53 See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 561-62 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 1895)
(discussing diﬀerent types of franchises that existed in the thirteenth century).
54 See id. at 562-63 (listing “[f]iscal powers” as another category of thirteenth-century
franchises). Early on, even the power to hold courts that would administer justice (and enable the
franchisee to collect fees and ﬁnes) was a type of “franchise” that the king might grant. See id. at
563-72; cf. Naomi D. Hurnard, The Anglo-Norman Franchises (pts. 1 & 2), 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 289,
433 (1949) (arguing that Maitland exaggerated the extent to which franchise courts were authorized
to hear serious criminal cases).
55 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37 (listing the rights to “waifs, wrecks,
estrays, treasure-trove, royal fish, forfeitures, and deodands” as “franchises” that the king might grant).
56 Id. But see 1 KYD, supra note 50, at 15 (arguing that under Kyd’s preferred deﬁnition, “a
corporation cannot be called a franchise” because the status of incorporation was not an estate or
inheritance that “may be granted and conveyed from one to another”).
57 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 595 (1839); see also JOYCE, supra note 49, at 5 (“This
definition has been extensively quoted or adopted and relied upon as an authority by the courts . . . .”).
58 Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 595.
59 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 366 (New York, O. Halsted 1828).
60 Id.
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not allowed to obstruct the public right of navigation along a river, a private
company might be granted the franchise of building and maintaining a bridge
over the river (and collecting a charge from users).61 On similar principles, the
government might grant private individuals or entities the franchise of
operating a ferry to transport members of the public across the river for a fee.62
Likewise, an early twentieth-century treatise about franchises observed that
utility companies might be authorized “to dig up the streets of a city or town”
and to lay water or gas lines for the purpose of supplying residents, and transit
companies might be authorized “to construct and operate a street railway.”63 In
Kent’s locution, all these grants were “franchises.”64
Admittedly, nineteenth-century courts and commentators used the word
“franchise” in various ways, and they did not always give it a clear deﬁnition.65
Still, the deﬁnitions oﬀered by Chief Justice Taney and Chancellor Kent
persisted throughout the century. Both judicial opinions and treatises deﬁned
a “franchise” as “a privilege or authority vested in certain persons by grant of
the sovereign . . . to exercise powers, or to do and perform acts which without
such grant they could not do or perform.”66
In contrast to powers that people could exercise simply as a matter of private
right, the privileges or authorities conferred by franchises were said to be “of a
public nature” in the sense that they “cannot be legally exercised without
legislative grant.”67 As a condition of receiving the grant, moreover, franchisees
often promised to perform “important duties of a public character.”68 As we shall
see, though, franchisees who were living up to their end of the bargain were
thought to enjoy private rights in their franchises. In the words of one court,

61 See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 451 (1837) (argument of counsel); JOYCE, supra note 49, at 43-44.
62 See JOYCE, supra note 49, at 45-46.
63 Id. at 41-43, 48-50.
64 See KENT, supra note 59, at 367 (“Special privileges conferred upon towns and individuals in a
variety of ways, and for numerous purposes, having a connexion with the public interest, are franchises.”).
65 See, e.g., Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217, 223 (1876) (“Much confusion of thought has arisen
in this case and in similar cases from attaching a vague and undeﬁned meaning to the term
‘franchises.’”); City of Bridgeport v. N.Y. & New Haven R.R. Co., 36 Conn. 255, 266 (1869) (“The
term ‘franchise’ has several signiﬁcations and there is some confusion in its use.”); City of Potwin
Place v. Topeka Ry. Co., 33 P. 309, 310 (Kan. 1893) (“The term ‘franchise’ seems to be used by the
courts with much laxity.”); see also JOYCE, supra note 49, at 1-14 (canvassing deﬁnitions).
66 Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe & James River R.R. Co., 38 Va. 42, 75-76 (1840); accord,
e.g., JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 181
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888).
67 State ex rel. Clapp v. Minn. Thresher Mfg. Co., 41 N.W. 1020, 1025 (Minn. 1889); accord, e.g.,
State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 599 (1844); People v. Trs. of Geneva Coll., 5 Wend. 211, 217
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); People ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 387 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818).
68 Calif. State Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co., 22 Cal. 398, 422 (1863), overruled in part on other grounds
by City of S.F. v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493 (1874).
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The grant of a franchise is in the nature of a vested right of property . . . . So
long as the grantee fulfills the conditions and performs the duties imposed upon
him by the terms of the grant, he has a vested right which cannot be taken away,
or otherwise impaired by the Government, any more than other property.69

B. Corporate Franchises
1. The Distinction Between Public and Private Corporations
As we consider where franchises ﬁt in doctrines about vested rights, we
can start with what Kent identiﬁed as the most common franchise known to
American law—the grant of corporate status. By the 1810s, the Supreme
Court had begun to articulate doctrines that shaped discussion of this topic
for the rest of the nineteenth century and beyond.
The process started in Terrett v. Taylor, where the Court (through Justice
Story) drew a sharp distinction between “public corporations” and “private
corporations.”70 Although both types of corporations owed their existence to
the legislature, Justice Story indicated that the doctrine of vested rights
treated them diﬀerently once they had been created. In Justice Story’s telling,
“public corporations which exist only for public purposes, such as counties,
towns, cities, &c.,” did not have vested rights in their charters; even after a
state legislature had created a public corporation, the legislature normally
could resume some or all of the political powers that the legislature had
initially granted.71 By contrast, “the principles of natural justice, . . . the
fundamental laws of every free government, . . . the spirit and the letter of
the constitution of the United States, and . . . the decisions of most
respectable judicial tribunals” all cut against the idea that the legislature could
unilaterally repeal the charter of a private corporation and direct the
disposition of the corporation’s property.72 Of course, the common law
recognized some grounds for the forfeiture of corporate charters; a private

Id.
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51-52 (1815).
See id. at 52. Although Story asserted that “the legislature may, under proper limitations,
have a right to change, modify, enlarge or restrain” public corporations, he suggested that the
legislature needed to “secur[e] . . . the property” held in the name of these corporations “for the
uses of those for whom and at whose expense it was originally purchased.” Id.; cf. HENDRIK
HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 17-18 (1983) (noting that although nineteenth-century
authors distinguished between the “political power” and the “property rights” that had been granted
to New York City, the city’s charter did not itself draw this distinction, and even the regulatory
powers granted by the charter arguably “came to the corporation as private property”).
72 See Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52.
69
70
71
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corporation could act in such a way as to lose its right to exist.73 But Justice
Story implied that legislatures could not authoritatively declare, by statute,
that such a forfeiture had occurred. Consistent with the idea that vested rights
were at stake, “a judicial judgment” was necessary.74
A few years later, the same concepts played central roles in the famous
Dartmouth College case.75 In 1769, the governor of the province of New
Hampshire (acting in the king’s name) had issued a charter establishing the
Trustees of Dartmouth College as a “body corporate and politic.”76 The charter
gave the Trustees various corporate powers, including the authority to select
successor trustees.77 In 1816, however, the New Hampshire state legislature
enacted statutes increasing the number of trustees by nine (who would be
appointed by the state’s governor and executive council) and requiring various
important decisions to be approved by a new board of overseers (filled mostly
with appointees of the governor and executive council).78 The old trustees
went to court to challenge the validity of these statutes.
The New Hampshire Superior Court, which upheld the statutes, began
its analysis by observing that “corporations may be divided into public and
private.”79 In the state court’s telling, for-proﬁt corporations that were
operated at least partly for the beneﬁt of private shareholders were private
corporations, and the franchises and property of such corporations could
amount to vested private rights.80 But the Trustees of Dartmouth College did
not ﬁt this template; its franchises were to be exercised for the purpose of
education (a “matter[] of public concern”), and the individual trustees who
were resisting the legislature’s changes lacked “any private interest in the
property of this institution.”81 For these and other reasons, the court
73 See id. at 51 (“A private corporation created by the legislature may loose its franchises by a
misuser or a nonuser of them . . . .”).
74 Id. (observing that a private corporation’s franchises “may be resumed by the government
under a judicial judgment upon a quo warranto to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture”).
75 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
76 See id. at 524 (statement of the case) (quoting the charter); JOHN M. SHIRLEY, THE
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 52-53
(Chicago, G.I. Jones 1895) (“The charter, in theory, was granted by George III., . . . but in fact it was
granted by John Wentworth, governor of the province, without the knowledge of the king or the
Home Office.”); cf. 1 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 7-29 (1917) (noting that during the colonial period, it was common for
corporations to be established “by grants from colonial proprietors, governors, or assemblies” rather
than “by letters patent issuing from the English crown,” and discussing the legal status of such grants).
77 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 532 (statement of the case).
78 See id. at 626 (opinion of the Court); see also id. at 539-49 (statement of the case) (quoting the
statutes); Richard W. Morin, Will to Resist: The Dartmouth College Case, DARTMOUTH ALUMNI MAG., April
1969, at 17, 19-26 (describing events leading up to the state’s attempt to reconstitute the board of trustees).
79 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 115 (1817).
80 See id. at 115-16.
81 Id. at 119.
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concluded that the Trustees of Dartmouth College should be regarded as a
public corporation.82 According to the court, moreover, nothing in either the
State or the Federal Constitution prevented the legislature from revising the
charter of such an entity. In the court’s words, “All public interests are proper
objects of legislation; and it is peculiarly the province of the legislature, to
determine by what laws those interests shall be regulated.”83
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Daniel Webster
(representing the old trustees) acknowledged that “[s]ome corporations are
for government and political arrangement,” and “[t]hese may be changed and
modiﬁed as public convenience may require” (assuming that property rights
were respected).84 According to Webster, though, the state court had deﬁned
this category of corporations too broadly. Rather than being a public
corporation that remained subject to legislative interference, Dartmouth
College was properly regarded as a private eleemosynary corporation—a
charity rather than a for-proﬁt entity, but one that had been established “for
the management of private property, according to the will of the donors,” and
one whose corporate franchises “are as inviolable as any vested rights of
property whatever.”85 In Webster’s words, “Whether the State will grant these
franchises, and under what conditions it will grant them, it decides for itself.
But when once granted, the constitution holds them to be sacred, till forfeited
for just cause.”86 In keeping with the general doctrine of vested rights,
moreover, Webster added that the legislature could not conclusively declare
such a forfeiture: “Corporate franchises can only be forfeited by trial and
judgment,” and a legislature that sought to rescind a franchise by statute
would be “assum[ing] to exercise a judicial power.”87
Of course, the Federal Constitution says little about separation of powers
at the state level—and while the Fifth Amendment forbids the federal
government to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without “due
process of law,”88 the Federal Constitution did not impose a similar restriction
on the states until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratiﬁed in 1868. At the
time of Dartmouth College, the primary restrictions on a state legislature’s
ability to abrogate vested private rights were found in state constitutions.
Webster argued at length that the statutes in question violated New
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 120-21.
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 562 (1819) (argument of
counsel) (giving as examples “cities, counties, and the towns in New England”).
85 See id. at 562-76.
86 Id. at 573.
87 Id. at 560, 579.
88 U.S. CONST. amend. V. On the longstanding connection between the idea of “due process of law”
and the separation of powers, see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation
of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012); see also Nelson, supra note 2, at 569 n.42 (citing additional sources).
82
83
84
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Hampshire’s constitution,89 but he conceded that the U.S. Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to reverse the state court’s judgment on that basis;
the “single question” was “whether these acts are repugnant to the
constitution of the United States.”90
On that topic, Webster pointed to the Contract Clause of the Federal
Constitution (which says that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts”91). In Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme Court had
already held that this clause prevents states from impairing a private person’s
rights not only under contracts with another private person, but also under
contracts with the state itself.92 Fletcher had also established that a grant
conferred by statute could sometimes give rise to such a contract—and if it
did, the Contract Clause would limit the state legislature’s power to repeal or
amend that statute.93 Admittedly, the contract at issue in Fletcher was the sort
of contract that could be made between purely private parties—a sales contract
about the transfer of land upon payment of the purchase price. But in the

See Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 577-88 (argument of counsel).
Id. at 557 (acknowledging “the limits which bound the jurisdiction of the Court in this case”);
see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (describing the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over cases from the state courts).
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
92 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-39 (1810).
93 In 1795, the legislature of the state of Georgia had enacted a statute selling four huge tracts
of public land to four private companies for a total of half a million dollars. See C. PETER
MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 7 (1966); Act of Jan. 7, 1795,
1794–1795 Ga. Laws 1. Technically speaking, the statute did not itself grant the land, but it directed
the governor to do so upon proof that the ﬁrst installment of the purchase price had been paid. See
id. at 3-6. The purchasers did indeed pay the money and the governor granted the land. Soon,
though, it emerged that the four companies had allowed legislators who supported the statute to buy
shares in the companies on favorable terms, and the state was engulfed in accusations of corruption.
See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT YAZOO LANDS SALE: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK
38-40 (2016). In 1796, after elections had “largely purged [the legislature] of those who had
succumbed to the bribes,” MAGRATH, supra, at 12, the new legislature enacted a statute purporting
to declare that the earlier statute was “null and void,” that all grants derived from it were also void,
and that the land described in the earlier statute belonged to the state. See Act of Feb. 13, 1796, 1796
Ga. Laws 1, 5; see also id. (providing for good measure that the enrolled version of the earlier statute
“shall . . . be publicly burnt, in order that no trace of so unconstitutional, vile and fraudulent a
transaction, other than the infamy attached to it by this law, shall remain in the public oﬃces
thereof ”); HOBSON, supra, at 53-54 (reporting that this ceremony occurred two days later). But in
Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme Court held that this new statute violated the Contract Clause. 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) at 136-39 (reasoning that the earlier statute amounted to a contract that was performed
when the governor granted the land, and the state legislature could not validly unwind the legal
eﬀect of that transaction). To be sure, a party to a conveyance sometimes could obtain rescission by
proving fraud in court (subject to the need to protect the rights of innocent third parties). See id. at
133. But the legislature could not simply enact a statute making its own ﬁndings of fraud and
authoritatively declaring that the land still belonged to the state.
89
90
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Dartmouth College case, Webster argued that a charter granting corporate
powers, when accepted, “is as much a contract as a grant of land.”94
Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall agreed that “[i]t can
require no argument to prove[] that the circumstances of this case constitute a
contract.”95 Marshall rattled off the circumstances that he had in mind:
An application is made to the crown for a charter to incorporate a religious
and literary institution. In the application, it is stated that large contributions
have been made for the object, which will be conferred on the corporation, as
soon as it shall be created. The charter is granted, and on its faith the property
is conveyed. Surely in this transaction every ingredient of a complete and
legitimate contract is to be found.96

Like Webster and Story, Marshall emphasized that the Contract Clause did
not prevent states from reorganizing “their [own] civil institutions, adopted
for internal government”97—the entities that Story had called “public
corporations.”98 In Marshall’s words,
If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it create a civil
institution to be employed in the administration of the government, or if the
funds of the college be public property, or if the State of New-Hampshire, as
a government, be alone interested in the transactions, the subject is one in
which the legislature of the State may act according to its own judgment,
unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the constitution of
the United States.99

According to Marshall, however, matters were different “if this be a private
eleemosynary institution.”100 Ultimately, the Supreme Court did indeed classify
the Trustees of Dartmouth College as private rather than public—with the result
that the Contract Clause prevented the state legislature from either repealing its
charter or making a “violent alteration in [the charter’s] essential terms.”101
Marshall’s opinion for the Court conﬁned itself to “the circumstances of
this case” and did not explicitly assert that the charters of all private
corporations amounted to contracts with the state. In an inﬂuential
Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 592 (argument of counsel) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 627 (Marshall, C.J.).
Id.; see also id. at 643-44 (“This is plainly a contract to which the donors, the trustees, and
the crown, (to whose rights and obligations New-Hampshire succeeds,) were the original parties.”).
97 Id. at 629.
98 Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (emphasis omitted); accord Dartmouth Coll.,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 668-69 (Story, J., concurring).
99 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629-30; see also id. at 638 (referring to the legislature’s
“right to change” these civil institutions, which were but “the instruments of government”).
100 Id. at 630.
101 Id. at 630-41, 651-54.
94
95
96
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concurring opinion, though, Justice Story appeared to take that position. To
be sure, Story thought that the government enjoyed ongoing control over
whatever public corporations it created.102 For purposes of this doctrine,
though, Story deﬁned the category of “public” corporations narrowly, to
include only those corporations whose “whole interests and franchises”
belonged exclusively to the government.103 Once the government had issued
a charter to a private corporation, moreover, Story thought it “perfectly clear”
that the legislature could not unilaterally abrogate the franchises that the
charter had granted. In Story’s words,
[A]ny act of a legislature which takes away any powers or franchises vested by
its charter in a private corporation or its corporate officers, or which restrains
or controls the legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other persons,
without its assent, is a violation of the obligations of that charter. If the
legislature mean to claim such an authority, it must be reserved in the grant.104

2. Was Justice Story Making Things Up?
Historians agree that at the time of these opinions, neither the distinction
between public and private corporations nor its constitutional signiﬁcance
was as well settled as Justice Story suggested.105 Indeed, Professor Morton
Horwitz has spoken of “the entirely novel separation between public and
private corporations in the Dartmouth College Case,” which Justice Story
allegedly promoted in order “to free the newly emerging business corporation
from the regulatory public law premises that had dominated the prior law of
corporations.”106 Other scholars, however, see the matter less starkly.107 I am
See id. at 671-72 (Story, J., concurring).
Id.; see also id. at 668-69 (“[S]trictly speaking, public corporations are such only as are founded
by the government for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government.”).
104 Id. at 712; see also id. at 700 (“In respect to corporate franchises, they are, properly speaking,
legal estates vested in the corporation itself as soon as it is in esse.”).
105 See, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine of “Public and Private Corporations”
and the Rise of the American Business Corporation, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 833-35 (1976). For some of
the initial work in this vein, see WARREN B. HUNTING, THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 72-75 (1919); The Dartmouth College Case, 8 AM.
L. REV. 189, 215-32 (1874).
106 Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
1425 (1982). But cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, at 112-13 (1977) (tracing the distinction to the ﬁrst decade of the nineteenth century).
107 See Newmyer, supra note 105, at 833 (“The distinction between public and private
corporations was not new with the Dartmouth College case; nor, contrary to the impression given by
Story’s concurring opinion, was it an established doctrine in American law.”); Joan Williams, The
Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 240 (1985)
(reviewing HARTOG, supra note 71) (noting that “the basic structure of Story’s categories derived
from New England traditions,” but arguing that “Story exaggerated both the immunity of private
corporations from sovereign power and the vulnerability of public corporations to that power”); cf.
102
103
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inclined to think that Story’s position was neither inevitable nor illegitimate:
it was not the only possible way of understanding the constitutional status of
corporate franchises, but it also did not conﬂict with a determinate original
meaning or a prior consensus.
a. The Concept of “Public” Corporations
As many commentators have observed, the taxonomies of corporations
found in leading English works of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries did not classify corporations according to whether they were public
or private.108 English authors contrasted corporations that consisted of just
one person at a time (“corporations sole”) with those that consisted of many
people (“corporations aggregate”), and they contrasted “ecclesiastical”
corporations with “lay” corporations.109 Within the category of lay
corporations, they distinguished “eleemosynary” corporations from other
corporations (which they called “civil” corporations).110 But their system of
classiﬁcation did not draw Story’s public/private distinction.
Some English cases did draw such a distinction for certain purposes.111
Story himself emphasized Philips v. Bury, where Lord Chief Justice Holt had
contrasted corporations “[f]or publick government” with those “[f]or private
charity.”112 As commentators have observed, though, Lord Holt’s opinion was
simply about judicial review of decisions made by the “visitor” of a college,113

Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1082, 1100 (1980) (observing
that “before the nineteenth century, there was no distinction in England or in America between
public and private corporations,” but adding that this distinction “was not purely a legal invention”
and “had been generally emerging since the American Revolution”).
108 See The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 216; accord, e.g., EDWIN MERRICK DODD,
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
MASSACHUSETTS 17-19 (1954); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business
Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 19-20 (1945); James J. Robbins, The Private Corporation: Its
Constitutional Genesis, 28 GEO. L.J. 165, 169 (1939).
109 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *469-70; see also The Dartmouth
College Case, supra note 105, at 216-17 (citing numerous English authors).
110 See The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 216-17 (noting this taxonomy in the works
of Blackstone, Kyd, Wooddeson, and Chitty, among others).
111 See, e.g., Cudden v. Estwick (1704) 90 Eng. Rep. 1138, 1139 (K.B.) (contrasting by-laws made
by “a private corporation or company,” which bind only “their own members,” with those made by
“a great city or borough,” which can also bind “strangers”).
112 (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 469, 470 (K.B.).
113 The Bishop of Exeter had removed the rector of a college over which the bishop was the
visitor. In Philips, Lord Holt opined that the courts could not second-guess the bishop’s decision;
because the college was a corporation for private charity rather than for public government, the
decision that there were grounds for removal lay within the visitor’s jurisdiction and could not be
collaterally attacked in the royal courts. See id. at 470-71; accord, e.g., Parkinson’s Case (1689) 90 Eng.
Rep. 393, 394 (K.B.) (Holt, C.J.).
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and the fact that a public/private distinction mattered to that topic did not
necessarily support Story’s broader conclusions.114
Of course, even if Story exaggerated the distinction between public and
private corporations, it need not follow that he was wrong about the
inviolability of corporate charters. According to Lieutenant Warren Hunting,
English authorities from the second half of the eighteenth century and the
ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century indicated that “as between the Crown and
the recipients of its grants of corporate powers, the charter became a private,
vested right.”115 As a historical matter, Lieutenant Hunting suggested, Story’s
position might simply have been too narrow: “[T]he very precedents [Story]
cited to prove that the charters of private corporations were regarded as
private property applied equally to public corporations.”116
Hunting focused speciﬁcally on the charters of England’s “boroughs”—
incorporated entities that wielded powers of local government. In Hunting’s
words, “the doctrines that the Crown could not interfere with a charter once
granted, and that charters were franchises, applied to borough charters as well
as to the charters of other kinds of corporations.”117 As various scholars have
explained, however, England’s boroughs were not easy to characterize as
public or private.118 They originated in feudal times, when control over land
went along with governmental powers,119 and they blended what Frederic
Maitland called “ownership” and “rulership.”120
114 See The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 220 (arguing that Lord Holt’s discussion
was “limited to the subject of visitation then under consideration”); see also HUNTING, supra note
105, at 74 (“We agree . . . with Mr. Hill that Phillips v. Bury does not warrant the conclusion which
Story drew from it . . . .”).
115 HUNTING, supra note 105, at 65. The idea that corporate charters were vested as against the
Crown did not protect them against abrogation by Parliament; given theories of parliamentary
supremacy, a statute abrogating a corporate charter presumably would have had legal eﬀect. Still,
such a statute might have been regarded as a breach of faith—and hence something that America’s
written constitutions might prevent legislatures from doing. See id. at 71 (acknowledging that “Kyd
and Blackstone did seem to consider it necessary to assert that corporations could be dissolved by
an act of Parliament,” but expressing uncertainty about whether they reached this conclusion simply
“by virtue of [Parliament’s] omnipotence”); cf. Frug, supra note 107, at 1094 (“At the time of the
American Revolution, . . . corporate liberty was protected against royal attack, but the extent of its
vulnerability if Parliament became hostile remained unresolved.”).
116 HUNTING, supra note 105, at 75.
117 Id.; cf. Frug, supra note 107, at 1092-94 (recounting Charles II’s successful attack on London’s
charter in the 1680s, but noting that “the immunity of corporate charters from royal abrogation was
reestablished” after the Glorious Revolution).
118 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal
Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 380 (1985) (“In the late middle ages . . . when the traditional set of
borough powers was deﬁned, no sharp distinction between public and private as yet existed.
Boroughs, therefore, exhibited a characteristically feudal mixture of public and private roles.”).
119 See id. at 374-80.
120 FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 11-12, 30-31 (Cambridge,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1898), quoted in Frug, supra note 107, at 1087 n.106; see also HUNTING, supra
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In colonial America, New York City had a written charter along the lines
of an English borough,121 and so did a few other municipalities.122 Professor
Hendrik Hartog (author of the leading modern work on this topic) notes that
New York City’s corporate charter gave the city a diverse array of legal
interests, including an exclusive ferry franchise, title to a great deal of land,
and “what might be seen as a hodgepodge of public governmental powers.”123
At ﬁrst, Professor Hartog reports, people would not have sought to classify
these interests as either public or private.124 Indeed, such classiﬁcation might
have been diﬃcult, because the corporation used its property rights as part of
a strategy of governance.125 By the early nineteenth century, though, that
technique was fading, and people had begun to contrast the city’s proprietary
rights with its governmental powers.126 Consistent with hints in Justice
Story’s concurring opinion in Dartmouth College,127 the 1840 edition of Kent’s
Commentaries indicated that while municipal corporations did not have vested
rights in their political powers, their property was diﬀerent: “Grants of
property and of franchises coupled with an interest, to public or political
corporations, are beyond legislative control, equally as in the case of the
property of private corporations.”128 In 1865, however, New York’s highest

note 105, at 83 (“[A]t the time of which we are speaking, society was based upon the feudal system.
The land was full of franchises. Political and proprietary rights were everywhere commingled, but
commingled in such a way that the proprietary side was by far the more conspicuous.”).
121 See HARTOG, supra note 71, at 14-19, 25-30 (tracing New York’s various charters, which
culminated in the Montgomerie Charter of 1730).
122 See 1 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 50-60 (concluding that roughly two dozen corporations of this
sort were created, of which “sixteen or seventeen survived until the Revolution”); cf. HARTOG, supra
note 71, at 22-23 (cautioning against treating these corporations as identical, and emphasizing that
charters contained distinctive grants and created different entities). More municipal charters were
issued after independence. See Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50
WM. & MARY Q. 51, 63 (1993). Still, the entities that they created did not necessarily have the same
status as England’s ancient boroughs. Cf. Alabama v. Mayor of Mobile, 5 Port. 279, 285-86 (Ala. 1837)
(argument of counsel) (arguing that the city of Mobile is a “public corporation” that is “under the
control and power of the State government,” and contrasting it with “some of the municipal authorities”
in Europe, which “have rights of great antiquity, and of a different nature from any in this State”).
123 HARTOG, supra note 71, at 15-17.
124 See id. at 18-20.
125 See id. at 50-54 (discussing the city’s practice of granting waterfront property to individuals
on condition that they build streets and the like).
126 See id. at 17-18; see also id. at 113-14 (inferring from property grants made by the city in the
early 1790s that “city leaders were learning to distinguish the public from the private self of the
corporation”); id. at 119 (“The legal signiﬁcance of the distinction discovered between the property
rights and the governmental powers of the corporation was ﬁrst explored in the case of Mayor v.
Scott, decided in 1804.”); cf. id. at 225-29 (discussing the evolution of that distinction in Bailey v.
Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)).
127 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
128 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *306 n.b (4th ed. 1840); see also
MURRAY HOFFMAN, A TREATISE UPON THE ESTATE AND RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION OF
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court rethought that idea and suggested that neither New York City nor other
municipal corporations had any vested rights against the state. In the words
of Chief Judge Hiram Denio, “[c]ity corporations are emanations of the
supreme law making power of the state,” and property held in their name “is
not thereby shielded from the control of the legislature.”129
While New York City was regarded as a hybrid well into the nineteenth
century, New England towns apparently were considered more purely public.
In Dartmouth College, when Daniel Webster argued that “the legislature has
more power over some [sorts of corporations] than over others,” he
speciﬁcally used “the towns in New England” as an example of the sort that
“may be changed and modiﬁed as public convenience may require.”130
Consistent with this argument, Professor Joan Williams has concluded that
“the bifurcation of corporations into public and private began in
Massachusetts substantially before the Supreme Court decided Dartmouth
College in 1819.”131 As early as 1792, the attorney general of Massachusetts
indicated that the legislature could not unilaterally repeal “an incorporation
to build a bridge, or to cut a canal,” but that “legislative acts . . . incorporating
towns and proprietors . . . may be repealed at pleasure.”132 Thus, history does
CITY OF NEW YORK, AS PROPRIETORS 45 (New York, McSpedon & Baker 1853) (asserting
that this proposition “admits of no dispute”); Frug, supra note 107, at 1104-05 (discussing this idea).
129 Darlington v. Mayor of New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 193 (1865) (concluding that property held in
the name of incorporated cities “is as essentially public property as that confided to the administration
of similar official agencies in counties and towns”); id. at 198-201 (repudiating the contrary intimations
in Bailey); cf. id. at 205 (reserving judgment about whether the state legislature could “divert[] the city
property to other public use than such as concerns the city, or its inhabitants”). But see Webb v. Mayor
of New York, 64 How. Pr. 10, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882) (“I perceive no difference between the tenure
of property thus held by the city and the proprietary rights of natural persons or private corporations.
This privilege, however, is peculiar in this state to the city of New York.”); cf. Comment, Municipal
Water Systems—Are They Public or Private Property of the City?, 13 YALE L.J. 196, 196-97 (1904) (noting
a split of authority across the United States on the question posed by the Comment’s title).
130 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 562 (1819) (argument of
counsel); cf. Frug, supra note 107, at 1096 (noting that in pre-revolutionary New England, “no city
[or town] possessed a corporate franchise”); Williams, supra note 118, at 417-31 (discussing the sense
in which Massachusetts towns were corporations).
131 Williams, supra note 118, at 429 n.375.
132 THE PATH TO RICHES 57 (Boston, P. Edes 1792). Attorney General James Sullivan wrote
this pamphlet to advocate repealing the charter of the Massachusetts Bank, which Sullivan grouped
with towns rather than bridge companies. See id.; cf. OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN,
COMMONWEALTH 100-01 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing the Massachusetts Bank, which had private
investors but was authorized to issue banknotes with the state’s name and seal). But see Art. 9,
7 MONTHLY ANTHOLOGY & BOSTON REV. 187, 191-92 (1809) (“[T]he Massachusetts bank [is]
beyond the control of the legislature . . . .”), cited in HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra, at 153 n.74.
In 1802, Sullivan expressed more uncertainty about the legislature’s power over the bank. Without
trying to predict what courts would say, he observed that “the public opinion is, and so far as I
understand it, always has been, (that is for eighteen years past) that the legislature cannot, at pleasure
dissolve corporations, possessing the priviledges indicated by the emblem of a common seal”—and
“[w]hether there has been an existing distinction in this opinion, between banks, and other corporations
THE
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not necessarily defeat Justice Story’s suggestion that neither the Contract
Clause nor the broader doctrine of vested rights protected what he called
“public” corporations against control by the state legislature.
b. Vested Rights and “Private” Corporations
For many modern critics, the problem with Justice Story’s position is not that
he gave public corporations too little protection, but rather that he gave private
corporations too much. According to one standard account, the reason
eighteenth-century English authors did not distinguish public corporations from
private corporations is that all corporations were regarded as public entities.133
That is true in some respects. Incorporation was not something that
private people could do entirely on their own; corporate status required a
“public grant.”134 What is more, “such a grant was regarded as a special
privilege to be extended only upon condition that the public interest would
thereby be promoted”; to receive the beneﬁt of incorporation, an entity
needed to serve some public purpose.135 In eighteenth-century England,
though, the Crown could not freely retract corporate charters after issuing
them, and the extent to which Parliament could legitimately abrogate such
charters was not clear.136 Thus, the public-regarding features of incorporation
were not necessarily inconsistent with the idea that corporate charters could
create vested private rights.

I do not know.” James Sullivan, Opinion of the Attorney General of Massachusetts, on the Life of the
Corporation, 1802, in HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra, app. D at 254, 258. Still, Sullivan continued to
suggest that the legislature could freely dissolve towns. See id. at 257 (“Towns in England, as well as
here, are corporations for certain purposes; but they have no common seal. In this State, towns and
parishes have been created, altered[,] changed, and dissolved, at the pleasure of the legislature.”).
In the 1820s, a dictum in an opinion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appeared
to deny the legislature’s power to dissolve a town without its consent. See Waldron v. Lee, 22 Mass.
(5 Pick.) 323, 335 (1827). Later in the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Judicial Court
regarded this power as completely settled. See Weymouth & Braintree Fire Dist. v. Cnty. Comm’rs
of Norfolk, 108 Mass. 142, 144-45 (1871); see also Town of E. Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S.
(10 How.) 511, 534 (1851) (holding that even after a ferry franchise had been granted to a town, the
Contract Clause did not prevent the state legislature from modifying or abrogating it, because “the
towns[,] being mere organizations for public purposes, were liable to have their public powers, rights,
and duties modiﬁed or abolished at any moment by the legislature”).
133 For a full-throated articulation of this view, see Robbins, supra note 108; cf. Hendrik Hartog,
Because All the World Was Not New York City: Governance, Property Rights, and the State in the Changing
Definition of a Corporation, 1730–1860, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 91, 91-92 (1979) (referring to the “standard”
view that “[u]ntil the early years of the 19th century, . . . all corporations were public institutions,”
though suggesting that this view is too simplistic and warning that “we do not know what it meant
to be deﬁned as a ‘public’ corporation in 18th century America”).
134 Robbins, supra note 108, at 170.
135 Id.
136 See Frug, supra note 107, at 1094.
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In any event, using English conceptions of the corporation to draw
conclusions about American conceptions is potentially hazardous. What
modern lawyers think of as the paradigmatic private corporation—the profitseeking business corporation—was not common in eighteenth-century
England. In Professor Pauline Maier’s words, “The British . . . virtually ceased
to develop the corporation for business or profit-seeking purposes between
the passage of the Bubble Act in 1720 and its repeal 105 years later . . . .”137
That was true in colonial America too,138 but it ceased to be true soon after
independence.139 In the 1780s, states issued twenty-eight charters to business
corporations,140 and the pace accelerated dramatically in the 1790s141 and

137 Maier, supra note 122, at 51. To be sure, business corporations had existed in England for
centuries. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 39 (2000) (“In the second half of the sixteenth century
and during the seventeenth century, the corporation . . . increasingly began to be used . . . for proﬁtoriented organization of business.”); id. at 45 (“The ﬁrst two decades of the seventeenth century can
probably be characterized as the heyday of the initial age of the history of the business
corporation.”). Even before the era of the Bubble Act, though, “the corporation went through a long
decline.” Id. at 290; see also id. at 81 (“The Bubble Act was not as well deﬁned a turning point as
many have argued . . . .”). While some very well-known companies—including the East India
Company and the Bank of England—operated in the corporate form throughout the eighteenth
century, and while new corporations were also created, the corporation did not become the leading
form of business organization in England until the mid-nineteenth century. See Handlin & Handlin,
supra note 108, at 3 (“Throughout the whole of the eighteenth century England chartered some halfdozen corporations for manufacturing purposes, and hardly more in any other business sphere. Until
well into the nineteenth century the corporation was used extensively only in the organization of
canal companies.”); see also HARRIS, supra, at 33 n.27 (“Business corporations were mentioned only
brieﬂy in the major eighteenth-century treatise on corporations, written [by Stewart Kyd] in 1793–
1794 . . . .”); cf. id. at 53 (noting the early rise of the East India Company and the Bank of England);
id. at 95-100 (discussing the canal corporations of the 1760s and beyond). Ron Harris summarizes
the situation in England this way: “The business corporation originated in the sixteenth century,
acquired most of its features during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and gained gradual
legal recognition in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century to become a major phenomenon in the
economy by the late nineteenth century . . . .” Id. at 289-90.
138 See 1 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 48 (noting that “more than a dozen corporations” with charters
granted in England had conducted operations in colonial America, and “[t]he large majority were
dominated by business motives,” but “none of th[ose] business corporations had a continuous active
existence of more than a score of years”); id. at 87 (“Business corporations which were colonial both
in origin and in activity were few, and on the whole of no great importance.”).
139 See Maier, supra note 122, at 51-52.
140 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 22 (presenting a state-by-state, year-by-year tabulation). In
addition to the charters issued by states, Congress also issued one charter (to the Bank of North
America). See id. at 30. As Davis notes, some entities (including the Bank of North America)
received charters from multiple states. See id. at 22, 30 (indicating that 22 distinct business
corporations were created during the 1780s).
141 See id. at 22-23 (indicating that states issued 259 charters to business corporations in the
1790s, and Congress issued one more); cf. id. at 17-18 (noting that Massachusetts enacted a general
incorporation statute for aqueduct companies in 1799, and Davis’s tables do not reﬂect whatever
companies organized themselves under this statute).
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beyond.142 With only slight exaggeration, Professor Kent Newmyer asserts
that “[t]he business corporation was the unique creation of American
lawmakers during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries . . . .”143
In the 1780s, the two states that issued the most charters to business
corporations were Virginia and Massachusetts.144 In the 1790s, Massachusetts
surged into the undisputed lead, and other New England states also issued
many such charters.145 Perhaps because of growing familiarity with business
corporations,146 lawyers alluded to a distinction between public corporations
and private corporations in two cases involving Virginia in 1801 and 1802,147
and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is said to have acted upon
that distinction later in the same decade.148
Admittedly, even business corporations were connected to public needs;
state legislatures incorporated entities to serve speciﬁc public purposes, not
to conduct business in general.149 But the idea that incorporation was granted
142 See DODD, supra note 108, at 11 (“The chartering process went on even more rapidly after
the turn of the century[.] . . . [B]y 1830 the New England states alone had created nearly 1900
business corporations . . . .”).
143 R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
246 (2001); see also JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 35 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832) (“In no country
have corporations been multiplied to so great an extent, as in our own . . . .”); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1780–1970, at 8 (1970) (“[W]hen we began making important use of the corporation for
business in the United States from about 1780, there was little relevant legal experience on which to
draw. For 100 years, we proceeded to use the corporate instrument on a scale unmatched in England.”).
144 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 22.
145 See id. at 22-23 (indicating that the states that issued the most charters to business
corporations in the 1790s were Massachusetts [47], Connecticut [33], and New Hampshire [29]); see
also Maier, supra note 122, at 53 (“Although the immediate post-Revolutionary surge in
incorporations was not conﬁned to any one region—Virginia, for example, chartered several
important corporations for the development of inland navigation in the 1780s—New England, and
above all Massachusetts, soon led the nation in creating corporations.”).
146 Cf. HORWITZ, supra note 106, at 112 (“The distinction between public and private corporations,
so prominent in Justice Story’s concurring opinion [in Dartmouth College], was above all a response to the
dramatic growth in the number of business corporations during the previous generation.”).
147 See Virginia v. Howard, 28 F. Cas. 1224, 1225 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 16,963) (argument of
counsel) (contending, unsuccessfully, that a defendant could be criminally prosecuted for keeping a
slaughterhouse in violation of a by-law of the corporation of Alexandria, and observing in this
context that “[t]here is a diﬀerence between private and public corporations”); United States v. Bank
of Alexandria, 24 F. Cas. 982, 983 (C.C.D.C. 1801) (No. 14,514) (argument of counsel) (noting that
“[t]here are public corporations and private corporations,” and arguing unsuccessfully that
mandamus should not lie against the oﬃcers and directors of a private corporation).
148 See Dale A. Oesterle, Formative Contributions to American Corporate Law by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court from 1806 to 1810, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, 1692–1992, at 136-40 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992); Williams, supra
note 107, at 233. As Professor Williams notes, other New England courts also drew this distinction
before the federal Supreme Court did so in Dartmouth College. See id. at 233-34.
149 Professor Hurst reports:
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in consideration of beneﬁts to the public coexisted with the idea that
corporate charters could create vested private rights. Thus, in an 1806 case
involving a company that had been incorporated to build a turnpike (with a
right to collect tolls), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts famously
observed that “the rights legally vested in this, or in any corporation, cannot
be controuled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that
purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation.”150 If
anything, the fact that states granted corporate status as part of an
arrangement to beneﬁt the public may have contributed to the view that
corporate charters amounted to contractual bargains between the public and
the incorporators—an essential premise of the idea that such charters could
trigger the protections of the Contract Clause.151
Indeed, a prominent eighteenth-century lawyer (and future Supreme
Court Justice) made statements along these lines about the very first business
corporation created in the United States after independence—the Bank of
North America, chartered by Congress in 1781 and by three states in 1782.152 In
1785, when the Pennsylvania legislature was considering a bill to repeal the
charter that it had issued to the bank three years earlier, James Wilson
protested that the legislature “surely” did not have “the same discretionary

Of the 317 separate-enterprise special charters enacted from 1780 to 1801 in the states,
nearly two-thirds were for enterprises concerned with transport (inland navigation,
turnpikes, toll bridges); another 20 per cent were for banks or insurance companies;
10 per cent were for the provision of local public services (mostly water supply); less
than 4 per cent were for general business corporations.
HURST, supra note 143, at 17; see also Maier, supra note 122, at 80 (observing that well into the
nineteenth century, it was assumed that “even ‘private’ corporations had to serve a public function”).
150 Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 143, 146 (1806).
151 See Bruce A. Campbell, John Marshall, the Virginia Political Economy, and the Dartmouth
College Decision, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 40, 43, 61-63 (1975) (using language in Virginia’s
constitution and in charters issued by the Virginia legislature to argue that “in Virginia the charter
represented a bargain between the public and the corporation’s sponsors,” and suggesting that this
view informed Chief Justice Marshall’s position in Dartmouth College).
A leading book asserts that in Massachusetts, “[t]he application of the contract conception to
the relations between state and corporation seemed, as late as 1812, ‘too fanciful to need any
observation.’” HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 132, at 155 (quoting Brown v. Penobscot Bank, 8
Mass. (7 Tyng) 445, 448 (1812) (argument of counsel)). In context, though, the lawyer quoted in this
passage may simply have been denying that the state had made the particular contractual agreement
that the Penobscot Bank claimed, to the eﬀect that the bank would never face special legal penalties
for failing to pay its note-holders on time.
152 For detailed discussion of the bank and the controversies that enveloped it, see Joseph H.
Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate Governance, and Social
Responsibility, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1019-21, 1046-76 (2001). For good summaries, see 2 DAVIS,
supra note 76, at 30, 36-44, and Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, and the Problem of
Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 136-41 (2012).
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power of repeal” with respect to every type of statute.153 Wilson acknowledged
that as “the Representatives of the community,” legislators could be trusted
with the power to repeal “a law respecting the rights and properties of all the
citizens of the state.”154 But that was not true of some other kinds of laws,
including “[a] law to vest or confirm an estate in an individual” and “a law to
incorporate a congregation or other society.”155 Wilson explained that the act
chartering the bank had created a new party with interests distinct from those
of the community, and “[r]ules of justice, of faith, and of honor” needed to be
observed between them.156 Foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s conclusion in
Dartmouth College, Wilson suggested that the statute incorporating the bank
should “be considered as a compact” that the legislature either could not or at
least should not abrogate.157
Thomas Paine was even more explicit. In a pamphlet published in 1786,
he observed that “[t]he charter of the Bank, or what is the same thing, the Act
for incorporating it, is to all intents and purposes an Act of Negociation and
Contract, entered into, and conﬁrmed, between the State on one part, and
certain persons mentioned therein on the other part.”158 According to Paine,
such “a Contract, or a joint Act,” was “an Act of a diﬀerent kind” than “a law
or Act of legislation,” because the legislature could not unilaterally repeal it.159
Likewise, while “[t]he Bank may forfeit the charter by delinquency,” the
legislature could not simply decree or declare such a forfeiture; instead, “the
delinquency must be proved and established by a legal process in a court of
justice and trial by jury . . . .”160
At least at ﬁrst, the arguments advanced by Wilson and Paine did not
carry the day; the Pennsylvania legislature repealed the bank’s charter in

153 CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH-AMERICA 16 (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers
1785); see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 9 (2016)
(noting Wilson’s authorship of this “widely circulated pamphlet”).
154 CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH-AMERICA, supra note 153, at 16.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 17.
158 THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON GOVERNMENT, THE AFFAIRS OF THE BANK, AND
PAPER-MONEY 16 (Philadelphia, Charles Cist 1786).
159 See id. Thirty years later, Rep. John Sergeant of Pennsylvania took a similar point for granted
during debates about the bill to charter the second Bank of the United States. Rep. Sergeant urged his
colleagues to think carefully, because the bill “was not . . . an ordinary act of legislation which Congress
might at their pleasure repeal.” 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1075 (1816). By its terms, the charter would last
for twenty years, and “there would be no power within that period to repeal it.” Id.; see also Aditya
Bamzai, Tenure of Office and the Treasury: The Constitution and Control over National Financial Policy, 1787
to 1867, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1299, 1355 (2019) (noting these statements as evidence that the bank
was considered a private entity). In a subsequent speech, Rep. Sergeant indicated that “[t]his is a
settled, established principle . . . and almost universally conceded.” 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1385 (1819).
160 PAINE, supra note 158, at 16.
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1785.161 But the legislature reissued a charter to the bank in 1787,162 and
Professor William Ewald portrays that decision as a vindication of Wilson’s
position.163 In a forthcoming article, moreover, Dean William Treanor links
this episode to the wording of the Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause.164
The Clause’s precursor in the Northwest Ordinance had protected only
“private contracts or engagements” (which might not include contracts with
the government), but the Committee of Style omitted this qualiﬁcation when
it inserted the Contract Clause into the draft Constitution.165 Dean Treanor
is inclined to attribute this choice to the Committee’s draftsman, Gouverneur
Morris, who had addressed the Pennsylvania legislature on behalf of the bank
in 1785 and (like Wilson and Paine) had suggested that the bank enjoyed
vested rights in its charter.166
To their credit, some of the leading twentieth-century commentators who
questioned the legal basis for Justice Story’s opinion in Dartmouth College
acknowledged that Wilson and Paine took a similar position in the 1780s.167
But another episode from the Founding era has attracted less attention.168 In
the 1750s, the proprietors of the Province of Pennsylvania had issued a charter
to the Trustees of the College, Academy and Charitable School of
Philadelphia.169 In 1779, the state legislature enacted a statute modifying the

161 Act of Sept. 13, 1785, ch. 1178, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 57 (1906).
162 Act of Mar. 17, 1787, ch. 1278, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,

supra note 161, at 412.
163 See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
901, 909 (2008) (describing Wilson’s arguments as “ultimately successful”).
164 William M. Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener: Gouverneur Morris and the Creation
of the Federalist Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 69-74),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383183 (draft of Dec. 1, 2020).
165 See id. (manuscript at 69, 71).
166 See id. (manuscript at 12-16) (discussing Morris’s drafting role); id. (manuscript at 70-71)
(suggesting that Morris intentionally adopted wording that could be interpreted to cover corporate
charters, even though other delegates to the Philadelphia Convention may not have recognized this
choice); id. (manuscript at 36) (noting Morris’s prior address defending the bank); see also Ewald, supra
note 163, at 909-10 (emphasizing James Wilson rather than Gouverneur Morris, but likewise concluding
that “[t]he Contracts Clause in the Constitution was an outgrowth of the arguments about Pennsylvania’s
authority to breach its own charter”); cf. ELY, supra note 153, at 10 (reporting Professor Ewald’s conclusion,
though not necessarily endorsing it).
167 See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
17-18 (1938); Handlin & Handlin, supra note 108, at 19.
168 Of course, I am not the only person to describe it. See, e.g., Speir, supra note 152, at 130-33. A
detailed account appears in Edward Potts Cheyney, A History of the University of Pennsylvania, in 1
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA: ITS HISTORY, INFLUENCE, EQUIPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS
44, 80-97 (Joshua L. Chamberlain ed., 1901).
169 ADDITIONAL CHARTER OF THE COLLEGE, ACADEMY, AND CHARITY-SCHOOL OF
PHILADELPHIA, IN PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, B. Franklin & D. Hall 1755).
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charter and converting the school into a university.170 For the next few years,
William Smith—the ousted provost of the school—ﬁled repeated petitions
with the state legislature protesting this statute.171 In 1783–1784, Smith and
others also lodged memorials with the state’s Council of Censors,172 which
was charged with “enquir[ing] whether the [state] constitution ha[d] been
preserved inviolate” during the previous seven years.173 Although a
committee of the Council agreed that the 1779 statute had been
unconstitutional, a majority of the full Council voted to strike this portion of
the committee’s report.174 Later in 1784, however, Smith ﬁled another petition
with the state legislature, which was poised to repudiate the prior statute until
the minority party ﬂed and deprived the legislature of a quorum.175
Smith renewed his petition in 1788 and also published it as a pamphlet.176
As part of his argument, Smith observed that “[c]olleges and other like
corporations are . . . of two sorts.”177 Some were “constituted for public
government, and endowed by the public.”178 But others, “which . . . are called
private corporations,” were “constituted by private persons and for charities
speciﬁed in the act of foundation.”179 Smith maintained that once such a
private corporation was established, “the state cannot change, alter or abridge
any of the laws, rules, orders or privileges of the FOUNDERS,” let alone
“disseize the founders of the whole franchises and estates . . . and, dissolving the
former body, create a new one upon its ruins!”180 This time, the legislature
170 Act of Nov. 27, 1779, ch. 871, reprinted in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
supra note 161, at 23.
171 See Cheyney, supra note 168, at 92-93 (chronicling Smith’s petitions).
172 See JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS 15, 95-96, 129 (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 1784).
173 PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 47.
174 See Cheyney, supra note 168, at 93 (noting that the vote was 13 to 9). Some of the majority’s
reasons were specific to the old school and its conduct. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL OF
CENSORS, supra note 172, at 130 (arguing that the old corporation had lost a quorum and had become
incapable of exercising its essential functions “long before this act of Assembly was made”); id. at 131
(arguing that a by-law adopted in 1764 was contrary to the existing charters and “amount[ed] to a
forfeiture of the said charters”). More broadly, though, the majority suggested that because “corporations
. . . are the creatures of society,” they could not “plead any exemption from legislature regulation.” Id. at
131-32 (rejecting the “absurdity” that one session of the General Assembly “can enact a law that no
succeeding General Assembly can alter, amend or repeal, without the consent of the corporators”).
175 See Cheyney, supra note 168, at 94-95.
176 WILLIAM SMITH, AN ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN
THE CASE OF THE VIOLATED CHARTER, OF THE COLLEGE, ACADEMY AND CHARITABLE
SCHOOL OF PHILADELPHIA (Philadelphia, R. Aitken & Son 1788).
177 Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 5-6. In describing the 1779 statute as an “open violation of the constitution of this
commonwealth,” Smith invoked a speciﬁc provision preserving “the privileges, immunities and
estates” of “all religious societies[] or bodies of men heretofore united or incorporated for the
advancement of religion and learning, [or for] other pious and charitable purposes.” Id. at 3-4
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agreed. In March 1789, the legislature declared that the 1779 statute had been
“repugnant to justice, a violation of the constitution of this commonwealth
and dangerous in its precedent to all incorporated bodies and to the rights
and franchises thereof.”181 Without abolishing the university that had been
created in 1779, the legislature reanimated the old school and restored its
charter.182 Two years later, the two entities were merged (with their consent)
to form the University of Pennsylvania.183
The back-and-forth in Pennsylvania over the Bank of North America and
the Philadelphia academy suggests that at the time of the Founding, there was
not a consensus about the constitutional status of corporate charters. Still,
both the distinction between public and private corporations and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Contract Clause in Dartmouth College
have more historical support than is often suggested. In keeping with that
fact, Professor Stephen Siegel reports that the Dartmouth College decision was
not particularly controversial in its day.184
In any event, to the extent that the signiﬁcance of the public/private
distinction in this context had not been settled before 1819, Dartmouth College
helped to settle it. In ensuing decades, courts repeatedly held that the charters
of public corporations did not amount to contracts and could be revoked or
altered by statute,185 but that the charters of private corporations were
diﬀerent. Writing in 1838, indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court declared that
“[n]o proposition is more thoroughly established, than that the franchises of
a corporation can not be forfeited without a judgment either on scire facias or

(emphasis omitted) (quoting PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 45). But Smith argued that the 1779
statute was “equally repugnant to common justice.” Id. at 31.
181 Act of Mar. 6, 1789, ch. 1393, reprinted in 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
supra note 161, at 187, 188-89 (explaining that the 1779 statute, “without trial by jury, legal process or
proof of misuser or forfeiture,” had deprived the trustees, the corporation, the teachers, and others
of their “charters, franchises and estates”).
182 Id. at 189-92.
183 Cheyney, supra note 168, at 100.
184 Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1986). But
cf. THOMAS EARLE, THE RIGHT OF STATES TO ALTER AND ANNUL CHARTERS, CONSIDERED,
AND THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES THEREON, EXAMINED
11-18 (Philadelphia, Carey & Lea et al. 1823) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions on this
topic “have been erroneous” and that “[w]e, who assert this erroneousness, . . . are supported by the
judges of several state courts”).
185 See, e.g., Coyle v. Gray, 30 A. 728, 731 (Del. 1884) (“The corporation of the city of
Wilmington . . . is merely an agency instituted by the state for the purpose of carrying out in detail
the objects of government. . . . It has no vested powers or franchises. Its charter . . . is in no sense a
contract with the state.”); Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio 427, 432 (1831) (“In this respect there
seems to be a well settled distinction between private and public corporations. . . . [A] public
corporation, created for the purposes of government, cannot be considered as a contract.”).
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quo warranto” (that is, judicial proceedings to determine whether a recognized
ground for forfeiture had occurred).186
That proposition survived even after methods of incorporation changed
dramatically. Early on, legislatures had almost always created business
corporations on a case-by-case basis: a state legislature (or occasionally
Congress) would enact a “special act” naming the entity, establishing it as a
corporate body, and either listing its powers and obligations or referring to a
standard list found in another statute.187 The fact that the state was issuing a
charter to one particular corporation, and that the state was trying to
encourage that corporation to perform functions that would beneﬁt the
public, may have made it easier to think of the arrangement as contractual.188
But that way of thinking persisted even after states started enacting “general”
incorporation acts that allowed entrepreneurs to organize business
corporations without special permission from the legislature.189 As the
Supreme Court subsequently conﬁrmed, the incorporators’ acceptance of the
terms oﬀered by the state could still create a contract (and the franchises
granted thereby could still be vested rights) even if the state made the same
terms available to other would-be incorporators.190
186 Webb v. Moler, 8 Ohio 548, 552 (1838); see also, e.g., Del. R.R. Tax, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206,
225 (1874) (“That the charter of a private corporation is a contract between the State and the
corporators, and within the provision of the Constitution prohibiting legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts, has been the settled law of this court since the decision in the Dartmouth
College case.”); Mayor of Mobile v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 570, 578 (1875) (observing that this
doctrine is “settled beyond controversy, by judicial decision,” though criticizing its consequences);
Stephens v. Marshall, 3 Pin. 203, 207-08 (Wis. 1851) (“The power of the legislature to abrogate grants
or franchises, after private rights have become established under them, has not been asserted since
the Dartmouth College Case. The general principle is settled by authority.”).
The Ohio Supreme Court’s acceptance of this doctrine did not last. See infra notes 255–85 and
accompanying text (discussing the Ohio Supreme Court’s resistance in the 1850s).
187 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 16-17; DODD, supra note 108, at 417 n.28.
188 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
189 On the spread of general incorporation acts, see Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to
General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 101-04
(1999) (noting that the trend began in the late 1830s and that such acts became common in the ensuing
decades). There are isolated examples of general incorporation acts for certain types of business
corporations before the 1830s, but not many. See DODD, supra note 108, at 417 n.28 (observing that
“the earliest American general incorporation act for business enterprises would seem to be the
Massachusetts general Aqueduct Act of 1799,” and “[t]he earliest general act of real importance is the
New York Manufacturing Corporations Act of 1811”); cf. 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 16-17 (noting earlier
examples of general incorporation acts for religious or eleemosynary purposes).
The spread of general incorporation laws caused some commentators to doubt that
incorporation should still be called a “franchise.” See, e.g., 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 884 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1886) (noting
that what once had required “a gift of a special privilege” was now available to all).
190 See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 161 (1877); Miller v.
State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478, 488, 492 (1873); see also Capital City Gaslight Co. v. City of Des
Moines, 72 F. 829, 831-32 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1896) (“Whether a charter is given directly, by act of the
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3. Some Early Qualiﬁcations
Of course, even if the charters that state legislatures granted to private
corporations amounted to contracts, the legislatures could determine the
wording of the charters that they granted, and hence the terms of the deal. In
the late eighteenth century, some acts of incorporation passed by the
Connecticut legislature included a clause specifying that the legislature could
repeal or amend the act at will.191 In 1806, when the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts observed that acts of incorporation could give rise to vested
rights, the court acknowledged the potential eﬀectiveness of such clauses; as
the court put it, “the rights legally vested . . . in any corporation[] cannot be
controuled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that
purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation.”192 Justice Story’s
concurring opinion in Dartmouth College both praised this statement as a
matter of general law and recognized the same exception under the Contract
Clause. If Dartmouth’s charter had included a reservation clause, Justice
Story indicated, the Contract Clause would not have prevented the state from
exercising the powers that had been reserved, because that possibility would
have been built into the contract all along.193
After Dartmouth College, state legislatures often preserved their flexibility
by including broad reservation clauses in the acts of incorporation that they
passed.194 Indeed, the Delaware Constitution of 1831 required every new act of
legislative body, or whether articles of incorporation or association are adopted under general
statutes theretofore enacted by such legislative body, is not material on this point.”).
191 See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the Norwich Bank § 7 (1796), reprinted in 1 RESOLVES AND
PRIVATE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO THE YEAR 1836, at
131, 133 (Hartford 1837) (“[T]his act or any part thereof may be altered or repealed at the pleasure of
the general assembly.”); 2 DAVIS, supra note 76, at 316 & n.2 (citing this and other examples); id. at
315-16 (noting that a similar reservation appeared in a 1789 statute incorporating the Director,
Inspectors, and Company of Connecticut Silk Manufacturers); see also Bruce A. Campbell,
Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The Formation of Constitutional Policy, 70 KY. L.J. 643,
701 (1982) (noting that “[i]n England, the Crown regularly inserted reservation clauses in corporate
charters,” and early American legislatures may have been “following England’s lead” in this respect).
192 Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 143, 146 (1806) (emphasis added).
193 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 708 (1819) (Story, J.,
concurring) (citing the relevant passage from Wales); id. at 712 (“If the legislature mean to claim
such an authority, it must be reserved in the grant. The charter of Dartmouth College contains no
such reservation; and . . . therefore . . . the acts of the legislature of New-Hampshire, now in
question, do impair the obligations of that charter, and are, consequently, unconstitutional . . . .”);
see also Siegel, supra note 184, at 33 (“So clearly was [the signiﬁcance of reservations] a corollary of
contract notions, that the reserve clause doctrine made its appearance in the very same opinions . . .
that ﬁrst declared that state-granted franchises were protected by the contract clause.”).
194 See Siegel, supra note 184, at 33 n.153 (noting that Chancellor Kent described such clauses as
having become common in “all the recent acts of incorporations” (quoting 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 246 (New York, O. Halsted 1827))); see also ELY, supra note 153,
at 39 (reporting that within weeks after the Supreme Court decided Dartmouth College, a newspaper in
Kentucky urged the state legislature to include a reservation clause in all subsequent charters).
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incorporation to include “a reserved power of revocation by the legislature.”195
Once states started enacting general incorporation acts, moreover, those acts
often included global reservation clauses, applicable to all corporations created
under the acts.196 A number of state constitutions similarly reserved the power
to alter acts of incorporation,197 and the Supreme Court ultimately held that
such constitutional reservations were as effective as reservations in individual
acts of incorporation.198 Going forward, the widespread use of reservation
provisions limited the practical effect of the Dartmouth College doctrine.199
So did the rule of construction that the Supreme Court announced in the
famous Charles River Bridge case.200 There, the Court held that a statute
incorporating a company to build and maintain a bridge, and authorizing the
company to collect tolls at speciﬁed rates for the purpose of defraying its
expenses, did not impliedly promise that the state would never cause a free
bridge to be constructed in the same vicinity. More generally, the Court
agreed with a recent English opinion that although an act of incorporation
could amount to a contract between the state and the incorporators, “any
ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers,
and in favour of the public, and the [incorporators] can claim nothing that is
not clearly given them by the act.”201 Even with respect to old charters that
did not include reservation clauses, this rule of construction cut back on the
scope of the private rights that charters were understood to confer and that
the Contract Clause protected against abrogation.202

DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 17.
See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 60 (“[I]t became the rule rather than the exception to
avoid the restrictions imposed by [Dartmouth College and related decisions] through the adoption of
reservation clauses in general incorporation statutes and constitutional provisions.”); see also, e.g.,
Act of June 10, 1837, ch. 63, § 23, 1837 Conn. Laws 49, 53 (“[T]he General Assembly may at any time,
for just cause, rescind the powers of any corporation, created pursuant to the provisions of this
act . . . .”); cf. N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 1, ch. 18, tit. 3, § 8, 1827 N.Y. Laws 449 (“The charter of every
corporation, that shall hereafter be granted by the legislature, shall be subject to alteration,
suspension and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature.”).
197 See WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 85 (citing N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VIII, § 1, which “was
evidently the model” for similar clauses in some other state constitutions).
198 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478, 497 (1873).
199 Cf. Speir, supra note 152, at 155 n.297 (“At present, 49 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted a reservation clause as part of their corporation codes, their constitutions, or both.”).
200 Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420 (1837); see also HORWITZ, supra note 106, at 130-39 (discussing the case’s signiﬁcance).
201 Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 544 (quoting Proprietors of the Stourbridge Canal
v. Wheeley (1831) 109 Eng. Rep. 1336, 1337 (K.B.)); see also id. at 549 (“In charters of this description,
no rights are taken from the public, or given to the corporation, beyond those which the words of
the charter, by their natural and proper construction, purport to convey.”).
202 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 184, at 40 (“The strict construction principle was a major
undermining of the contract clause’s protection of state-granted franchises.”).
195
196
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Still, neither reservation provisions nor the Charles River Bridge principle
changed the theoretical status of corporate franchises. The state did not have to
grant such franchises, and the state could build appropriate qualifications into the
franchises that it chose to grant. But when granted in unambiguous terms and
without reservations, corporate franchises amounted to vested private rights.
C. Ferries, Bridges, Turnpikes, and Other Public Utilities
The preceding Section focused mostly on the franchise of incorporation.
As noted above, however, nineteenth-century lawyers also used the word
“franchise” to refer to various other legal interests that private people could
not exercise without a grant from the government, and that the government
was supposed to grant only in consideration of beneﬁts to the public, but that
nonetheless were regarded as a species of private property once granted.
For instance, the authority to establish a ferry for transporting members
of the public across a river, and to collect a toll from passengers, was said to
be “among the most common examples of a franchise.”203 In seventeenthcentury England, Sir Matthew Hale had observed that “by an ancient right
of prerogative,” the king enjoyed certain interests in many rivers, including
“[a] right of franchise or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry
for all passengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from
the king.”204 Likewise, nineteenth-century American courts generally agreed
that someone who wanted to operate a ferry for members of the public needed
a grant from the public’s authorized representatives.205
A state’s grant of a ferry franchise to a private individual or entity amounted
to a bargain between the state and the franchisee. Whether by statute or as a
matter of unwritten law, the franchisee normally was regarded as a common
carrier who owed members of the public a duty to operate the ferry, to keep it
in good repair, and not to refuse unreasonably to transport people who tendered
the prescribed fee.206 In return, the state allowed the franchisee to collect tolls
203 Davis v. Mayor of New York, 14 N.Y. 506, 523 (1856); accord, e.g., McRoberts v. Washburne,
10 Minn. 23, 27 (1865) (“All the books speak and treat of the right to run a ferry boat for public
accommodation and to charge tolls, as a franchise.”).
204 MATTHEW HALE, A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND, IN
THREE PARTS 6 (London, Francis Hargrave ed., 1787) (emphasis omitted).
205 See Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts 434, 438-39 (Pa. 1839); see also, e.g., Murray v. Menefee, 20 Ark. 561,
566 (1859) (“[A] ferry franchise being the creature of sovereign power, no one can exercise it without the
consent of the State . . . .”); cf. 25 C.J. Ferries § 7 (1921) (“In most jurisdictions the power of establishing
ferries has been delegated by the state to certain inferior bodies, which are authorized under general laws
to issue licenses for this purpose, such as county or session courts, county commissioners, boards of
county supervisors, police juries, municipalities, and other bodies.” (footnotes omitted)).
206 See 25 C.J. Ferries §§ 50–59 (1921) (summarizing the duties and liabilities of ferrymen); Sanders
v. Young, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 219, 220 (1858) (“A ferryman is liable as a common carrier.”); see also, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42 (1845) (specifying duties by statute); 2 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL
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from passengers, and the state sometimes promised not to authorize other
ferries over the same stretch of river.207 Unless the state reserved the power to
rescind the arrangement at will, courts often held that the franchisee’s rights
were protected by the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution.208 By the
same token, the franchise was also widely regarded as private property (despite
having been granted for the convenience of the public).209 In the Supreme
Court’s words, “A ferry franchise is as much property as . . . chattels, or realty.
It is clothed with the same sanctity and entitled to the same protection as other
property.”210 Chancellor Kent agreed that “[a]n estate in such a franchise, and
an estate in land, rest upon the same principle.”211
Consistent with the framework described in Part I, these ideas affected
nineteenth-century views about the need for “judicial” power. When a state
legislature or its delegee decided to grant a ferry franchise to one applicant
and not another, the disappointed applicant was not automatically entitled to
judicial review; generally speaking, no one had a vested private right to be
awarded a franchise in the first place.212 But once a ferry franchise had been
ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 683-85 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823)
(summarizing Massachusetts statutes and unwritten law); 3 KENT, supra note 128, at *458 (noting that
“[t]he privilege of . . . establishing a ferry, and taking tolls for the use of the same, is a franchise,” and
adding that “the owners of the franchise are liable to answer in damages, if they should refuse to transport
an individual without any reasonable excuse, upon being paid or tendered the usual rate of fare”).
207 See, e.g., Costar v. Brush, 25 Wend. 628, 632 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (discussing the exclusivity
provision in an agreement regarding the Fulton ferry). But cf. Wright v. Nagle, 101 U.S. 791, 794-96
(1880) (holding that although Georgia law authorized county courts to establish ferries, it did not
authorize them to confer exclusive rights).
208 See, e.g., Benson v. Mayor of New York, 10 Barb. 223, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (“[T]he
authorities are abundant to show, that a grant of a franchise of this description, which has been
accepted and acted upon, partakes of the nature of a contract, so far as to be protected by [the
Contract Clause] . . . .”); 25 C.J. Ferries § 16 (1921) (“A legislative grant of a ferry franchise without
reservation, when duly accepted, is a contract between the grantee and the state which cannot be
impaired by subsequent legislation, except in so far as the right to do so has been reserved.” (footnote
omitted)). But cf. Chapin v. Crusen, 31 Wis. 209, 214-15 (1872) (ﬁnding that a statute by which the
Wisconsin legislature had authorized a particular ferry did not amount to a contract).
209 See Smith v. Harkins, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 613, 619 (1845) (“[A]lthough the public
convenience is the occasion of granting franchises of this nature, and . . . the ferry established . . . is
publici juris, yet the property is private . . . .”); see also 2 DANE, supra note 206, at 683 (“[A] ferry
becomes property, an incorporeal hereditament, the owners of which, for the public convenience, being
obliged by law, to perform certain public services, must, as a reasonable equivalent, be protected in
this property . . . .”); 2 EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 21 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1862) (same); cf. State v. Real Est. Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 599
(1844) (“In the language of the civilians, [a franchise] is private property by public use.”).
210 Conway v. Taylor’s Ex’r, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 603, 632 (1862); accord Louisville & Jeﬀersonville
Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1903); see also, e.g., Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. v.
McGehee, 41 Ark. 202, 212 (1883) (observing that “[a] ferry franchise is a sovereign right at common
law” and “belongs to no citizen . . . until granted by the sovereign,” but noting that “[w]hen it has
been granted it becomes a private vested right”).
211 3 KENT, supra note 128, at *458-59.
212 See, e.g., Lippencott v. Allander, 23 Iowa 536, 537-38 (1867).
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granted, neither the legislature nor any other nonjudicial body could
conclusively declare that the franchisee had acted in such a way as to forfeit it.
In the words of the Supreme Court of Iowa, “the difference between deciding
which of two or more persons applying therefor shall have a gratuitous grant
of a ferry franchise, and the taking away or revoking that franchise after it has
become a vested right in the grantee, is too manifest to require argument to
demonstrate.”213 In particular, “after such franchise has been granted, the right
of the licensee therein vested in him,” and “[w]hether he has done acts which
forfeit his franchise is a matter for judicial determination.”214
Courts reached similar conclusions with respect to toll bridges and
turnpikes. Just as establishing a ferry for common use required public
authorization, so did building a bridge over a navigable river and offering
passage to members of the public who paid a toll.215 Public authorization was
also necessary to collect tolls from members of the public for using a common
highway.216 But in the nineteenth century, legislatures often granted these
Lippencott v. Allander, 25 Iowa 445, 446 (1868).
Id. at 447; accord Territory v. Reyburn, McCahon 134, 142 (Kan. Terr. 1860) (“The act
[granting the franchise] . . . is a contract . . . which the legislature can neither change, repeal or
impair the obligation of. [Whether] it has been forfeited . . . is a judicial question which the court
alone can determine when a proper case is made for that purpose.”). The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts apparently suggested a similar view in the 1790s. In a case for which there is no oﬃcial
report but that a leading digest later summarized, a man named Chadwick claimed to own a ferry
franchise, and he sued the proprietors of a new bridge for violating his allegedly exclusive rights.
The defendants responded that the legislature had authorized them to build the bridge, and they
also argued that the same statute established “a special mode for ascertaining the plaintiﬀ ’s damage”
without trial by jury in the courts. 2 DANE, supra note 206, at 686. According to the digest, though,
“[t]he court was of opinion the act did not, and perhaps could not, deprive the plaintiﬀ of his
common law, and constitutional right, to try his title and damages, by a jury in a civil action.” Id.;
see also Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344,
483-85 (1829) (Putnam, J., dissenting) (describing the proceedings in Chadwick’s case in more detail,
and noting that Nathan Dane—the author of the digest—chaired the panel of referees to whom the
case was referred), aﬀ ’d, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
215 See, e.g., McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213, 222 (1851) (“[T]o erect a bridge and charge toll is
. . . a right which can only be enjoyed under a grant from the Legislature.”); McPheeters v. Merimac
Bridge Co., 28 Mo. 465, 467 (1859) (“The right to erect a bridge and to exact toll from passengers
crossing it is a franchise that can only be granted by the state.”); see also Covington Drawbridge Co. v.
Shepherd, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 112, 123 (1858) (noting that the navigable portion of the Wabash River was
“not subject to be bridged by an individual assuming to exercise a mere private right,” because building
a bridge would partially impair the public right of navigation and therefore required “public authority”).
216 See, e.g., Va. Cañon Toll-Road Co. v. People ex rel. Vivian, 45 P. 398, 399 (Colo. 1896) (“The
right of a corporation or of an individual to exact tolls is not of common right, and, in this country,
does not exist in the absence of a grant from the legislature.”). Normally, building a turnpike in the
ﬁrst place also required public authorization, not least because a private company ordinarily could
not assemble the necessary rights-of-way or parcels of land without being granted the power of
eminent domain. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by
Government: The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 237 (1973) (observing that
“[d]evolution of the eminent-domain power upon turnpike, bridge, canal, and railroad companies
was done in every state,” and explaining that “if such companies had lacked the power to take
213
214
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rights to private companies in order to induce them to build and operate
infrastructure that would benefit the public.217 As with the right to operate a
ferry across a navigable river, these rights too were denominated “franchises.”218
Again, the government’s decisions about whether to grant such franchises in
the first place were not necessarily subject to judicial review.219 But once the
government had granted such franchises without reserving the power to rescind
them at will, they were regarded as private property,220 and they triggered the
same separation-of-powers principles as other vested private rights.221

property coercively for rights-of-way, they would have been left at the mercy of any individual
landowner disposed to be stubborn or extortionate”); see also Cnty. Comm’rs v. Chandler, 96 U.S.
205, 208 (1878) (“[T]he right to erect [railroads, turnpikes, bridges, or ferries] is a public right.”).
217 See, e.g., David T. Beito, From Privies to Boulevards: The Private Supply of Infrastructure in the
United States During the Nineteenth Century, in DEVELOPMENT BY CONSENT: THE VOLUNTARY
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES 23, 24-30 (Jerry Jenkins & David E. Sisk eds., 1993);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2015).
218 See, e.g., Thompson v. People ex rel. Taylor, 23 Wend. 537, 562 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of Sen.
Edwards) (“Although the right to build the bridge in question and take toll was granted to an individual,
it was for the accommodation of the public and was a public franchise, and so are all grants of a similar
nature, as well as the grants for public roads and ferries.”); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN
LAW 211 (Philadelphia, Robert E. Peterson, 1851) (“The most common [franchises] are the grant of a right
or privilege of making roads, bridges, establishing ferries, and taking toll for the use of the same.”).
219 Cf. Truckee & Tahoe Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Cal. 89, 91-92 (1872) (“A grant of . . . a
[turnpike] franchise by a Board of Supervisors . . . is not liable to be attacked by a private person, or in a
collateral proceeding, for mere error in the exercise of the authority to make the grant. . . . [T]he
determination of the Board in respect to [the relevant] questions of fact, is conclusive in this action . . . .”).
220 See, e.g., Powell v. Sammons, 31 Ala. 552, 560 (1858) (“The right of the company to receive and
collect toll at their gates, erected in conformity to the charter, is a franchise, and is undoubtedly private
property.”); Cal. State Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co., 22 Cal. 398, 422 (1863) (“The grant of a franchise is in
the nature of a vested right of property . . . . So long as the grantee fulfills the conditions and performs
the duties imposed upon him by the terms of the grant, he has a vested right which cannot be taken
away, or otherwise impaired by the Government, any more than other property.”), overruled in part on
other grounds by City of S.F. v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493 (1874). In the early twentieth
century, a treatise on franchises collected some cases that questioned the status of franchises as property.
See JOYCE, supra note 49, at 79-80. But the treatise indicated that these cases were anomalous:
“Notwithstanding any assertion to the contrary, franchises are property, and are almost universally
classed as real property or incorporeal hereditaments.” Id. at 80 & n.36 (citing many cases).
221 See, e.g., JOYCE, supra note 49, at 867 (“Although a franchise must . . . emanate from the
sovereign power, and that power alone can grant it . . . , still when it . . . is once lawfully granted
. . . and accepted, it becomes surrounded by constitutional guarantees of protection which no
legislative body can set aside and ignore by declaring a forfeiture . . . .”).
The Supreme Court qualiﬁed this doctrine in Farnsworth v. Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Co., 92
U.S. 49 (1876). The Territory (and later State) of Minnesota had granted the company some land
on which to build a railroad. As a result of further transactions, the company’s ownership of the land
was subject to the condition that the company construct a portion of the track by a speciﬁed date,
and the company agreed that it would forfeit both the land and its franchises to the state if it missed
the deadline. See id. at 55-56. When the company nonetheless failed to build the road, the state
legislature enacted a statute transferring those property rights to another company. Id. at 56. In
ensuing litigation, the Supreme Court held that the state had not needed to go to court ﬁrst to
establish that a forfeiture had indeed occurred. According to Justice Field’s opinion for the Court,
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Of course, even after the government had granted someone a franchise to
operate a toll bridge or a turnpike, the government could use its power of
eminent domain to take the franchise (along with other types of property)
for public use; although “[a] franchise is property,” it is not “more sacred[]
than other property,” so it was not exempt from the government’s power of
eminent domain.222 When the government used that power, though, it was
liable to pay just compensation—and because a vested private right was at
stake, the legislature could not conclusively specify the amount of
compensation that was just. In the Supreme Court’s words, “this is a judicial
and not a legislative question.”223
As technology developed, new franchises became possible. For instance,
utility companies were granted franchises to run pipes or wires through city
streets for the purpose of supplying residents with water, gas, or electricity.224
Again, courts said that “[s]uch a franchise is property which cannot be
destroyed or taken away without compensation.”225
The very word “franchise” was often used to connote a strong type of
vestedness. While the words “franchise” and “license” were both used in various
ways in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was fairly common
for courts to contrast “an irrevocable franchise” with “a mere license, revocable
A forfeiture by the State of an interest in lands and connected franchises, granted for
the construction of a public work, may be declared for non-compliance with the
conditions annexed to their grant, or to their possession, when the forfeiture is
provided by statute, without judicial proceedings to ascertain and determine the
failure of the grantee to perform the conditions.
Id. at 66. Still, the Court made clear that the original grantee was not bound by the legislature’s version
of the facts: the forfeiture was “left open to legal contestation” in a lawsuit between the original grantee
and the person who claimed title pursuant to the forfeiture. Id. at 67-68. Consistent with the idea that
vested private rights were at stake, only judicial proceedings were capable of “establish[ing] as matter
of record, importing verity against the grantee, the facts upon which the forfeiture depends.” Id. at 66.
A later opinion explained that cases like Farnsworth merely put the government on the same
footing as a private person who had granted land subject to a condition subsequent. See Atl. & Pac.
R.R. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 434 (1897). If a private grantor believed that the condition had been
breached and that the land had reverted to him, he could reenter the land. By the same token, when
the state believed that land had reverted to it, the legislature could assert its rights by statute. See id.
But just as reentry by a private grantor would not compel courts to accept the grantor’s version of the
facts, neither would a statutory declaration of forfeiture. The statute was a way for the government to
assert its position, but the statute did not itself establish that the government’s position was correct.
222 W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 534 (1848).
223 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
224 See, e.g., 1 ALLEN RIPLEY FOOTE, THE LAW OF INCORPORATED COMPANIES
OPERATING UNDER MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES, SUCH AS ILLUMINATING GAS COMPANIES,
FUEL GAS COMPANIES, ELECTRIC CENTRAL STATION COMPANIES, TELEPHONE COMPANIES,
STREET RAILWAY COMPANIES, WATER COMPANIES, ETC. 115-16 (Charles E. Everett ed.,
Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1892); JOYCE, supra note 49, at 48-51.
225 People ex rel. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 169 N.Y.S. 139, 142 (App.
Div.), aﬀ ’d, 120 N.E. 192 (N.Y. 1918).
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at pleasure of the grantor.”226 In the words of one state supreme court that drew
this contrast, “a franchise is . . . a vested right protected by the Constitution.”227
D. Controversies about Franchises and Calls for Reform
As the nineteenth century wore on, each of the types of franchises
discussed above generated controversy. Courts, commentators, and political
reformers all expressed concerns about the power of state and local
legislatures to grant special rights to favored individuals or corporations,
especially if the Federal Constitution would prevent subsequent legislatures
from undoing those grants. Eventually, the Dartmouth College doctrine itself
came under attack from both state judges and commentators. But while the
Supreme Court qualiﬁed that doctrine in various respects, the Court
continued to regard franchises as vested rights.
1. Statutory Reforms and Constitutional Restrictions on the States’ Power
to Grant Franchises
Early in the nineteenth century, controversy about franchises focused
mostly on acts of incorporation. As noted above, some state legislatures had
included reservation clauses in corporate charters even before the Dartmouth
College decision, and this practice became widespread thereafter.228 Starting
in the 1830s, moreover, some states adopted constitutional provisions that
eﬀectively prevented the state legislature from granting charters without such
reservations.229 At the same time, Jacksonians raised pointed concerns about

226 Union Inst. for Sav. v. City of Boston, 112 N.E. 637, 637-38 (Mass. 1916); see also, e.g., Levis
v. City of Newton, 75 F. 884, 889 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1896) (asking rhetorically whether gas companies
that had been assumed to hold “franchises” from various cities instead held “merely . . . licenses,
which are revocable at the pleasure of the councils of these diﬀerent cities”), aﬀ ’d, 79 F. 715 (8th Cir.
1897); Recent Important Decisions, Corporations—Franchise and License Distinguished, 6 MICH. L.
REV. 704, 706 (1908) (noting this usage of the terms “franchise” and “license” in a diﬀerent case).
For discussion of how courts have decided whether a grant amounts to a “franchise” or a mere
“license,” see John Greil, The Unfranchised Competitor Doctrine, 66 VILL. L. REV. 357, 388-91 (2021).
Greil also cites old cases recognizing that the owners of ferry franchises, street-railway franchises,
and the like could obtain injunctive relief against competitors who were operating without legal
authorization—a further indication that these franchises were historically regarded as property. See
id. at 379-85 (citing Walker v. Armstrong, 2 Kan. 198 (1863); Carroll v. Campbell, 17 S.W. 884 (Mo.
1891); Patterson v. Wollmann, 67 N.W. 1040 (N.D. 1896); and Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co.
v. Grassmeyer, 173 P. 504 (Wash. 1918)); cf. 1 JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
INJUNCTIONS 18 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 3d ed. 1890) (reciting the traditional doctrine that “in
the absence of any injury to property rights,” equity “will not lend its aid by injunction to restrain
the violation of public or penal statutes, or the commission of immoral and illegal acts”).
227 Elizabeth City v. Banks, 64 S.E. 189, 192 (N.C. 1909).
228 See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text.
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the very concept of special acts of incorporation,230 and states began to enact
general incorporation acts that allowed businesses to incorporate themselves
on standard terms without special approval from the legislature.231 To be sure,
the legislatures in many of these states continued to grant special charters for
much of the nineteenth century.232 But by 1889, a majority of states had
adopted constitutional amendments that prohibited or at least restricted the
issuance of special charters.233
Starting in the 1870s, some state constitutions imposed similar restrictions
on franchises more broadly. For instance, the Illinois Constitution of 1870
forbade the state legislature to enact “local or special laws” of various
descriptions, including those “[g]ranting to any corporation, association or
individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise
whatever.”234 Many other states adopted similar provisions.235 Likewise, the
constitution with which Colorado entered the Union in 1876 forbade the state
legislature to pass any law “making any irrevocable grant of special privileges,
franchises, or immunities”236—and again other states adopted similar

230 See, e.g., WHAT IS A MONOPOLY? 13 (New York, George P. Scott & Co. 1835) (“Every
corporate grant is directly in the teeth of the doctrine of equal rights, for it gives to one set of men
the exercise of privileges which the main body can never enjoy. Every such grant is equally adverse
to the fundamental maxim of free trade . . . .”); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE
OF JACKSON 188-89 (1953) (discussing this pamphlet by Theodore Sedgwick, which originated as
articles in the New York Evening Post in 1834).
231 See supra note 189; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 230, at 337 (observing that general
incorporation statutes are “a direct legacy from Jacksonian democracy”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634-36 (1988) (similarly noting
the Jacksonian character of this reform).
232 See HURST, supra note 143, at 21 (describing general incorporation acts of the midnineteenth century as “optional” and noting that “legislatures . . . continued to grant special charters
with diﬀerent terms”); Hamill, supra note 189, at 123-28 (tracing state constitutional prohibitions on
special charters and concluding that “a signiﬁcant number of state legislatures permitted special
charters through the early twentieth century”).
233 See Hamill, supra note 189, at 127.
234 ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 4, § 22.
235 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. 4, § 19; COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. 5, § 25; MINN.
CONST. of 1857, art. 4, § 33 (1881); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. 5, § 26; NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. 3,
§ 15; N.M. CONST. of 1912, art. 4, § 24; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. 3, § 18 (1874); N. DAK. CONST. of
1889, art. 2, § 69; S. DAK. CONST. of 1889, art. 3, § 23; WYO. CONST. of 1889, art. 3, § 27; see also Act
of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, § 1, 24 Stat. 170, 170 (imposing this restriction on territorial legislatures).
236 COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. 2, § 11.
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language.237 State constitutions also explicitly restricted municipalities’
power to grant franchises.238
The spread of such provisions reﬂects discomfort with the Dartmouth
College doctrine, or at least with some of its consequences. Formally speaking,
of course, the doctrine persisted: when the state had granted someone an
irrevocable franchise that the recipient had accepted and that was supported
by consideration, the Supreme Court continued to regard the franchise as a
vested private right. But to the extent that state constitutions deprived
legislatures of their power to grant irrevocable franchises in the ﬁrst place,
the Dartmouth College doctrine had less room to operate.
2. Limitations on the Dartmouth College Doctrine
In the second half of the nineteenth century, some state judges and
commentators took more direct aim at the Dartmouth College doctrine. As
described below, the Ohio Supreme Court launched a frontal attack on the
doctrine in the 1850s. By the 1870s and 1880s, several leading authors had
joined the fray, sharply criticizing the doctrine for preventing current
legislators from rescinding franchises that their predecessors had granted
unwisely or corruptly.239 Indeed, a law review article published in 1874
referred to “the murmuring at the entire doctrine which is beginning to be
237 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. 1, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. 2, § 9; KY. CONST. of
1891, Bill of Rights, § 3; S. DAK. CONST. of 1889, art. 6, § 12; UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. 1, § 23.
Along the same lines, the Texas Constitution of 1876 provided that “no irrevocable or uncontrollable
grant of special privileges or immunities shall be made; but all privileges and franchises granted by
the legislature or created under its authority shall be subject to the control thereof.” TEX. CONST. of
1876, art. 1, § 17. Ultimately, though, the Texas Supreme Court read this provision narrowly. See Mayor
of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co., 19 S.W. 127, 130-31 (Tex. 1892) (tentatively concluding that
this provision was simply intended to permit revocation for cause, not revocation “at the mere pleasure
or will of the legislature,” and holding that Houston’s city council could not validly repeal an ordinance
that had authorized the railway company to operate in the city streets for a term of thirty years).
238 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. 13, §§ 4–6; OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. 18, § 5(a).
239 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *279 n.2
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1871) (“Every privilege granted or right conferred . . . being
made inviolable by the Constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of its authority in
very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation . . . .”); FRANCIS WHARTON,
COMMENTARIES ON LAW 554, 556 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1884) (observing that “there is a
growing tendency to doubt the correctness of the general rule laid down in [Dartmouth College], so far
as it involves the assertion that a state cannot recall a franchise granted to a private corporation or
modify grants made to such a corporation,” and adding that “[t]he policy of irrevocably granting away
public franchises . . . has become far more questionable with the lapse of years than it was [then]”);
see also VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER
THAN CHARITABLE 417 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1882) (“The rule established by the Dartmouth
College case was acquiesced in for a time; but it has been much criticised of late years, . . . and a
tendency has been manifested by the courts to limit its application as far as possible.”); Hovenkamp,
supra note 231, at 1618-24 (highlighting both Cooley’s and Wharton’s discussions).
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heard throughout the country, the restless, ﬁtful desire to get rid of it . . .
which large classes of people begin to feel.”240
Various critics suggested that the Supreme Court never should have held
that franchises could be vested private rights. As one state judge wrote in 1892,
The decision of the supreme court of the United States in the celebrated
Dartmouth College Case, where it was declared that a franchise, upon being
accepted by the grantee, became a perfect contract, which the state could
neither recall nor in any wise impair, has never been universally admitted to
have been based upon sound principles of government. Many eminent writers
and courts have thought that a franchise is a mere privilege extended by the
sovereign power of the state, which it could recall whenever it should be
deemed advisable so to do.241

Still, the same judge observed that “[t]he courts have generally . . . from necessity
yielded to the supreme court of the United States”—with the result that franchises
continued to be treated as vested rights notwithstanding these protests.242
As we shall see, the Supreme Court eventually qualiﬁed the Dartmouth
College doctrine in ways that reﬂected some of the critics’ concerns. Most
prominently, the Court concluded that even if a state promised never to
subject a particular corporation to particular types of regulations, the
Contract Clause would not prevent the state from changing its mind; no one
could acquire a vested right to be exempt from core aspects of a state’s police
powers. But while the concept of “franchises” did not extend to everything of
value that the government might grant, the Court never repudiated the idea
that true franchises amounted to vested rights.
a. Public Oﬃces
As background for understanding limits on the concept of “franchises,” it
helps to start with the treatment of public oﬃces. Traditionally, the common
law of England had treated some oﬃces as the property of the oﬃceholder.243
Thus, although Blackstone distinguished between oﬃces and franchises, he
categorized them both as “incorporeal hereditaments.”244 During the
nineteenth century, though, American courts largely rejected this way of

The Dartmouth College Case, supra note 105, at 191.
Houston City St. Ry. Co., 19 S.W. at 130.
Id.
See STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT
WE OWN 8 (2011).
244 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *36-37.
240
241
242
243
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thinking about public oﬃces. In the United States, incumbents were said to
hold their oﬃces in trust for the public, not as a species of private property.245
Admittedly, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison
indicated that William Marbury had a “vested legal right” in the office to
which he had been appointed.246 But Congress had not tried to eliminate that
office,247 and Marshall’s majority opinion in Dartmouth College suggested that
“offices held within a State for State purposes” normally remained subject to
state control.248 Three decades later, the Supreme Court explicitly held that
even if a state statute specified the term of an office and the fees or
compensation that the officeholder would collect, the person who was
appointed to this office did not thereby acquire a contractual right to serve the
full term at the specified pay; without violating the Federal Constitution’s
Contract Clause, the legislature could always amend the statute to shorten the
term or to reduce the compensation for work that the officeholder had not yet
performed.249 By and large, state courts agreed that public offices created by
statute “are not held by grant or contract, nor has any person a private property
or vested interest in them, and they are therefore liable to such modifications
and changes as the law-making power may deem it advisable to enact.”250
245 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1029-31 (citing cases); see also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548,
576 (1900) (“The view that public office is not property has been generally entertained in this country.”).
246 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
247 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1031 (“Statutory entitlements might be vested in the weak
sense as against executive intrusion while not being vested . . . against legislative termination; it is
not clear in which sense Marshall meant the right was vested. The issue of whether Marbury’s oﬃce
was legislatively defeasible was not presented . . . .”).
248 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627-29 (1819). But cf. id.
at 699 (Story, J., concurring) (including “oﬃces” along with “franchises” as types of “incorporeal
hereditaments” whose owners “have a legal estate and property in them”).
249 See Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416-17 (1851). But cf. Hall v. Wisconsin,
103 U.S. 5, 8-11 (1880) (limiting this doctrine to “oﬃcer[s]” and distinguishing people who performed
services for the government as mere employees or contractors).
250 State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Davis, 44 Mo. 129, 131 (1869); accord, e.g., Stuhr v. Curran, 44 N.J.L.
181, 188-89 (1882), abrogated on other grounds by N.J. Dep’t of Corr. v. Int’l Fed’n of Pro. & Tech. Eng’rs,
Local 195, 780 A.2d 525 (N.J. 2001); City of Steubenville v. Culp, 38 Ohio St. 18, 23 (1882); see also
Conner v. Mayor of New York, 5 N.Y. 285, 295 (1851) (opinion of Ruggles, C.J.) (“Public offices in
this state are not incorporeal hereditaments; nor have they the character or qualities of grants.”); id.
at 296 (“The prospective salary or other emoluments of a public office[] are not . . . property . . . .
[W]hen the plaintiff accepted the office of clerk, he must be supposed to have known that the
legislature had the power to regulate and change his compensation as the public interests might
require.”); Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 Serg. & Rawle 322, 323 (Pa. 1820) (rejecting a mayor’s challenge
to a law reducing his salary after his term had begun, and observing that “[t]hese services rendered
by public officers do not, in this particular, partake of the nature of contracts, nor have they the
remotest affinity thereto”); FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES
AND OFFICERS 295-96 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1890) (“Except in North Carolina, it is now well
settled that there is no contract, either express or implied, between a public officer and the
government whose agent he is. . . . Neither, except in North Carolina, can a public office be regarded
as the property of the incumbent.”); MONTGOMERY H. THROOP, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
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In keeping with this view, many courts held that the legislature could
establish administrative mechanisms to remove oﬃceholders for cause before
the expiration of their terms. By the end of the nineteenth century, a number
of courts did say that the oﬃceholder in question was entitled to notice and
an opportunity to be heard (at least in the absence of clear statutory language
to the contrary)251—a doctrine that presaged modern notions of procedural
due process.252 According to the majority rule, though, the proceedings did
not have to occur in a true court: vested private rights were not at stake in
proceedings to remove someone from public oﬃce, and so “judicial” power in
the constitutional sense was not required.253
RELATING TO PUBLIC OFFICERS AND SURETIES IN OFFICIAL BONDS 345 (New York, J.Y. Johnston
Co. 1892) (“[I]n this country an office is not regarded as property, nor has the officer any vested rights
therein, which are within the protection of the United States constitution, or the general provision of
a state constitution, forbidding legislative interference with property or vested rights.”). But see People
ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Wells, 2 Cal. 198, 203-04 (1852) (“Under our system of government, [an office]
may be regarded as a contract between the State on one hand and the individual on the other, whereby
he assumes the performance of certain duties for a certain compensation. For these purposes he
becomes seised of the office, as of any other property, in the right and enjoyment of which he cannot
be disturbed or defeated, except by operation of law.”); see also BANNER, supra note 243, at 8-9
(quoting early statements by Alexander Hamilton to the effect that officeholders could have vested
rights in their offices); cf. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1, 16-24 (1833) (acknowledging that the
legislature can abolish or modify offices by statute, but endorsing a limited version of the idea that
“an office is deemed the subject of property”), overruled by Mial v. Ellington, 46 S.E. 961 (N.C. 1903).
251 See MECHEM, supra note 250, at 287 (“[W]here the appointment or election is made for a
deﬁnite term or during good behavior, and the removal is to be for cause, it is now clearly established
by the great weight of authority that the power of removal can not, except by clear statutory
authority, be exercised without notice and hearing . . . .”).
252 See, e.g., E. St. Louis Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1220 v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. No. 189 Fin.
Oversight Panel, 687 N.E.2d 1050, 1061 (Ill. 1997) (discussing procedural-due-process protections
for public employees and oﬃcers). On the development of procedural-due-process doctrines in
administrative settings, see Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and Due Process: The Historical Connection,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 223.
253 See, e.g., Donahue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. 94, 103-07 (1881), overruled in part by E. St. Louis
Fed’n, 687 N.E.2d at 1061; State ex rel. Whitaker v. Adams, 15 So. 490, 491 (La. 1894); Att’y Gen. ex
rel. Rich v. Jochim, 58 N.W. 611, 613-14 (Mich. 1894); State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Hawkins, 5 N.E. 228,
232-33 (Ohio 1886); Cameron v. Parker, 38 P. 14, 29 (Okla. 1894); State ex rel. Starkweather v.
Common Council, 64 N.W. 304, 305-06 (Wis. 1895); Territory v. Cox, 6 Dak. 501, 508-12 (Dak. Terr.
Dist. Ct. 1889); see also Lynch v. Chase, 40 P. 666, 667 (Kan. 1895) (“The decided weight of authority
is that, while the proceeding to remove from office for cause involves the examination of facts and the
exercise of judgment and discretion by the executive officer, his action is not judicial in the sense that
it belongs exclusively to the courts.”); Alonzo H. Tuttle, Removal of Public Officers from Office for Cause
(pt. 2), 3 MICH. L. REV. 341, 347 (1905) (“[R]emoval for cause . . . is quasi judicial or judicial in nature
but not judicial in the sense that it comes within the inhibition of the clause ‘all judicial power shall
be vested in the courts.’”). But see, e.g., Christy v. City of Kingfisher, 76 P. 135, 136-37 (Okla. Terr.
1904) (holding that removal for cause is “judicial action” that necessitates the involvement of courts
with “judicial power”); cf. Page v. Hardin, 47 Ky. 648, 672-75 (Ky. 1848) (concluding that “every
proceeding for the removal of an officer for cause . . . is essentially an exercise of the judicial power
of the Commonwealth,” though adding that the legislature could nonetheless “refer the case of any
particular officer to the action and judgment of the Governor, or to some other officer or tribunal”);
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b. Exemptions from the Exercise of Governmental Powers
The doctrines that I have just surveyed can be summarized as follows:
public oﬃcers lacked vested private rights in the powers of their oﬃce.
Instead of acquiring any sort of ownership interest in the governmental power
that the public allowed them to exercise, individual oﬃceholders held such
power only as “agent[s] of the public.”254
By contrast, there was more controversy about the status of exemptions from
governmental power. When a legislature wanted to encourage the creation of
a corporation, the legislature sometimes promised not to exercise certain
powers against the corporation, and the legislature sometimes included this
exemption in the corporation’s charter. From the mid-nineteenth century on,
lawyers engaged in fierce debates about whether such exemptions amounted
to vested private rights.255 Indeed, this issue caused the Ohio Supreme Court
to repudiate the Dartmouth College doctrine in its entirety and to deny that the
Contract Clause insulated any charter provisions against subsequent repeal.256
As we shall see, the U.S. Supreme Court held firm against this challenge, but
the Court subsequently articulated important limits on the kinds of
exemptions that the Federal Constitution required legislatures to respect.
i. Controversy About Tax Exemptions
The ﬂashpoint for the Ohio Supreme Court’s resistance involved
exemptions from state and local taxes. In 1845, the Ohio legislature had
enacted a statute allowing individuals “to associate and form companies for
the purpose of carrying on the business of banking.”257 The statute speciﬁed
that “[e]ach banking company, organized under this act, or accepting thereof,
and complying with its provisions,” would pay six percent of its proﬁts to the
state “in lieu of all taxes to which such company, or the stockholders thereof,
on account of stock owned therein, would otherwise be subject.”258 Six years
later, however, the legislature enacted a statute subjecting banks to the normal
Dullam v. Wilson, 19 N.W. 112, 115-16 (Mich. 1884) (agreeing that when the state constitution
authorized the governor to remove public officers for cause, it “clothe[d] him with judicial power,”
although perhaps only in the sense that required notice and an opportunity to be heard).
254 Lynch, 40 P. at 667.
255 For valuable discussion, see Siegel, supra note 184, at 41-54.
256 See id. at 41 n.203.
257 Act of Feb. 24, 1845, § 1, 43 Ohio Laws 24, 24. Each such company could choose to operate
either “as an independent banking company” or as “a ‘branch of the State Bank of Ohio.’” Id. § 7, 43
Ohio Acts at 27. Once at least seven qualifying companies had elected to operate as branches of the
State Bank of Ohio, they were each to appoint a member of a “board of control” that would have
various powers over the branches. Id. §§ 13–14, 43 Ohio Laws at 30-31; see also id. § 16, 43 Ohio Laws
at 32 (providing for the board of control to operate as a corporation until at least 1866).
258 Id. § 60, 43 Ohio Laws at 48.
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property taxes,259 and a new state constitution subsequently prohibited special
tax exemptions for corporations.260 Banks that already had been organized
under the 1845 statute argued that the Federal Constitution prevented these
new laws from applying to them: by organizing themselves under the 1845
statute, they had acquired a contractual exemption from taxation, and the
state could not unilaterally alter that contract.
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. Some of its arguments stayed within
the rubric of the Dartmouth College doctrine. For instance, the court argued
that even under the state constitution that had been in force in 1845, the Ohio
legislature had lacked the authority to make contracts that would prevent
future legislatures from exercising the state’s powers of taxation.261 (If that
were true, this restriction would have had the same effect as a constitutional
reservation clause.262) Likewise, Justice John Corwin argued that the State of
Ohio used banking companies “in the exercise of one of its sovereign functions
and duties, to regulate the currency,” and each banking company should
therefore be regarded as “a public institution” that remained subject to public
control.263 But the Ohio Justices also went farther. In a frontal assault on the
doctrine that Dartmouth College had been taken to establish, they denied that
an ordinary corporate charter amounted to a contract, and they argued that
the legislature could repeal acts of incorporation no less than other statutes.264
As part of this argument, Chief Justice Thomas Bartley insisted that the
rights and powers conferred by a corporate charter were conceptually
diﬀerent than vested private rights. Casting his point in Lockean terms,
Act of Mar. 21, 1851, 49 Ohio Laws 56.
OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. XIII, § 4 (“The property of corporations, now existing, or
hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as the property of individuals.”).
261 See Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. & Tr. Co., 1 Ohio St. 563, 577-83 (1853), aﬀ ’d, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
416 (1854).
262 See, e.g., Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430, 438 (1869) (dictum).
263 Knoup v. Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio, 1 Ohio St. 603, 608-09 (1853), rev’d, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854). Justice Corwin clariﬁed that when he referred to “banking,” he did not
mean merely “the receiving of money on deposit[]” or “the purchase and sale of bullion and bills of
exchange.” Id. at 619; see also id. (noting that those activities “require no permission from
government, nor is the right to transact them a franchise”). Instead, he used the term to refer to
“the business of issuing promissory notes, bills, or certiﬁcates, to circulate as money.” Id. Unlike
simple promissory notes that an individual might issue, “[a] bank bill is designed to perform the
oﬃce of money, and does perform that oﬃce.” Id. at 620. According to Justice Corwin, “No citizen
can issue such a bill without permission from government . . . . The right to coin money, or, what is,
in eﬀect, the same, to issue bills, notes and obligations, to circulate as money, is a sovereign power.”
Id. Justice Corwin concluded that “[a] corporation established upon such a consideration, and for
such a purpose, must needs be a public corporation.” Id.
264 See, e.g., Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 657-69 (1853); Mechanics’ &
Traders’ Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Debolt, 1 Ohio St. 591, 597-603 (1853) (dictum); see
also Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1615-16 (describing these and other Ohio cases as “exhibiting
extreme state court disregard of federal law”).
259
260
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Chief Justice Bartley contrasted “the franchise of a corporation” (which “is an
adventitious or derivative right, originating in the government”) with “[t]he
rights of private property, . . . personal liberty and personal security” (which
“are original and fundamental rights, existing anterior to and independent of
civil government”).265 To be sure, people in the state of nature might enter
into contracts, and those contracts might concern things that did not
otherwise ﬁt the template of property. But as Chief Justice Bartley
understood the theory of American government, the type of authority
conferred by a corporate charter could not really be disposed of by contract
or become the subject of private property. In his view, the franchise of a
corporation should instead be regarded in the same way that Americans
regarded the occupancy of a public oﬃce—as “a trust of civil power granted
or delegated in the administration of the public aﬀairs,” but “remain[ing]
subservient to . . . the public welfare.”266
These statements inﬂuenced the two paragraphs in my 2007 article that
used the word “franchise.”267 Indeed, when I referred to “franchises”
interchangeably with “privileges” to describe a category of legal interests that
were not vested rights, I quoted Chief Justice Bartley.268 But the U.S.
Supreme Court did not share his view. To the contrary, when one of the Ohio
cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error in 1854, a majority
of the Court rejected the Ohio judges’ arguments. In Piqua Branch of the State

265
266

Bank of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. at 663-64.
Id. at 662-64 (emphasis omitted). He explained:
In this country, no vested right of private property can exist or be held in the civil
power or authority of government. . . . When, in the establishment of the civil
institutions of the State, or in the administration of the government, civil power and
authority is vested or delegated to any person or persons, [it] is still a trust to be
exercised pursuant to the design of its original delegation by the people, and ever
subject to control and regulation for that purpose.

Id. at 659-60; see also id. at 642-52 (criticizing the “arbitrary distinction” between public and private
corporations and arguing that every corporation is “a political institution of the state”).
Justice Corwin articulated a narrower version of this idea. He agreed that “[a] franchise is a right
belonging to the government, as a sovereign, yet committed, in trust, to some officer, corporation or
individual.” Knoup, 1 Ohio St. at 614. As Justice Corwin understood the Ohio Constitution, moreover,
whatever private advantages might flow from the grant of a franchise were not properly regarded as
vested property rights; franchises were conferred only for “the public good,” and the public remained
in charge of them. Id. at 615-16 (emphasis omitted). Still, Justice Corwin asserted that the mere right
to be a corporation, unaccompanied by other sovereign powers, was not a franchise in this sense. See
id. at 613. Unlike Chief Justice Bartley, then, Justice Corwin might not have thought that the
legislature could freely repeal simple acts of incorporation. Justice Corwin seemed more concerned
with other delegations to corporations (such as delegations of the power “to coin money,” or “to
appropriate private property” by exercising the state’s power of eminent domain). Id. at 614.
267 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 567-68.
268 Id. at 568 & n.36.
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Bank of Ohio v. Knoop,269 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the banking
companies in question were indeed private corporations;270 that their
acceptance of the terms oﬀered by the 1845 statute had created a binding
contract with the state;271 that in the absence of special limitations in the state
constitution, the state was just as capable of making a contract about the
amount and objects of taxation as about other topics;272 and that having made
such a contract, the state legislature could not abrogate it by statute.273
Members of the Ohio Supreme Court were not persuaded. In Piqua itself,
they apparently thought hard about whether to enter the U.S. Supreme
Court’s mandate, and ultimately did so only over a long and radical dissent by
Chief Justice Bartley.274 By that time, the U.S. Supreme Court had already
issued another majority opinion reiterating what it had said in Piqua.275 In later
cases, however, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to treat these opinions by

57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854).
See id. at 380-81 (indicating that in light of the relevant precedents, “no legal fact is
susceptible of less doubt”).
271 See id. at 380-83.
272 See id. at 383-88. As the Court noted, earlier cases tended to support this proposition. See
id. at 385-87 (citing New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812), and Gordon v. Appeal Tax
Ct., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845)).
273 See id. at 380, 389, 392.
274 See Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoup, 6 Ohio St. 342, 343-448 (1857)
(Bartley, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that notwithstanding Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816), the Supreme Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts); Siegel, supra
note 184, at 50-51, 51 n.253 (describing this episode and noting that “[i]t took the Ohio Court two
years” to enter the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate).
275 See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 360-61 (1856).
269
270
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the U.S. Supreme Court as binding precedents.276 The U.S. Supreme Court
therefore continued to reverse the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgments.277
Admittedly, the U.S. Supreme Court was divided.278 Throughout the
relevant period, several Justices agreed with one of the Ohio judges’ principal
arguments: as a matter of state constitutional law, the typical state legislature
lacked the power to make contracts surrendering its successors’ powers of
taxation with respect to a particular corporation.279 A number of state courts
also took this position,280 as did many lawyers.281 Over time, moreover, a
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court qualiﬁed and limited its doctrines about

276 The Ohio Supreme Court set this pattern within months after the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Piqua. See Order of the Ohio Supreme Court (July 26, 1854) (enforcing Ohio’s tax against
another bank), in Transcript of Record at 8, Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank v. Debolt, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
380 (1856) (No. 73); Order of the Ohio Supreme Court (July 26, 1854) (same), in Transcript of
Record at 8-9, Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 384 (1856) (No. 74). In 1856,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed these decrees. Debolt, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 383; Thomas, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) at 385. For a brief time thereafter, a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court accepted the
U.S. Supreme Court’s position. See Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1616 & n.152 (citing cases); A.W.
Gans, Annotation, Tax Exemptions and the Contract Clause, 173 A.L.R. 15, 38 n.16 (1948) (referring to
this “brief interlude”). In 1858, however, the Ohio Supreme Court reverted to its original position.
See Sandusky City Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio St. 481, 481-82 (1858) (indicating in the syllabus that the
key questions were matters of Ohio law as to which the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions were not
binding); see also Skelly v. Jeﬀerson Branch of the State Bank of Ohio, 9 Ohio St. 607, 607 (1860)
(stating more broadly in the syllabus that precedents established by the U.S. Supreme Court “do
not bind and conclude the judgment of this court”), rev’d, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1862). (For the
signiﬁcance of the Ohio Supreme Court’s syllabus, see Ohio Sup. Ct. R. VI, 5 Ohio St. vii (1858)
(indicating that the syllabus is prepared “by the Judge assigned to deliver the opinion of the Court,”
subject to the revision of “the Judges concurring therein,” and states “the points of law, arising from
the facts of the case, that have been determined by the Court”).)
277 See Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1616 & n.153 (citing Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) at 450); Ann
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 94 & n.91
(1997) (also citing Franklin Branch Bank v. Ohio, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 474 (1862)); see also Siegel, supra note
184, at 47 & n.234 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed other state courts on this issue as well).
278 See Siegel, supra note 184, at 49-50 (noting that Justices Campbell, Catron, and Daniel
dissented in Piqua and subsequent cases, and “when they left [the Court], Chief Justice Chase and
Justices Field and Miller continued the dissent”).
279 See, e.g., Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439, 443 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting)
(“We do not believe that any legislative body, sitting under a State constitution of the usual character,
has a right to sell, to give, or to bargain away forever the taxing power of the State.”); Piqua, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) at 407 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Ohio legislature’s powers, and
“especially” its power of taxation, as “trust powers” that legislators “held . . . in deposit[], to be
returned . . . to their constituents without abuse or diminution”); id. at 404 (Catron, J., dissenting)
(concluding that “according to the constitutions of all the States of this Union . . . the sovereign
political power is not the subject of contract so as to be vested in an irrepealable charter of
incorporation,” and “the taxing power is a political power of the highest class”).
280 See, e.g., Mott v. Pa. R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 9, 27-33 (1858); W. Wis. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors,
35 Wis. 257, 265-66 (1874) (dictum), aﬀ ’d, 93 U.S. 595 (1876); see also Siegel, supra note 184, at 51-52
(citing cases from other states too).
281 See Ernest W. Huﬀcut, Legislative Tax-Exemption Contracts, 24 AM. L. REV. 399, 415-16
(1890) (speculating that “a large majority of the profession” would agree with the dissents in Piqua).
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tax exemptions in various ways.282 (For instance, contrary to a suggestion in
Justice Story’s concurring opinion in Dartmouth College,283 the Court held that
the Contract Clause normally did not prevent states from rescinding tax
exemptions or other legal interests that the legislature had given an existing
entity as a mere “gratuity” rather than as part of an exchange of
consideration.284) But the Court continued to say that when a corporation
had validly been granted an exemption from taxation as part of its charter,
for consideration and without any applicable reservations, a subsequent
legislature could not unilaterally eliminate the exemption by statute.285
ii. Core Aspects of the Police Power
While a majority of the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of
contractual exemptions from state or local taxes, the Court was less receptive
to the idea of contractual exemptions from certain aspects of the police power.
In that context, the Court accepted some of the arguments that the Ohio
Supreme Court had tried to make with respect to the power of taxation.

282 See id. at 417-26; see also Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of GovernmentBusiness Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970,
991-92 (1975) (noting these limitations, as well as the fact that state legislatures had various ways of
putting pressure on corporations to renegotiate tax exemptions that the legislature wanted to end, and
concluding that “[b]y 1890 the question was of little importance as a practical matter or a legal issue”).
283 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 683-84 (1819) (Story, J.,
concurring). After Dartmouth College, state judges appear to have been divided about whether the
legislature could rescind franchises that were not supported by consideration. Compare Derby Tpk.
Co. v. Parks, 10 Conn. 522, 541 (1835) (“[N]o case has been shewn to prove, that a consideration is
necessary.”); with Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130, 145 (1849) (dictum) (indicating that the legislature
would remain in control of a ferry franchise “unless it was founded on valuable consideration”).
284 See Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 527, 574-75 (1875) (citing Rector of Christ
Church v. County of Philadelphia, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 300 (1861)); accord W. Wis. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 93 U.S. 595, 597-98 (1876); Grand Lodge of State of La. of Free & Accepted Masons
v. City of New Orleans, 11 So. 148, 151-52 (La. 1891); People ex rel. Davies v. Comm’rs of Taxes &
Assessments, 47 N.Y. 501, 503-04 (1872). In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

There is reason and authority for holding that a supplement to a charter of
incorporation which merely confers upon it a new right or enlarges an old one, without
imposing any new or additional burden upon it, is a mere license or promise by the
state and may be revoked at pleasure. It is without consideration to support it and
cannot bind a subsequent legislature . . . .
Phila. & Gray’s Ferry Passenger Ry. Co.’s Appeal, 102 Pa. 123, 129 (1883); see also Pa. R.R. Co. v.
Bowers, 16 A. 836, 838 (Pa. 1889) (“[A] franchise granted without a consideration moving from the
grantees of such franchise is not binding upon the state.”); MORAWETZ, supra note 239, at 421 (“A
grant by a State of a continuing privilege or future right, such as an exemption from taxation, to a
corporation already in existence may be revoked, unless it is binding upon the State as a contract. It
is necessary, therefore, that such grant be made upon a valid consideration.”).
285 See, e.g., Powers v. Detroit, Grand Haven, & Milwaukee Ry. Co., 201 U.S. 543, 556-59
(1906); Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 500 (1894).
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Consider Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1878.286 In 1828, the Massachusetts legislature had incorporated the Boston
Beer Company “for the purpose of manufacturing malt liquors in all their
varieties.”287 In 1869, however, the legislature enacted a law sharply restricting
the manufacture and sale of liquor in Massachusetts.288 The Boston Beer
Company argued that its charter gave it a contractual right (protected by the
Federal Constitution) to make and sell beer even in the face of subsequent
statutory prohibitions,289 but the Supreme Court disagreed. For one thing,
the charter had been subject to a broad reservation provision, and the Court
held that this provision defeated the company’s contractual argument.290 But
the Court indicated that even in the absence of an explicit reservation
provision, the company still would have lost, because “[t]he legislature had
no power to confer any such rights” as the company was claiming.291 In the
Court’s words, “[t]he legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the
power” to enact laws for “the protection of the lives, health, and property of
the citizens, and . . . the preservation of good order and the public morals.”292
The Court expanded upon this point in Stone v. Mississippi.293 In 1867, the
Mississippi legislature had passed a statute creating a corporation for twentyfive years and giving it the power to conduct lotteries.294 As part of this
arrangement, the statute required the corporation to pay the state $5000 up
front and to post a bond to secure the payment of an additional annual tax on
its receipts from the sale of lottery tickets.295 But after the corporation had
been operating for a few years, a new state constitution prohibited all lotteries,
and the legislature enacted a statute implementing this prohibition.296 As in
Beer Co., the corporation argued that it had a contractual right to continue
operating lotteries under the arrangement established by the 1867 statute and
that the Contract Clause prevented the state from unilaterally abrogating this
arrangement. Again, though, the Supreme Court disagreed. Even though the
286 97 U.S. 25 (1878); see also WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 196-99 (observing that “[n]ot until
1878 did the Court hand down a decision explicitly based upon the principle that there are certain
police or regulatory powers which the states may not contract away,” but noting that state courts and
legal treatises had embraced this principle earlier).
287 Act of Feb. 1, 1828, ch. 32, § 1, reprinted in 6 PRIVATE AND SPECIAL STATUTES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 595, 595 (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1837).
288 See Act of June 19, 1869, ch. 415, 1869 Mass. Acts 706.
289 Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 26-27 (argument of counsel).
290 Id. at 31-32 (opinion of the Court).
291 Id. at 33.
292 Id.; see also McCurdy, supra note 282, at 993 (noting a suggestion to the same eﬀect in Boyd
v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645, 650 (1877)).
293 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
294 Act of Feb. 16, 1867, ch. 256, §§ 1, 6, 11, 1867 Miss. Laws 349, 349-51, 354.
295 See id. § 8, 1867 Miss. Laws at 352-53.
296 MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 15; Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 58, 1870 Miss. Laws 144.
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1867 statute seemed to promise that the corporation would be able to continue
conducting lotteries, the legislature that was sitting in 1867 could not really
commit its successors to this position: “No legislature can bargain away the
public health or the public morals.”297 Rather than being a subject of vested
private rights, “the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to
the government, no part of which can be granted away.”298
To reconcile this principle with the Contract Clause, the Court asserted
that “[t]he contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to
property rights, not governmental.”299 The Court conceded that “the line
which separates governmental from property rights” is not always obvious,
but the Court saw no uncertainty with respect to lotteries: “Certainly the
right to suppress them is governmental . . . .”300 Thus, “[a]ny one . . . who
accepts a lottery charter does so with the implied understanding that the
people, in their sovereign capacity, and through their properly constituted
agencies, may resume it at any time when the public good shall require,
whether it be paid for or not.”301 According to the Court, a charter authorizing
a corporation to conduct lotteries created “in legal eﬀect nothing more than
a license” that the state could revoke—”a permit, good as against existing laws,
but subject to future legislative and constitutional control or withdrawal.”302
In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court applied the same idea to a
number of valuable privileges that legislatures had conferred in acts of
incorporation. For instance, after the Louisiana legislature had granted a
company the exclusive right to operate slaughterhouses in New Orleans,303 and
after the company had made extensive investments in its facilities, the Court
held that the Contract Clause did not prevent the state from ending the
company’s monopoly; the authority to regulate “unwholesome trades,
slaughter-houses, [and] operations offensive to the senses” was a core aspect
of the police power, and a legislature could not deprive its successors of that
authority by contract in a way that the Federal Constitution required the state
Stone, 101 U.S. at 819.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id. at 820-21.
Id. at 821.
Id. In a later case, the Court acknowledged that the constitution of a particular state might
restrict the state legislature’s power over lottery companies. See New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U.S.
265, 268-69, 273-76 (1886) (discussing LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 167). But even if the people of a
state chose to tie the legislature’s hands in this way, the authority to operate a lottery still would not
become a contractual right of the sort that the Contract Clause protected; if the state constitution
were later amended to expand the legislature’s power, the Federal Constitution would not prevent
the state legislature from regulating lottery companies that had been created under the old regime.
See id. at 275; see also Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 498-99 (1897) (clarifying this point).
303 See Act of Mar. 8, 1869, No. 118, 1869 La. Laws 170; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 61-62, 80-81 (1873) (upholding this statute against Fourteenth Amendment challenges).
297
298
299
300
301
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to respect.304 For the same reason, the Contract Clause did not prevent a state
legislature from overriding a provision in a railroad company’s charter that had
exempted the company from tort liability for the death of any of its
employees.305 While the Supreme Court was “not prepared to say that the
legislature can make valid contracts on no subject embraced in the largest
definition of the police power,”306 certain aspects of the police power were not
to be bargained away, and the Court declined to treat exemptions from those
powers as vested contractual rights.307 By the early twentieth century if not
before, the Court had said the same thing about the power of eminent domain:
even if a corporation’s charter said that the state would never use the power of
eminent domain against the corporation’s franchises or other property, the
Contract Clause would not prevent the state from changing its mind later.308
The idea that exemptions from the police power amounted to revocable
licenses, rather than vested rights of the sort that the Contract Clause
protects, helps to account for a basic shift in the patterns of constitutional
litigation. Professor Wright famously calculated that for the ﬁrst century of
the Constitution’s operation (that is, between 1789 and 1889), the Contract
Clause came up in almost forty percent of the cases in which the Supreme
304 Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750-51 (1884) (quoting 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *340).
305 See Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1911).
306 Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 750-51; see also New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S.
650, 662 (1885) (referring to “cases in which grants of exclusive privileges respecting public highways
and bridges over navigable streams have been sustained as contracts, the obligations of which are fully
protected against impairment by State enactments,” and taking those cases to show that “the police
power, according to its largest definition, is restricted in its exercise by the National Constitution”).
307 See Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 751 (concluding that “a wise policy forbids the legislative body
to divest itself of the power to enact laws for the preservation of health and the repression of crime,”
and refusing to read the Contract Clause to contradict that policy); cf. New Orleans Gas Co., 115 U.S. at
669 (emphasizing that the Court had announced this principle “with reference to particular kinds of
private business which, in whatever manner conducted, were detrimental to the public health or the
public morals,” and concluding that “[t]he present case involves no such considerations”). For references
to other cases and useful discussion of the doctrine, see WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 203-13.
308 In Contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917), the
Court cast this point as a matter of settled doctrine:

There can be now, in view of the many decisions of this court on the subject, no room
for challenging the general proposition that the States cannot by virtue of the contract
clause be held to have divested themselves by contract of the right to exert their
governmental authority in matters which from their very nature so concern that
authority that to restrain its exercise by contract would be a renunciation of power to
legislate for the preservation of society or to secure the performance of essential
governmental duties. . . . [I]t is equally true that the previous decisions of this court
leave no doubt that the right of government to exercise its power of eminent domain
upon just compensation for a public purpose comes within this general doctrine.
Id. at 23-24.
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Court heard constitutional challenges to state legislation, and it was the basis
for decision in nearly half of the cases from that period in which the Supreme
Court held that a state law was unconstitutional.309 During the period from
1890 to the 1930s, however, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment supplanted the Contract Clause as a focus of constitutional
challenges to state regulatory enactments.310 That is partly because of how the
Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause during the so-called
Lochner era, but it is also because of how cases like Stone v. Mississippi
interpreted the Contract Clause. If a particular regulatory requirement did
not violate the Due Process Clause (because it was a legitimate exercise of the
state’s police power), then the Contract Clause normally would not prevent
the state from enforcing that requirement even against a corporation to which
the state legislature had once promised an exemption. When litigants
challenged the constitutionality of a state’s purported exercise of the police
power, then, the key arguments normally boiled down to the Due Process
Clause rather than the Contract Clause.
As doctrine under the Due Process Clause developed, moreover, the
Supreme Court held that states had more leeway to regulate businesses that
were “affected with a public interest” than to regulate other types of
businesses.311 The kinds of businesses that exercised franchises granted by the
government (besides the simple franchise of incorporation) were paradigmatic
examples of businesses that were affected with a public interest.312 But while
legislatures could and did regulate franchise-based businesses to a greater

See WRIGHT, supra note 167, at 95.
See id. at 95-100; see also, e.g., James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal
Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. REV.
381, 381 (1982) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the due process clause had usurped the place
of the contract clause as the centerpiece in litigation about individual rights.”); id. at 387-404
(canvassing scholarly explanations for this shift).
311 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (quoting HALE, supra note 204, at 77-78); see also
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 47-65 (1998) (discussing Munn and its progeny).
312 See Munn, 94 U.S. at 126 (using ferry franchises as an example); see also Charles Wolﬀ
Packing Co. v. Ct. of Indus. Rels., 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923) (noting that one category of “[b]usinesses
said to be clothed with a public interest justifying some public regulation” consisted of “[t]hose
which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of privileges which either expressly or
impliedly imposes the aﬃrmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of
the public”); California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40 (1888) (“[A] franchise is a right,
privilege or power of public concern, which ought not to be exercised by private individuals at their
mere will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the
government directly, or by public agents, acting under such conditions and regulations as the
government may impose in the public interest, and for the public security.”). But cf. Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-32 (1934) (noting that businesses did not have to be “dependent upon public
grants or franchises” in order to be “subject to regulation in the public interest”).
309
310
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extent than some other businesses, the franchises continued to be regarded as
vested private rights that legislatures could not freely rescind.313
III. OIL STATES AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS
Nineteenth-century conceptions of “franchises” are relevant today
because of the revival of interest in the broader framework described in Part I.
In a series of separate opinions, Justice Thomas has used that framework to
identify the kinds of claims that Congress can authorize administrative
agencies to resolve and the kinds of claims whose authoritative adjudication
instead requires “judicial” power.314 Like my initial article, some of those
opinions lump “franchises” together with “privileges”315 and suggest that
under the original understanding of the Constitution, both “could be taken
away without judicial process.”316
The cases in which Justice Thomas ﬁrst addressed these issues did not
themselves involve franchises. But in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v.
313

For a few examples, consider the following statements:
[T]he right to operate a [cotton] gin and to collect tolls therefor, as provided by [Okla.
Comp. Stat. §§ 3712–18 (1921)], is not a mere license, but a franchise, granted by the
state in consideration of the performance of a public service; and as such it constitutes
a property right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Frost v. Corp. Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515, 519-20 (1929).
The grant by ordinance to an incorporated telephone company, its successors and
assigns, of the right to occupy the streets and alleys of a city with its poles and wires
for the necessary conduct of a public telephone business, is a grant of a property right
in perpetuity, unless limited in duration by the grant itself or as a consequence of some
limitation imposed by the general law of the State, or by the corporate powers of the
city making the grant. . . . If the grant be accepted and the contemplated expenditure
made, the right cannot be destroyed by legislative enactment or city ordinance based
upon legislative power, without violating the prohibitions placed in the Constitution
for the protection of property rights.
City of Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1913).
[T]he grant of a right to supply gas or water to a municipality and its inhabitants through
pipes and mains laid in the streets, upon condition of the performance of its service by
the grantee, is the grant of a franchise vested in the State, in consideration of the
performance of a public service, and after performance by the grantee, is a contract
protected by the Constitution of the United States against state legislation to impair it.
Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 9 (1898); see also id. at 17 (“[W]here a contract
for a supply of water is innocuous in itself and is carried out with due regard to the good order of the
city and the health of its inhabitants, . . . the police power cannot be invoked to abrogate or impair it.”).
314 See supra note 8 (citing cases).
315 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1246 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); B & B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 171 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 344 n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
316 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1246 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a federal statute allowing the Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce to cancel a patent for an invention.317 In upholding the statute, Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion relied on the idea that when the government gives
an applicant the kinds of rights that a patent confers, the government is
“grant[ing] a public franchise,” and Congress can validly reserve the power to
cancel this franchise in the manner that the statute described.318 This Part
evaluates that conclusion in light of the relevant history.
A. A Brief Summary of the English Background
Scholars have written extensively about the early history of patents in
England,319 and I have nothing to contribute on that topic. Because the
English background is relevant, though, this Section summarizes it brieﬂy.
In England, the precursors of what modern lawyers think of as patents
developed as a subset of a much broader category. From an early date, the Crown
used “letters patent” to grant special privileges of various sorts to the people
named in the letters.320 (The adjective “patent” simply indicated that the letters
were “exposed to open view”; they were “matter[s] of public record” and were
“usually directed or addressed by the king to all his subjects at large.”321) Starting
in the mid-sixteenth century, some letters patent gave the people named in the
letters a temporary monopoly in the manufacture of particular products.322 The
exclusive rights conferred by these letters were paradigmatic “franchises,”
granted by the Crown as a matter of royal prerogative.323
The prerogative did not necessarily entitle the Crown to impose restraints
that would be of no beneﬁt to the realm.324 But in many circumstances, the
138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018).
Id. at 1373.
For references to leading books and articles, see Ben McEniery, Patent Eligibility and
Physicality in the Early History of Patent Law and Practice, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 175, 180
n.34 (2016). For a helpful overview, see John F. Duﬀy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal
Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19-33 (2007).
320 See CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH
PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 10 (1988).
321 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346.
322 See Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
615, 627-35 (1959) (discussing an isolated example of such a grant from 1449, but otherwise tracing
this practice to the second half of the sixteenth century); see also E. Wyndham Hulme, The History
of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 LAW Q. REV. 141, 145-50 (1896)
(listing “the industrial monopoly licenses issued during the period 1561–70”).
323 See, e.g., Klitzke, supra note 322, at 623-28; cf. 4 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 343 (1924) (“It was only very occasionally that Parliament intervened to encourage
the founder of a new industry by the grant of statutory privileges.”).
324 See HAROLD G. FOX, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND
FUTURE OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 57 (1947); see also Oren Bracha, The Commodification of
317
318
319
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grant of temporary monopolies was said to be beneﬁcial.325 For instance,
consistent with the mercantilist ideas of the day, Queen Elizabeth often
granted such monopolies to try to foster new industries in England.326
Sometimes the Crown granted these monopolies to foreign artisans who
agreed to move to England and teach their crafts to Englishmen.327
Sometimes the recipients were native Englishmen who proposed to introduce
to England industries that were established in other countries.328 Sometimes
the recipients claimed to have invented genuinely new machines or processes
that were thought to be useful, and the Crown was rewarding them.329
In practice, the Crown did not limit its grants to situations of this sort.
Whether to please favorites, to compensate servants, or to raise revenue for
the Crown beyond the parliamentary subsidy, Queen Elizabeth and her
successors sometimes granted monopolies in industries that already existed
and needed no encouragement.330 Even when the Crown was acting for less
Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177,
193-94 (2004) (noting widespread agreement that “a king had to rule so to promote the public good,”
but describing seventeenth-century debates between people who saw the monarch “as the sole arbiter
of the public good” and people who thought that the king’s prerogative was “limited by law” in ways
that other actors could enforce).
325 See D. Seaborne Davies, The Early History of the Patent Specification, 50 LAW Q. REV. 86, 9798 (1934) (examining what patents themselves said about the beneﬁts to the public).
326 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents
(pt. 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 855-57 (1994) [hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents
(pt. 2)]; see also E. Wyndham Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present, 13 LAW
Q. REV. 313, 313-14 (1897) (“The bringing in of new trades or manufactures . . . [was] the whole aim
and object of the [early] monopoly system . . . .”); cf. 3 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 352-56 (6th ed. 1956) (identifying four different categories of “patents of monopoly” in
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, but linking the first category to “the principles of
Mercantilism”). For discussion of the concepts of “mercantilism” and “monopoly,” see Thomas B.
Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1318-27 (2005).
327 See MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 10-12; see also E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the
Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law: A Sequel, 16 LAW Q. REV. 44, 52 (1900)
(tabulating grants from 1561 to 1603 and concluding that grants to foreigners became less common
over time); Adam Mossoﬀ, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800,
52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1261 & n.25 (2001) [hereinafter Mossoﬀ, Intellectual History] (using Hulme’s
numbers to infer a shift in motivations for the grants).
328 See FOX, supra note 324, at 60-61 (discussing an early example).
329 See Duﬀy, supra note 319, at 23-24.
330 See LIPSON, supra note 326, at 354-55; see also Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies:
Parliament’s Attack Upon the Royal Dispensing Power 1597–1689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 204 (1985)
(noting that in the later years of her reign, Queen Elizabeth “found . . . that she could oﬀer neither
adequate payment to her servants nor rewards to her favorites,” and she granted monopolies in lieu
of cash); Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note 326, at 871 (noting that although James I
suspended existing monopolies at the start of his reign, “he soon fell into the trap of issuing patents
of monopoly as rewards to court favorites”). On the use of patents to generate revenue for the
Crown, see Klitzke, supra note 322, at 640-41 (acknowledging that “Elizabeth would frequently
reserve a small rent to herself in the patent grant,” but calling the amounts “nominal”); see also
LIPSON, supra note 326, at 356 (reporting that patents did not produce much revenue for either
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self-interested reasons, moreover, patents were granted “upon the faith of [the
patentee’s] representations,”331 and the information that the patentee provided
was not always true. Thus, when Queen Elizabeth asserted that some of her
patents had produced results “contrary to her Majesty’s expectation at the time
of those grants,” she was able to blame the patentees: “[I]t doth appear that
some of the said grants were not only made upon false and untrue suggestions
contained in her letters patents, but have been also notoriously abused . . . .”332
In anticipation of such problems, the typical patent reserved power for
the Crown to revoke or terminate the grant upon ﬁnding it to be harmful or
unwarranted.333 According to Professor D. Seaborne Davies, the earliest
known example of such a clause appears in a patent granted in 1575, and the
clause “gradually came into general use.”334 The mature version of the clause
contemplated proceedings in the Privy Council to ﬁnd the facts that the
clause made grounds for revocation (such as that the grant was “inconvenient
or prejudicial to the realm” or, later, that the purported invention was not new
or that the patentee was not the true inventor).335 In Professor Davies’s words,
“The Privy Council did not hesitate to exercise its powers under this clause
throughout the seventeenth century and there are records extant of
revocations made under the clause certainly as late as 1779.”336
Whether private litigants could challenge the validity of patents in court
was more contested. In 1601, when a plaintiﬀ who allegedly had imported
goods in violation of a patent brought a trespass suit against the defendants
who had seized those goods, Elizabeth’s Privy Council took the position that
Elizabeth or James I, but contrasting Charles I); MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 20-22 (concluding
that “the patent system was only minimally exploited as a ﬁscal device” after 1660).
331 Hulme, supra note 322, at 151.
332 Elizabeth’s Proclamation Concerning Monopolies (Nov. 28, 1601), reprinted in WILLIAM
HYDE PRICE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY app. J at 156 (1913).
333 See Davies, supra note 325, at 102.
334 Id. Professor Davies suggests that the clause was already common by 1601, when Queen
Elizabeth sought to quell controversy about her patents by revoking some of the most objectionable.
See id. at 103 & n.62. Except for a brief hiatus from 1625 to 1627 and another “[f]or a short time after
the Restoration,” the clause was also familiar in the patents of Elizabeth’s successors, and it
eventually “became a ﬁxed feature of all patents of invention.” Id. at 103.
Of course, monarchs with broad views of their prerogative powers might have thought that they
could revoke royal grants even in the absence of such reservations. Still, including an explicit
reservation in the grant made it unnecessary to take an aggressive position on that topic.
335 See id. at 102-03 & n.61; see also, e.g., H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui & Sean Bottomley, Privy
Council and Scire Facias 1700–1883: An Addendum to the Brief for H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui and Sean
Bottomley as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party 3 (Nov. 6, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989
(quoting a 1713 patent that authorized termination by the Crown for all these reasons).
336 Davies, supra note 325, at 103; see also id. at 103-04 (reporting that the most common grounds
for revocation were “non-user or . . . lack of novelty, or because the patentee was not the first inventor”).
For a catalog of revocation cases in the Privy Council, see E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and
Practice of Letters Patent for Invention from the Restoration to 1794 (pts. 1 & 2), 33 LAW Q. REV. 63, 180 (1917).
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“her Prerogative Royall may not be called in question for the valliditie of the
letters patentes.”337 Soon thereafter, though, Elizabeth changed her tune
under pressure from Parliament; she declared a number of patents void, and
she gave permission for people aggrieved by other grants “to take their
ordinary remedy by her Highness’s laws of this realm.”338
Elizabeth’s concession averted potentially hostile legislation from
Parliament,339 but the détente did not survive the reign of James I. In 1624,
amid continued outrage over “odious monopolies” and as part of a broader
struggle over the royal prerogative,340 Parliament enacted the Statute of
Monopolies. That statute began with several broad declarations, including
that (1) “all Monopolies and all Commissions, Grants, Licenses, Charters, and
letters patent . . . for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of
any thing within this Realm . . . are altogether contrary to the Laws of this
Realm, and so are and shall be utterly void,” and (2) “all Monopolies and all
such Commissions, Grants, Licenses, Charters, [and] letters patent . . . as
aforesaid and the force and validity of them . . . shall be forever hereafter
examined, heard, tried, and determined by and according to the Common
Laws of this Realm and not otherwise.”341 Still, the statute made various
exceptions,342 including one that left room for the development of modern
337 Mossoﬀ, Intellectual History, supra note 327, at 1267 (quoting Letter to the Lord Cheefe
Justice of the Common Pleas and to the Rest of the Justices of that Courte (Oct. 7, 1601), in 32 ACTS
OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND (2d ser.) 237, 237 (1907)). The patent in question was the
playing-card monopoly that was also at issue in the Case of Monopolies, summarized infra note 338.
See Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 131221 (1996) (describing the trespass action).
338 Elizabeth’s Proclamation Concerning Monopolies, supra note 332, at 157. The most famous
example of litigation in the common-law courts about the validity of an Elizabethan patent is the
Case of Monopolies (1603), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.). Letters patent had granted the plaintiﬀ a
monopoly on both the importation and the domestic manufacture of playing cards. See id. at 126061. The plaintiﬀ sued the defendant for allegedly violating these exclusive rights, but the court
entered judgment for the defendant. Id. at 1266. A dozen years later, Coke’s report of the case
portrayed the court as having held that the plaintiﬀ ’s grant was “utterly void” for various reasons
(such as that the Queen must have been deceived, for the grant would serve only “the private gain
of the patentees” and would not beneﬁt the public). Id. at 1262-65. Contrary to Coke’s report,
modern scholars believe that the court did not deliver opinions to explain the judgment. See Corré,
supra note 337, at 1325. Still, the report does show the kinds of arguments that common-law lawyers
could advance circa 1615, when the report was published.
339 For accounts, see FOX, supra note 324, at 75-77; Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note
326, at 865-66.
340 See, e.g., OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1790–1909, at 19-20 (2016); Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note
326, at 872-73.
341 Statute of Monopolies 1624, 21 Jac. I c. 3, §§ 1–2 (spelling and punctuation modernized).
342 For instance, it took care not to repeal any pre-existing grants that had been made or
conﬁrmed by Act of Parliament. See id. § 7. It also exempted charters and other grants or letters
patent to “any City, Borough, or Town Corporate within this Realm”; to “any Corporations,
Companies, or Fellowships of any Art, Trade, Occupation, or Mistery”; and to “any Companies or
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patent law. Speciﬁcally, section 6 said that the statute’s declarations “shall not
extend to any letters Patent and Grants of Privilege for the term of fourteen
years or under . . . of the sole working or making of any manner of new
Manufactures within this Realm, to the true and ﬁrst Inventor and Inventors
of such Manufactures,” provided that these grants “be not contrary to the
Law nor mischievous to the State, by raising of the prices of Commodities at
home, or hurt of Trade, or generally inconvenient.”343 (The word “Inventor”
in this provision was understood to include not only people who made
original discoveries but also people who simply introduced practices to
England from elsewhere in the world.344)
Despite Parliament’s declaration that the validity of patents should be
tried and determined “according to the Common Laws of this Realm,”
scholars agree that the Privy Council “continued to exercise the chief control
over matters relating to patents” until the eighteenth century.345 That did not
necessarily violate the Statute of Monopolies; the patents that section 6
tolerated arguably were exempt from all of the preceding declarations in the
statute,346 and in any event almost every patent granted by the Crown
continued to specify that the patent would have no further eﬀect if revoked
by the Crown upon ﬁndings made by the Privy Council.347 In practice,
though, the Privy Council eventually stopped playing this role.348 Starting in
the 1780s and continuing into the nineteenth century, when the Crown
thought that a patent should be revoked, the Crown went to court; the normal
mechanism for revocation became a scire facias action brought by the Crown
(or someone acting in the name of the Crown) against the patentee.349

Societies of Merchants within this Realm, erected for the maintenance, enlargement, or ordering of
any Trade of Merchandise.” Id. § 9 (spelling and punctuation modernized).
343 Id. § 6 (spelling and punctuation modernized). This exemption addressed patents or grants
“hereafter to be made.” Id. Section 5 made a similar exception for patents and grants that already
existed, except that they were allowed to last for up to twenty-one years. See id. § 5.
344 See Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 2), supra note 326, at 877 (citing sources).
345 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 323, at 354; see also Hulme, supra note 336, at 63 (noting that
the period “from the Statute of Monopolies to Dollond’s case (1766)” is “almost barren of recorded
Common Law decisions” in patent cases).
346 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents
(pt. 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 771, 772-73 (1995) [hereinafter Walterscheid,
Antecedents (pt. 3)] (noting uncertainty about the statute’s meaning on this point).
347 See supra notes 333–36 and accompanying text.
348 See BRACHA, supra note 340, at 22 & n.39 (noting that in the second half of the eighteenth
century, “Privy Council patent revocation proceedings atrophied and eventually disappeared,”
though doubting that the Privy Council’s role ended as abruptly as an earlier scholar had thought).
349 See Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 VAND. L. REV. 647, 654-60 (2019). For
more detail about the decline of Privy Council revocation proceedings and the rise of scire facias, see
generally Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note 335.
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By the 1780s, English practices with respect to patents had also changed in
other ways. Scholars have highlighted two developments that had the potential
to affect how people conceptualized the legal interests conferred by a patent.
First, and quite early, the Crown’s process for issuing patents became
routinized.350 Legally speaking, the issuance of a patent was always
discretionary. But in practice, a majority of applicants who followed the
procedures and whose petitions met the requirements received a patent, and
the patents themselves conferred “an increasingly standard set of
entitlements.”351 Although Professor Oren Bracha cautions against
exaggerating this development, he notes that it sowed the seeds for thinking of
patents as “standard rights” rather than “particularistic privileges.”352
Second, in the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth century, the Crown’s law oﬃcers
developed the practice of requiring patentees to provide speciﬁcations that
disclosed the details of their invention.353 Whatever the original motivations
for this requirement,354 Lord Mansﬁeld noted that it enabled other people to
practice the invention after the patent expired, and thereby gave the public a
beneﬁt in exchange for the exclusive rights that the patentee was getting.355
Soon, lawyers were describing the disclosure of the invention as “[t]he
consideration[] which the patentee gives for his monopoly.”356 In the words
of Professor Adam Mossoﬀ, that way of thinking suggests that a patentee “has
entered into a . . . contract [with society]” and “is morally entitled to the
beneﬁts of this contract, i.e., legal protection of his patent right.”357
350 See Bracha, supra note 324, at 200-02; see also MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 40-48
(describing the process).
351 Bracha, supra note 324, at 202.
352 Id. at 202-03.
353 See Davies, supra note 325, at 90 (noting that most patents issued after 1734 included a clause
requiring the patentee to provide speciﬁcations); Walterscheid, Antecedents (pt. 3), supra note 346,
at 778-81 (citing scholarship that attributes this requirement to the law oﬃcers).
354 Compare MACLEOD, supra note 320, at 51-55 (concluding that the specification “certainly” was
not introduced “for the purpose of disseminating inventions by disclosure,” and discussing other possible
motivations), with SEAN BOTTOMLEY, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM DURING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1700–1852: FROM PRIVILEGE TO PROPERTY 46-50, 89-91 (2014) (suggesting that the
specification was “initially introduced at the behest of petitioners” but “by the middle of the eighteenth
century” came to be seen “as the consideration on which the patent was awarded”).
355 See E. Wyndham Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries, 18 LAW Q. REV. 280, 285 (1902) (providing excerpts from Mansﬁeld’s instructions to the
jury in the 1778 case of Liardet v. Johnson); see also BRACHA, supra note 340, at 24 (noting that
Mansﬁeld’s account “became the new doctrinal orthodoxy” by the 1780s).
356 Turner v. Winter (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1276 (K.B.) (argument of counsel). Admittedly, even
before the specification requirement, patentees could have been said to provide other “consideration” for
their exclusive rights, so this way of talking could have emerged earlier. Cf. Hulme, supra note 326, at 314,
318 (arguing that “the [patentee’s] undertaking to work the grant”—and hence to introduce a new
industry to England—“constituted the essential consideration of the early Monopoly system”).
357 Mossoﬀ, Intellectual History, supra note 327, at 1301 (emphasis omitted); see also
BOTTOMLEY, supra note 354, at 79 (“[A] distinct rationale for the patent was constructed by the
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B. Conceptions of Patents in the United States
1. The Status of Federal Patent Rights in the Early Republic
After independence, the United States did not reinvent patent law, but it
also did not exactly duplicate English practices. I will set colonial and early
state practices aside and focus on the federal level.
American patents had a diﬀerent legal basis than English patents. The
Federal Constitution gave the President executive power but not unspeciﬁed
“prerogative” powers.358 Unlike the Crown, then, the President could not
validly issue patents on his own authority.359 Instead, the Constitution
allowed Congress to establish a federal patent system by statute. In the words
of Article I, “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”360
The ﬁrst federal Patent Act, enacted by Congress in 1790, either
established or reﬂected another important diﬀerence between American and
English concepts. In England, although the Statute of Monopolies had
restricted the Crown’s authority to confer exclusive rights, the statute’s
exception for “Inventors” had been understood broadly; the statute did not
prevent the Crown from granting exclusive rights to people who simply
introduced new trades or manufacturing techniques into England from
abroad.361 In the United States, by contrast, true creation (not mere
importation) was required for a federal patent. As Edward Walterscheid has
recounted in detail, one version of the bill that became the Patent Act of 1790
would have treated the ﬁrst importer of a device as its inventor within the
United States, but members of Congress rejected this provision during the
legislative process.362 Indeed, Walterscheid adduces evidence that Rep. James
1770s, one where the patent was conceived as representing a contract between the inventor and the
public.”); N. Scott Pierce, Double Jeopardy: Patents of Invention as Contracts, Invention Disclosure as
Consideration, and Where Oil States Went Wrong, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
645, 710 (2020) (asserting that “[p]atents have been considered contracts since the eighteenth
century” and calling this shift “the basis for modern jurisprudence in patent law”).
358 See Mortenson, supra note 47, at 1173; cf. Ilan Wurman, In Search of Prerogative, 70 DUKE
L.J. 93, 107-37 (2020) (reviewing evidence and agreeing with Mortenson on this point).
359 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 362-63 (1888) (“[W]e have here no
prerogative right of the crown; and letters patent, whether for inventions or for grants of land, issue
not from the President but from the United States. The President has no prerogative in the matter.”).
360 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
361 See supra note 344 and accompanying text; see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duﬀy,
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 379 (2008) (“Though a variety
of legal and technological changes made patents of importation infrequent after the late nineteenth
century, they were not completely abandoned [in England] until 1977.”).
362 EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE 319-26 (2002); see also H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 6 (Feb. 16, 1790), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
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Madison doubted Congress’s constitutional power to authorize what modern
scholars call “patents of importation.”363 Be that as it may, the Patent Act of
1790 required applicants to claim that they “have invented or discovered [a]
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or [an] improvement
therein not before known or used,”364 and the Patent Act of 1793 used similar
language.365 Consistent with both the legislative history and an additional
statute enacted in 1800,366 early judges said that “if . . . [a person] was not the
original inventor, in reference to other parts of the world as well as America,
he is not entitled to a patent.”367
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1626, 1631 (Charlene
Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) (setting forth the provision that was stricken).
363 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362, at 321-25 (canvassing the legislative history and
private correspondence, and concluding that constitutional concerns were a major reason for the
omission of the language that would have authorized patents of importation); cf. id. at 323-27 (noting
that those concerns may not have been well founded).
364 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362,
at 325 (noting that the phrase “in the United States” had appeared at the end of this provision in
one version of the bill, but the phrase was deleted in recognition of the elimination of the section
that would have treated importers like inventors).
365 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318-19 (requiring applicants to allege that they
“have invented [a] new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or [a] new
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or
used before the application”).
366 The Patent Act of 1793 had allowed only “citizens of the United States” to apply for patents.
Id. at 318; cf. Patent Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 109 (inviting applications from “any person”). In 1800,
Congress broadened the category of potential applicants to include noncitizens who had been living
in the United States for at least two years by the time of their application—but people who sought
a patent under this statute had to attest that to the best of their knowledge, the “invention, art or
discovery” that they were attempting to patent “hath not . . . been known or used either in this or
any foreign country.” Act of April 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 1, 2 Stat. 37, 38.
367 Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710) (jury instruction of
Bushrod Washington); see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362, at 330-35 (citing Reutgen; Dawson
v. Follen, 7 F. Cas. 216, 216 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 3670) (jury instruction of Bushrod Washington);
and Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 853 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4559), rev’d on other grounds, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 454 (1818)). In support of the same conclusion, Justice Story also pointed to section 6 of
the Patent Act of 1793, which allowed defendants to defeat infringement claims (and, indeed, to get
the court to declare a patent “void”) on the ground that the patented thing “was not originally
discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in some public work anterior
to the supposed discovery of the patentee.” 1 Stat. at 322. Under these provisions, Story observed,
“it has been uniformly held, that it must be shown that the invention is new, not only in the United
States, but to the world.” Mellus v. Silsbee, 16 F. Cas. 1332, 1333 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 9404); see
also Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographic Limitation on Prior Art in a Small
World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 698 n.67 (2003) (calling attention to Story’s opinion).
The Patent Act of 1836 relaxed this principle somewhat. Each applicant for a patent still had to
swear or aﬃrm “that he does verily believe that he is the original and ﬁrst inventor or discoverer of
the art, machine, composition, or improvement, for which he solicits a patent, and that he does not
know or believe that the same was ever before known or used.” Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5
Stat. 117, 119. But if, unbeknownst to the applicant, the invention was known to people in a foreign
country, a U.S. patent could nonetheless be issued to the applicant unless the invention either had
been patented in the other country or had been described in a printed publication there. See id. § 7,
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As Professor Mossoﬀ has noted, an increased emphasis on applicants’
creativity potentially dovetailed with a diﬀerent way of thinking about patent
rights—not as governmental largesse, nor even as part of a deal between the
public and an inventor, but as something that the inventor truly deserved even
before a patent was issued.368 In the context of copyright law, several state
legislatures had already declared that “there [is] no Property more peculiarly
a Man’s own than that which is produced by the Labour of his Mind,” and
they had suggested that security for “the Fruits of [a person’s] Study and
Industry” is “one of the natural Rights of all Men.”369 In January 1791,
moreover, the National Constituent Assembly of France explicitly endorsed
a similar idea with respect to patents. In the preamble of a patent statute that
was modeled on English and American law,370 the Assembly declared that
“every new idea, the manifestation or development of which could become
useful to society, belongs originally to him who conceived it; and . . . it would
attack the rights of man in their essence not to regard an industrial discovery
as the property of its creator.”371 Three decades later, Rep. Daniel Webster
5 Stat. at 119-20; see also id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123 (making a parallel provision about defenses in
infringement suits). In the 1840s, the Attorney General explained these provisions as a way to
prevent “the existence of a secret invention or discovery abroad” from defeating the “rightful
property” of an American inventor who “has been so fortunate as to invent or discover the same
thing” and who was entitled to “the fruits of his ingenuity.” Patents for Invention, 5 Op. Att’y Gen.
19, 21 (1848); see also id. at 21-22 (defending the rights of “an original bona fide inventor in this country,
who verily believed himself the original and ﬁrst inventor, or discover[er], at the time of his
application,” and observing that under the statute, “[t]he fact that an invention not patented, and
not described in any printed publication, has been before known or used in any foreign country, is
rendered immaterial, except so far as it may have come to the knowledge of the applicant”).
368 See Mossoﬀ, Intellectual History, supra note 327, at 1302-15 (arguing that even in England,
the conception of novelty in eighteenth-century patent law was linked to John Locke’s idea of a
natural right to property in the fruits of one’s own labor).
369 Act of Mar. 17, 1783, ch. 26, 1783 Mass. Acts (Jan. Sess.) 236, 236; Act of Nov. 7, 1783, 1783
N.H. Laws (Oct. Sess.) 305, 305; An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right
and Beneﬁt of Publishing Their Literary Productions, for Twenty-One Years, 1783 R.I. Laws (Dec.
Sess.) 6, 6; see also Adam Mossoﬀ, Who Cares What Thomas Jeﬀerson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 982 & n.134 (2007)
[hereinafter Mossoﬀ, Jeﬀerson] (calling attention to these statutes). Admittedly, what people said
about copyrights did not necessarily extend to patents. Compare Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent
or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 85 (1995)
(noting that in eighteenth-century England, the common law was thought to recognize property
rights in literary works but not in inventions), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 at 288 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (explaining the constitutional provision that empowers
Congress to secure exclusive rights for authors and inventors by noting that “[t]he copy right of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law” and observing
that “[t]he right to useful inventions[] seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors”).
370 See Fredrik Neumeyer, Contribution to the History of Modern Patent Legislation in the United States
and in France, 4 SCANDINAVIAN ECON. HIST. REV. 126, 147-48 (1956) (noting that the relevant report
to the Assembly emphasized both English patent law and American acceptance of English concepts).
371 Act of Jan. 7, 1791, in 41 PROCES-VERBAL DE L’ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE (Paris 1791) (“[T]oute
idée nouvelle dont la manifestation ou le développement peut devenir utile à la société, appartient
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spoke as if most of his colleagues in the U.S. House of Representatives
accepted this idea. In an 1824 debate about a bill involving patents, Rep.
Webster assumed his colleagues would agree “that the right of the inventor is
a high property; it is the fruit of his mind—it belongs to him more than any
other property— . . . and he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of it.”372
Webster knew his audience: the colleague whom he was debating (future
President James Buchanan) “concur[red] . . . heartily . . . in [Webster’s]
sentiments . . . respecting the property which an inventor has in that which
is the product of his own genius.”373
Of course, even if an inventor has some moral entitlement to prevent
others from freely using his idea, it would have been diﬃcult to enforce that
entitlement in the state of nature. For Lockeans, though, that practical point
would not disprove the existence of the entitlement. Indeed, the fact that
smooth enforcement requires state power does not necessarily distinguish
intellectual property from other forms of property.
Still, there are important diﬀerences between property in ideas and
property in physical things. In an 1813 letter that has since become famous,
Thomas Jeﬀerson invoked those diﬀerences to try to debunk the notion “that
inventors have a natural and exclusive right to their inventions.”374 Even if
there could be a natural right to property “in an acre of land, for instance,”
Jeﬀerson took theorists to agree that any such right rested on occupation of
the land and lasted only so long as the occupation continued.375 According to
Jeﬀerson, ideas were “incapable of . . . exclusive appropriation” in the relevant
sense, and so “inventions . . . cannot in nature be a subject of property.”376 In
primitivement à celui qui l’a conçue, et . . . ce seroit attaquer les droits de l’homme dans leur essence, que
de ne pas regarder une découverte industrielle comme la propriété de son auteur . . . .”). Admittedly, the
Assembly also authorized patents of importation. See id. art. III (“Quiconque apportera le premier en
France, une découverte étrangère, jouira des mêmes avantages que s’il en étoit l’inventeur.”).
372 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824).
373 Id. at 936; see also Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection
of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 718 & n.155 (2007) (quoting this exchange).
374 See Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 379, 382 (J. Jeﬀerson Looney ed., 2009) (observing
that this notion had been advanced “by some (and in England especially)”); cf. BOTTOMLEY, supra
note 354, at 86-87 (noting the reference to natural rights in the preamble of the French patent
statute, and tracing the spread of this legislation to some other countries in the ﬁrst quarter of the
nineteenth century, but concluding that “[i]n England, notions of natural rights were much less
important in contemporary debate about patents”); H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750–1852, at 18 (1984) (agreeing
that in the early nineteenth century, “the natural-rights-in-invention thesis was more extensively
employed by Continental countries” than in England).
375 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 374, at 382-83; cf. id. at 382
(setting aside the question “whether the origin of any kind of property is derived from nature at all”).
376 Id. at 383. But see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405 (describing copyright
as a “species of property which, being grounded on labour and invention, is more properly reducible
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his words, “the moment [an idea] is divulged, it forces itself into the
possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it”—
and yet “no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of
it.”377 Jeﬀerson concluded that “if nature has made any one thing less
susceptible, than all others, of exclusive property, it is the action of the
thinking power called an Idea.”378 To be sure, society could choose to
encourage invention by giving people “an exclusive right to the proﬁts arising
from [their ideas]”—but “this may, or may not be done, according to the will
and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from any body.”379
Two centuries later, it is hard to know how many members of the founding
generation agreed with Jefferson and how many shared the views that he was
criticizing. In Professor Mossoff’s words, “The historical record is mixed.”380
Professor Oren Bracha suggests that at least in some quarters, “a strong
ideological support for patent rights had consolidated” by the 1790s, but neither
law nor practice reflected “a clear shift to a right-based system.”381 More
broadly, although a “new conceptual framework” that saw “the patent as an
inventor’s property right in his mental creation” had emerged, “[i]t was not
immediately clear . . . how this new concept of patent rights changed the nature
of the inventor’s claim on the state, compared with the privilege system.”382
Some features of founding-era patent law are hard to reconcile with the
notion that inventors have a natural right to control the use of their ideas
even after those ideas have been disclosed. The Constitution itself authorizes
Congress to give inventors exclusive rights only “for limited Times”383—a
restriction that seems inconsistent with the strongest possible versions of a
natural right to intellectual property.384 On their face, moreover, the Patent
to the head of occupancy than any other; since the right of occupancy itself is supposed by Mr.
Locke, and many others, to be founded on the personal labour of the occupant” (footnotes omitted));
cf. Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 222 (K.B.) (opinion of Aston, J.) (“Barbeyrac, in his
notes on Pufendorf, clearly shews that the right acquired from taking possession does not cease when
there is no possession; that perpetual possession is impossible; [and] that the [contrary] hypothesis
would reduce property to nothing . . . .”).
377 Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 374, at 383.
378 Id.
379 Id.
380 Mossoﬀ, Jeﬀerson, supra note 369, at 1008.
381 BRACHA, supra note 340, at 191-201.
382 Id. at 188.
383 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
384 See, e.g., EXPOSITION OF PART OF THE PATENT LAW 6 (1816) (asserting that by limiting
the duration of patents, “the public claim more than their right; for the ingenuity and labour of the
inventor is his, exclusively, by natural law and justice”). The author of this pamphlet, Oliver Evans,
was an inventor who “completely revolutionized the processes of ﬂour manufacture.” Coleman
Sellers, Jr., Oliver Evans and His Inventions, 122 J. FRANKLIN INST. 1, 1 (1886). In 1790, he was
awarded one of the earliest federal patents. See id. at 8. A few years after it expired, Congress enacted
a private bill authorizing the Secretary of State to grant him a new patent for another fourteen years.
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Act of 1790 and the Patent Act of 1793 both gave federal oﬃcials the discretion
to grant patents to worthy applicants, without creating any obligation to do so.
Still, these features of early patent law are consistent with a more modest
version of natural-rights thinking. While inventors may not have a natural
right to prevent others from using their ideas after the ideas have become
public, inventors have no duty to disclose their ideas in the first place. The
absence of such duty might be cast as one type of natural “right”—the liberty
to keep one’s ideas to oneself. In the words of a modern commentator, the
patent system encourages inventors to surrender “the natural right to keep an
invention secret” in exchange for “the civil right of a patent.”385 That
characterization dovetails with the view that patents reflect a contract between
the public and the inventor, under which the inventor receives exclusive rights
for a limited time in exchange for disclosing an idea that people will be able
to use freely thereafter. Scholars agree, moreover, that by the early nineteenth
century, this notion of patent as contract was “a common theoretical
justification, offered by both British and North American writers.”386
The Patent Act of 1790 ﬁts this characterization well. Recall that in
eighteenth-century England, the Crown’s law oﬃcers had developed the
practice of requiring patentees to furnish speciﬁcations, and Lord Mansﬁeld
eventually explained that requirement as part of an exchange between the
public and the inventor.387 In the United States, section 2 of the Patent Act
of 1790 both codiﬁed the speciﬁcation requirement and echoed Lord
Mansﬁeld’s explanation of it.388

See An Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70 (1808); see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent
and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective (pt. 2), 49 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 58-65 (2001) (chronicling the litigation over Evans’s patent). Evans’s eﬀorts to
enforce the new patent are what prompted Isaac McPherson’s correspondence with Thomas
Jeﬀerson. See Letter from Isaac McPherson to Thomas Jeﬀerson, Aug. 3, 1813, in 6 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES, supra note 374, at 353.
385 Ronald E. Andermann, Comment, Employee Inventors, the Dual Ladder, and the Useful Arts:
From Thomas Paine to the “Dilbert Boycott”, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 310, 328 (2002).
386 Christine MacLeod, The Paradoxes of Patenting: Invention and its Diﬀusion in 18th and 19thCentury Britain, France, and North America, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 885, 895 (1991).
387 See supra notes 353–57 and accompanying text.
388 Section 2 provided:
[T]he grantee . . . of each patent shall, at the time of granting the same, deliver to the
Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing a description . . . and explanations
and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a model) of the thing
. . . by him . . . invented or discovered . . . ; which specification shall be so particular, and
said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other
things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the
art or manufacture . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may
have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term . . . .
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The idea that rights conferred by a patent sounded in contract (and hence
vested upon issuance of the patent rather than at the time of the invention)
also ﬁts with the roles that the Patent Act of 1790 gave executive and judicial
actors. Anyone who claimed to “have invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not
before known or used” could apply for a patent by petitioning three highranking executive oﬃcials—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and
the Attorney General.389 If a majority of those oﬃcials “deem[ed] the
invention or discovery suﬃciently useful and important,” they had discretion
to authorize the preparation of a patent, which the executive branch would
issue in the name of the United States.390 On the other hand, if the three
oﬃcials decided not to grant a patent, the statute did not appear to
contemplate any judicial review. Thus, the statute put the executive branch in
charge of whether to issue a patent in the ﬁrst place.
Once a patent was issued, though, any challenges to its validity had to
proceed in court. Within the first year after issuance, a challenger who averred
that the patent had been “obtained surreptitiously . . . or upon false
suggestion” could file a motion in the district court for the district where the
patentee resided, and the judge could order the patentee to “show cause why
process should not issue against him . . . to repeal such patent[].”391 Ultimately,
“in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall appear
that the patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer, judgment
shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patent.”392 Even after
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (emphasis added); see also Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic:
Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights and Authors, 73 SOC. RSCH. 1129, 1134-38 (2006) (associating the
Patent Act of 1790 with the idea of “the patent bargain—the contract between inventors and citizens”).
389 Patent Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 109-10.
390 Id. at 110.
391 Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 111; see also Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (enacting a similar
provision with a deadline of three years rather than one).
392 Patent Act of 1790 § 5, 1 Stat. at 111; see also Patent Act of 1793 § 10, 1 Stat. at 323 (using almost
the same words); infra notes 406–10 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Court
eventually interpreted these provisions). For insightful discussion, see Beauchamp, supra note 349.
In an opinion on circuit, Justice Story compared and contrasted proceedings under these
provisions to “a scire facias at the common law to repeal a patent.” Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175,
1178 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 13,337). As Justice Story understood English practice, only the Crown
could maintain a scire facias proceeding in court, except that “where two patents have issued for the
same thing[,] . . . the prior patentee may maintain a scire facias to repeal the second patent.” Id. at
1178-79. By contrast, Justice Story thought that “under our patent act, any person, whether a patentee
or not, may apply for the repeal.” Id. at 1179.
Professor Beauchamp suggests that proceedings to repeal a patent are therefore an exception to
what Ann Woolhandler and I have described as the historical precursors of modern standing
doctrine, under which private litigants normally needed a private litigable interest. See Beauchamp,
supra note 349, at 667 & n.105 (citing Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 3). I do not deny the
existence of such exceptions, but I am not sure that repeal proceedings were one. The plaintiﬀ in a
repeal proceeding was trying to establish that he did not owe the defendant a duty to refrain from
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the deadline for this sort of proceeding passed, the defendant in an
infringement suit could avoid liability by successfully challenging the truth of
the patentee’s claim of invention or the adequacy and accuracy of the patent’s
specifications.393 But while these matters were open for judicial consideration,
American patents did not reserve any power of revocation for the executive
branch, and until the twentieth century no federal patent statute tried to build
such a power into the terms of the bargain that patentees were offered.
As Professor Christopher Beauchamp has noted, this fact does not
necessarily prove “that the [revocation] process was seen as inherently
judicial”; perhaps Congress simply wanted to assign the revocation function
to “geographically distributed federal oﬃcials,” and judges were the only such
oﬃcials whom it made sense to use.394 Still, the way that the early federal
patent statutes allocated decisionmaking is at least suggestive. Congress
plainly believed that executive-branch oﬃcials could be authorized to decide
whether to issue patents in the ﬁrst place. But in keeping with the idea that
patents (like contracts) gave rise to vested rights after issuance, Congress did
not authorize the same executive-branch oﬃcials who issued patents to
entertain motions to revoke them.
Of course, those oﬃcials had enough to do as it was. The idea that every
application for a patent would be evaluated personally by the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General would be laughable
today, and it did not work well in 1790 either.395 In 1793, Congress therefore
enacted a new Patent Act that simply authorized the Secretary of State to
cause a patent to be prepared upon receiving an application that met the
using the invention that the defendant had patented. Ordinarily, someone who was trying to
establish that legal position would have a private litigable interest—the same sort of private interest
that is at stake on one side of an infringement suit. Consistent with this point, Professor Beauchamp
notes that a repeal action initiated by a private complainant was “constructed throughout as a private
action” and was brought “in the name of a private plaintiﬀ, not the government.” Id. at 664-65; see
also Wood v. Williams, 30 F. Cas. 485, 485-87 (E.D. Pa. 1834) (No. 17,968) (denying a motion to redocket such a suit “as an action wherein the United States are plaintiﬀs”).
393 Patent Act of 1790 § 6, 1 Stat. at 111-12. In infringement suits, the 1790 Act made the patent
“prima facie evidence[] that the said patentee . . . was . . . the ﬁrst and true inventor or . . . discoverer
. . . of the thing so speciﬁed, and that the same is truly speciﬁed,” but the Act allowed the defendant
to introduce evidence to the contrary. See id. at 111. The Patent Act of 1793 omitted the “prima facie
evidence” language (presumably because the 1793 Act contemplated that the executive branch would
issue patents without much scrutiny). The 1793 Act added that if the defendant in an infringement
suit showed that the patentee was not the true inventor or that the patent’s speciﬁcations concealed
or added information “for the purpose of deceiving the public,” then the court should not only render
judgment for the defendant but also declare the patent “void.” Patent Act of 1793 § 6, 1 Stat. at 322.
394 Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 666.
395 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of History: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
Thomas Jefferson’s Influence on the Patent Law, 39 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 195, 203-04 (1998) (concluding that
the main impetus for the Patent Act of 1793 was the “recognition by the members of the Patent Board . . .
that they simply had insufficient time to properly carry out the tasks assigned to them under the Act”).
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statute’s formal requirements.396 Although the statute cast this authority as a
power rather than a duty, Professor Bracha asserts that no one expected the
Secretary to examine the substantive merits of the application: “it was clear
to everyone involved that patents would be issued on demand.”397 At any rate,
that is basically what happened.398 Although only ﬁfty-seven patents had been
issued under the Patent Act of 1790,399 nearly ten thousand were issued under
the Patent Act of 1793, including many that were not really valid.400
The fact that it was easy to get a patent, and that many patents were
obtained upon false suggestions, aﬀected how federal district judge William
Van Ness interpreted the procedure for judicial “repeal” of a patent. The
Patent Act of 1793 essentially duplicated the provision in the Patent Act of
1790 about that procedure,401 but neither statute speciﬁed the nature of the
proceedings.402 Sitting on circuit in 1816, Justice Story had interpreted the
statutory language to call for “a proceeding in the nature of a scire facias at
the common law,” complete with trial by jury.403 In the early 1820s, though,
Judge Van Ness disagreed.404 Because patents in the United States were being
“granted as matters of course, if the applicant complies with the forms of the
law,” and because purported inventors could use bad patents to “harass the
396 Patent Act of 1793 § 1, 1 Stat. at 318-21. As under the Patent Act of 1790, the Attorney General
would review the patent for matters of form after the patent was prepared, but the Attorney General
no longer had a role in the initial decisionmaking, and the Secretary of War had no role at all. See id.
397 BRACHA, supra note 340, at 202. The principal exception appears to have been “interfering
applications”—but even then, disputes about which application to grant were to be resolved by
arbitrators rather than by the Secretary of State. See Patent Act of 1793 § 9, 1 Stat. at 322-23.
398 See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 24-338 (1836), reprinted in 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 854, 856 (1936) (“The
act of 1793 . . . gives, according to the practical construction it has received, no power to the Secretary
to refuse a patent for want of either novelty or usefulness. The only inquiry is whether the terms
and forms prescribed are complied with.”); Robert P. Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S.
Patent System, and Why They Matter Today, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2559, 2568 (2019) (“From 1793 to 1836,
inventors who sent the proper documents to the State Department received a patent.”); see also
Patents for Inventions, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 170, 171 (1812) (advising the Secretary of State that when an
applicant had submitted the paperwork required by the statute, “the Department of State has no
discretion to decline to issue the patent as applied for,” and “[t]he eﬃcacy of the patent, when issued,
will be for judicial cognizance”).
399 P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 244 (1936).
400 See Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 886 (1998); see also S. Doc. No. 24-338, supra note 398, at 857 (“A
considerable portion of all the patents granted are worthless and void, as conﬂicting with, and
infringing upon one another, or upon[] public rights not subject to patent privileges . . . .”); cf. id.
at 859-60 (noting large increases in the number of patents granted each decade).
401 See supra notes 391–92 and accompanying text.
402 See Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 674.
403 Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1179 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 13,337).
404 See McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8793). Although Federal Cases
(compiled by the West Publishing Company in the late nineteenth century) lists the date of this
opinion as June 29, 1821, that appears to be the date of the patent. The opinion was issued in 1822.
See Practice Under the Patent Laws of the United States, 1 U.S.L.J. 82, 83-84 (1822).
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community,” he thought that the statute should be understood to establish an
“easy and summary” procedure by which courts could examine the validity of
a patent soon after it was issued.405
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court rejected Judge Van Ness’s
position as insuﬃciently attentive to the private rights that were at stake after
a patent had been granted. Writing for the Court in the 1824 case of Ex parte
Wood, Justice Story explained that ambiguities in the statutory language
should be resolved in the manner “most congenial to our institutions.”406
Justice Story added that during the period covered by a patent, “[t]he
inventor has . . . a property in his inventions[—]a property which is often of
very great value, and of which the law intended to give him the absolute
enjoyment and possession.”407 In Justice Story’s view, Congress should not
lightly be understood to have “institute[d] a new and summary process, which
should ﬁnally adjudge upon [the inventor’s] rights, without a trial by jury,
without a right of appeal, and without any of those guards with which, in
equity suits, it has fenced round the general administration of justice.”408
Thus, even though the summary process described by Judge Van Ness would
occur in court, Justice Story suggested that it would not adequately protect
“the security of vested rights and property.”409 Instead, the Supreme Court
interpreted the statutory language to envision full-ﬂedged proceedings akin
to other civil actions, and the Court issued a writ of mandamus commanding
Judge Van Ness to conduct such proceedings in the case at hand.410
2. The Patent Act of 1836
Although concerns about the profusion of bad patents did not cause the
Supreme Court to embrace Judge Van Ness’s summary procedure for postissuance revocation, those concerns eventually led Congress to change the

405 McGaw, 16 F. Cas. at 98-99; see also Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 677-78 (discussing both
this opinion and Judge Van Ness’s background, which included having been “Aaron Burr’s second in
the duel that killed Alexander Hamilton”). As Professor Beauchamp notes, Judge Van Ness’s opinion
in Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) (No. 13,957), expressed similar concerns
about the “very alarming facility with which patents are procured.” Id. at 1041; see also id. at 1042
(urging policymakers to introduce “[s]ome mode . . . of examining into the novelty and utility of
alleged inventions, before patents are issued to the applicants”). Again, Federal Cases apparently
reports the wrong date for Thompson; that opinion too probably was issued in 1822. See Beauchamp,
supra note 349, at 676 n.169; Note by the Publishers of the Journal, 1 U.S.L.J. 459, 459 (1823) (referring
to the opinion in the January 1823 issue).
406 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 606 (1824).
407 Id. at 608; see also id. at 609 (referring to the inventor’s “exclusive property”).
408 Id. at 608.
409 See id. at 612.
410 Id. at 614-15.
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mechanism for issuing patents in the ﬁrst place.411 The Patent Act of 1836
created a new federal agency called the Patent Oﬃce, headed by a
Commissioner of Patents.412 Any person who claimed to have “discovered or
invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter” and who wanted “to obtain an exclusive property therein” could apply
to the Commissioner for a patent.413 After the applicant submitted the
required speciﬁcations (and paid the required fee), the Commissioner would
“make or cause to be made[] an examination of the alleged new invention or
discovery”—and if the Commissioner deemed the invention “suﬃciently
useful and important” and found no disqualifying facts, “it shall be his duty
to issue a patent therefor.”414
Despite creating this statutory duty, the Patent Act of 1836 was not
constructed on the premise that inventors had a vested right to obtain a patent
before one was granted. For the first three years of the Act’s operation, when the
Commissioner denied applications for a patent, the disappointed applicants
normally had no right to judicial review; they could “appeal” the Commissioner’s
decision to a board of examiners that operated under the auspices of the
executive branch, but the process normally stopped there.415 Not until 1839 did
Congress allow all disappointed applicants to take the matter to court.416
411 See S. Doc. No. 24-338, supra note 398, at 857-58 (cataloguing “the evils which necessarily
result from the law as it now exists,” under which “the Department of State has been . . . issuing
patents on every application, without any examination into the merit or novelty of the invention”).
412 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117-18. At ﬁrst, the Patent Oﬃce was attached to
the Department of State, id., but in 1849 Congress transferred it to the newly created Department
of the Interior. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 2, 9 Stat. 395, 395.
413 Patent Act of 1836 § 6, 5 Stat. at 119.
414 Id. § 7, 5 Stat. at 119-20. The potentially disqualifying facts were “that the same had been
invented or discovered by any other person in this country prior to the alleged invention or discovery
thereof by the applicant, or that it had been patented or described in any printed publication in this
or any foreign country, or had been in public use or on sale with the applicant’s consent or allowance
prior to the application.” Id. at 119; see supra note 367.
415 See Patent Act of 1836 § 7, 5 Stat. at 120 (providing that the board would be “composed of
three disinterested persons, who shall be appointed for that purpose by the Secretary of State”); P.J.
Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (pt. 1), 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 838, 838-42 (1940) (describing
this system of review). As discussed below, the 1836 Act did give disappointed applicants recourse to
the courts in one situation: if the board of examiners upheld the denial of an application “on the ground
that the patent applied for would interfere with an unexpired patent previously granted,” the applicant
could seek relief in a court of equity, which might ultimately determine (“on notice to adverse parties
and other due proceedings”) that the existing patent was invalid and that the applicant was indeed
entitled to a patent. See Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24 (lumping this situation together with
cases in which “two interfering patents” had been issued); see also infra subsection III.B.4.
416 See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (authorizing suits in equity by
disappointed applicants). Apart from freestanding suits in equity, the 1839 Act also created a
summary mechanism for disappointed applicants to “appeal” the Commissioner’s decision to the
chief judge of the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia. See Act of Mar.
3, 1839, § 11, 5 Stat. at 354; see also infra notes 541–43 and accompanying text (noting uncertainty
about how to characterize later versions of this procedure).
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From the start, though, once a patent had been issued, only a court could
authoritatively declare its invalidity. If two existing patents interfered with
each other, “any person interested in any such patent” could bring suit in a
court of equity, which “may adjudge and declare either the patents void in the
whole or in part.”417 Likewise, defendants who were sued for infringing a
patent could avoid liability by proving various facts relating to the patent’s
validity (such as that “the patentee was not the original and ﬁrst inventor or
discoverer of the thing patented” or that the speciﬁcation had concealed facts
“for the purpose of deceiving the public”).418
Presumably because the executive branch would no longer be granting
patents on demand, the Patent Act of 1836 dropped the provisions of the earlier
statutes that had authorized people to sue for the “repeal” of a patent shortly
after its issuance.419 What is more, neither the 1836 Act nor its successors
explicitly authorized the federal government itself to sue for the cancellation of
a patent. In later years, courts divided over the viability of such suits,420 until
the Supreme Court held that the United States could indeed bring suit in
equity to cancel a patent that had been obtained by fraud.421 But even when the
Commissioner of Patents had identified grounds to cancel a patent, the
executive branch could not cancel the patent on its own.422 As the Supreme
Court eventually confirmed, “The only authority competent to set a patent
aside, or to annul it, or to correct it, for any reason whatever, is vested in the
judicial department of the government, and this can only be effected by proper
proceedings taken in the courts of the United States.”423 For the Supreme
Court, that conclusion followed from the nature of the private rights at stake:
Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24.
See id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123.
See John F. Duﬀy, The Inequities of Inequitable Conduct: A Case Study of Judicial Control of
Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 417, 423 (2013); cf. supra notes 391–92, 401–10 and
accompanying text (discussing the earlier provisions).
420 Compare Attorney Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608, 620, 624
(C.C.D.R.I. 1876) (concluding that the Attorney General cannot sue in his own name to repeal a
patent, and suggesting that such a suit does not lie in the name of the United States either), and
United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 32 F. 591, 601 (C.C.D. Mass. 1887) (agreeing that “the
government, in the absence of any express enactment, has no power to bring a bill in equity to cancel
a patent”), rev’d, 128 U.S. 315 (1888), with United States v. Gunning, 18 F. 511, 512 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1883) (holding that the United States can sue in equity to vacate a patent that was obtained by fraud).
421 Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 356-73.
422 See McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898) (noting that
if an existing patent had been obtained by fraud or deception, the Commissioner of Patents should
ask the Attorney General to institute a suit to cancel the patent, but the Commissioner could not
cancel the patent himself, for that “would be to deprive the [patentee] of his property without due
process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the
executive”); cf. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 229 (1832) (argument of Daniel Webster)
(“The vacating and canceling the record of a patent is in its nature a judicial act.”).
423 Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 364; accord McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609.
417
418
419
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once a patent was issued, “[i]t has become the property of the patentee, and as
such is entitled to the same legal protection as other property.”424
In taking this position, the Supreme Court explicitly analogized patents
for inventions to patents for land—instruments by which the United States
transferred title to real property from the federal government to a private
person.425 Although Congress could grant titles by statute,426 much federal
land was instead doled out by the executive branch pursuant to statutory
authority, and the issuance of a patent was typically the ﬁnal step in the
administrative process.427 Even after the government had issued a land patent
declaring the transfer of title, the law recognized certain grounds on which
the government could ask a court to set aside the patent or to declare it
void.428 But as the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in the 1860s and
1870s, the agency that had issued the patent could not itself cancel the patent
authoritatively: “That is a judicial act, and requires the judgment of a
424 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609; cf. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843)
(noting that although the Patent Act of 1836 had repealed earlier patent laws, “[t]his repeal . . . can
have no eﬀect to impair the right of property then existing in a patentee,” and citing Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 493 (1823), which had
observed that “the termination of a treaty cannot devest rights of property already vested under it”).
425 See McCormick, 169 U.S. at 608-09 (asserting that “repeated decisions of this court” had
established that the executive branch cannot revoke or cancel a patent once it has been issued, and
adding that “in this respect a patent for an invention stands in the same position and is subject to
the same limitations as a patent for a grant of lands”); Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 364-68 (citing a
series of Supreme Court opinions about patents for land); see also Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright,
94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) (dictum) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land.
The right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”).
But cf. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 238 (1897) (comparing patents for land to
patents for inventions, and observing that “although each vests in the patentee certain rights, yet
they are not in all things alike”); infra note 618.
Current federal law continues to treat patents as property, but Congress has chosen concepts of
personal rather than real property as the appropriate baseline. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the
provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”); Act of July 19, 1952,
ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792, 810 (enacting this provision).
426 Nelson, supra note 2, at 577.
427 See, e.g., Roger D. Billings, The Homestead Act, Pacific Railroad Act and Morrill Act, 39 N. KY. L.
REV. 699, 713-15 (2012) (describing the process under the Homestead Act of 1862); see also Harrison Land
Act, ch. 55, § 7, 2 Stat. 73, 76 (1800) (describing registers’ duties in connection with the sale of lands in
the Northwest Territory and authorizing the President to grant patents upon proof of final payment).
428 See United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1865) (indicating that this relief was
available not only for “fraud in the patentee” but also for certain kinds of “mistake,” such as “where
the [issuing] oﬃcer has no authority in law to grant [the patents in question], or where another party
has a higher equity [than the patentee] and should have received the patent”). To the extent that
other people claimed rights in land that the government had purported to grant, they too could
challenge the validity of a patent in court. See Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 640-48 (1882)
(summarizing nineteenth-century cases about the grounds upon which a court of law would
disregard a patent, as well as the broader grounds upon which a litigant could seek relief from a
court of equity); see also Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 87, 98-99 (1815) (discussing
similar doctrines with respect to land patents issued by a state).
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court.”429 Once a patent had been issued, after all, the patentee could claim a
vested private right in the land that he had been granted, and the idea that
the executive branch could conclusively adjudicate and reject such a claim “is
utterly inconsistent with the universal principle on which the right of private
property is founded.”430 This principle can be traced all the way back to
Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall not only analogized
Marbury’s commission to a land grant431 but also noted that “[t]he question
whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried
by the judicial authority.”432
3. Did the Idea of Patents as Property Originate in the Jacksonian Era?
According to Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, the idea that patents for
inventions “have the same protections that apply to rights in land or other
traditional property” did not emerge until the Jacksonian era, when “the
patent gradually became rebranded as a set of ‘property’ rights.”433 More
broadly, Professor Hovenkamp warns against attributing later ideas to the
founding generation.434 While his warning is well taken, I think that he is
only partially correct about patents.
Professor Hovenkamp is correct, I think, that early state legislatures
regarded patents in essentially the same way that they then regarded corporate
charters—as franchises that the state could grant on a case-by-case basis to
encourage economic development.435 Even after the Constitution was ratified,
that view persisted at least at the state level; while members of the First
Congress may have believed that federal patents could be issued only to
genuine inventors as a reward for new discoveries,436 states were thought to be
able to grant exclusive rights to “developers” who “promised to build
something with existing technology” and whose rights were conditioned on

429 Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 535; see also, e.g., Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533 (1878) (“The
functions of [the executive] department necessarily cease when the title has passed from the government.”).
430 Moore, 96 U.S. at 534.
431 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803); see also Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 85 (1871)
(agreeing with Marshall’s premise that someone who purchased land from the federal government
had a vested right once he paid his money and received a certiﬁcate entitling him to a patent, even
if the patent was not actually issued).
432 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167.
433 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263,
271 (2016); see also id. at 293 (“Increasingly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court treated patents as
a species of property, having many of the same constitutional protections as other forms of property.”).
434 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 217, at 1-5 (arguing, contrary to the rhetoric of modern
libertarians, that the Constitution was not written against the backdrop of laissez-faire economics).
435 See Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 266-68.
436 See id. at 272-73.
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putting that promise into practice.437 In this respect, Professor Hovenkamp
suggests, states continued to follow what he calls “pre-classical theories of
economic development,” of the sort that had animated mercantilism.438 Just as
states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries granted corporate
charters selectively, to encourage specific enterprises that would benefit the
public, so too states granted other exclusive rights to entrepreneurs who
promised to do something useful.439 And just as states were thought to have a
symbiotic relationship with the corporations to which they issued charters,440
so too the “pre-classical” model “envisioned considerable state involvement in
ensuring that granted patents were actually used in socially beneficial ways.”441
As Professor Hovenkamp notes, this model of economic development
eventually gave way to what we now call “classical” economics, which “began to
take serious hold in the United States in the 1830s” and which rejected the idea
that governments were better than individual market actors at directing capital
to productive uses.442 At the same time, Jacksonians condemned the corruption
that they associated with granting special privileges to favored individuals or
entities. Professor Hovenkamp observes that at the federal level, the Patent Act
of 1836 reflected both trends: it “limit[ed] the number of issued patents” by
requiring substantive examination of patent applications, but it gave the
responsible administrative officials a duty to grant applications that satisfied
“politically neutral” criteria and it envisioned little role for “government
economic policy making.”443 Under the influence of this system, Professor
Hovenkamp argues, federal patents came to be viewed as “property right[s],
pure and simple”—meaning that “once they were issued, patents were subject to
the management of their owners” and came with “few social obligations.”444 In
Professor Hovenkamp’s account, that is the point of the analogy between patents

Id. at 276.
Id. at 265; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1595 (referring to the “pre-classical,
mercantilist model”).
439 See Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 276.
440 See Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 1595 (noting that under the “pre-classical” model, each
business corporation “was a unique entity created by the state for a special purpose and enjoying a
privileged relationship with the sovereign”).
441 Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 267.
442 See id. at 273, 275; see also 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1-256 (London 1776) (systematically repudiating many of the
premises of mercantilism).
443 Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 270, 294-95; see also id. at 297 (linking the “ministerial”
nature of patent issuance to the rise of general incorporation statutes, another Jacksonian reform).
444 Id. at 271, 273, 307; see also id. at 284 (“[T]he emergent classical conception of the patent
saw it as a narrowly authorized property right, given only to inventors and thereafter placed more
or less completely under the patent owner’s control.”).
437
438
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and land; the owner of a patent could choose to practice it or not,445 with “little
government oversight other than protection of title and boundaries.”446
Professor Hovenkamp acknowledges that once patents were thought of as
property rights in this sense, they could be revoked “only through judicial
process and for cause.”447 He asserts, however, that under the “pre-classical”
idea that patents were “exclusive privileges granted in exchange for a promise
to develop economic infrastructure,” they could be “revoked by the same
legislative body” that issued them.448 Despite the richness and insight of
Professor Hovenkamp’s overall account, I do not believe that this particular
assertion was ever true of federal patents, and I doubt that it was
uncontroversially true even of the kinds of exclusive rights that states granted.
In discussing the “pre-classical” conception of patents, Professor
Hovenkamp himself focuses primarily on the exclusive rights that states
granted, and he notes diﬀerences between those grants and federal patents.449
Still, his article can be read to suggest that federal patents did not “evolv[e]
into a ‘property right’” until after Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1836.450
Contrary to that suggestion, the Patent Act of 1793 itself spoke of patentees
as “obtaining an exclusive property” in their inventions,451 and lawyers and
judges alike used similar locutions to describe the rights conferred under that
statute.452 When instructing a jury on circuit, moreover, Supreme Court
Justice Henry Baldwin asserted that once a patent had been issued under the
Act, a court that treated the patent as void for a reason not listed in the Act
would be violating the principles of Fletcher v. Peck.453 That objection would
445 See id. at 287; see also id. at 271 (“The decision to make productive use of the innovation
represented in a patent became purely private, emulating the law of real property.”).
446 Id. at 275.
447 Id. at 293.
448 Id. at 292; see also Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 66 (2013) (making a similar suggestion).
449 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 267 (“[S]tate patents, but not federal patents, were
issued to ‘promoters’—that is, to those who had not really invented anything new, but rather
promised to install technology or infrastructure in a new place.”).
450 Id. at 270.
451 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 320.
452 See supra note 407 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738, 792 (1824) (argument of counsel) (describing “the patent rights granted by the
national government” as “individual property”); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019, 1021 (C.C.D. Pa. 1819)
(No. 5719) (describing the infringement of a patent as “an unlawful invasion of property to which [the
patentee] was exclusively entitled”); Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4564)
(Marshall, C.J.) (“The constitution and [the statute], taken together, give to the inventor, from the
moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, which is completed by suing out a patent.”),
reviewed on pro forma certificate of division, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815); cf. Mossoff, Jefferson, supra
note 369, at 992-97 (citing many cases treating patents as property, including some from this era).
453 See Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1080 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585) (“No case could
arise in which the language of the supreme court, in Fletcher v. Peck, would be more forcibly applicable;
the character of ex post facto legislation, so severely reprobated in their opinion, would not depend on
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apply all the more readily to a statute that purported to revoke a patent—
something that, as far as I know, Congress never did.
With respect to the exclusive rights that states granted for the purpose of
encouraging economic development, Professor Hovenkamp is correct that
these grants were analogous to the franchises conferred by corporate charters.
As the Dartmouth College case attests, though, once a state legislature granted
such franchises to private individuals or entities, the legislature could not
freely rescind the grant. Unless a reservation of that power was built into the
grant itself, the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution protected
corporate charters against legislative repeal, and the same was true of other
kinds of franchises.454
Professor Hovenkamp does cite one early example of a state legislature
that purported to repeal a patent by statute,455 but the lessons of that example
are equivocal. The protagonist of the story is John Fitch, who has as good a
claim as anyone to have invented the steamboat.456 In 1786 and 1787, at a time
when the federal government had no power to issue patents, the state
legislatures of New Jersey, Delaware, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia
all enacted statutes granting Fitch exclusive rights to make and use
steamboats within the state for a fourteen-year term.457 In 1798, however, the
New York legislature purported to repeal its grant and to convey similar rights
to Robert Livingston.458 The 1798 statute indicated that the legislature was
acting upon the suggestion “that the said John Fitch is either dead or hath
withdrawn himself from this State without having made any attempt in the

the tribunal which exercised it.”); see also id. (asserting that in a suit for patent infringement, “the trial
is on a question of property, of private right, unconnected with the public interest, and without any
reference to the public, unless a case is made out of a design to deceive them”).
454 See supra notes 84–104 and 212–27 and accompanying text.
455 Hovenkamp, supra note 433, at 280-81, 292; see also Hrdy, supra note 448, at 66 n.83 (citing
the same example).
456 See THOMPSON WESTCOTT, THE LIFE OF JOHN FITCH, THE INVENTOR OF THE
STEAMBOAT 119-47 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1857) (describing the genesis of Fitch’s idea
in 1785 and his early eﬀorts to obtain support); cf. JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, STEAMBOATS COME
TRUE: AMERICAN INVENTORS IN ACTION 367-68 (1992) (acknowledging that “Fitch built in 1790
a remarkably eﬀective boat,” but concluding that “he never completely understood what he was
doing” and “was incapable of repeating his success”).
457 See WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 150-51 (New Jersey); id. at 173-75 (Pennsylvania); id. at
175-76 (Delaware and New York); id. at 197 (Virginia). For the texts of the statutes, see Act of Mar.
18, 1786, ch. 136, 1785 N.J. Acts 266; Act of Mar. 19, 1787, ch. 57, 1787 N.Y. Laws 472; Act of Mar. 28,
1787, ch. 1286, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 161, at 441;
Act of Nov. 7, 1787, ch. 77, 1787 Va. Acts 42; see also Act of Feb. 3, 1787, 1786–1787 Del. Laws 25 (noting
the statute but not reprinting it). Virginia’s act included a condition that Fitch failed to satisfy, so it
lapsed after three years. WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 197, 297.
458 Act of Mar. 27, 1798, ch. 55, 1798 N.Y. Laws 215.
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space of more than ten years for executing the plan for which he so obtained
an exclusive privilege, whereby the same is justly forfeited.”459
Although this episode is well known, its controversiality is not. To guard
against “laws inconsistent with the spirit of this constitution, or with the public
good,” New York’s state constitution provided for a Council of Revision
(composed of the governor, the chancellor, and the judges of the supreme
court) to review all bills that passed both houses of the state legislature.460 In
1798, when the legislature passed the bill repealing Fitch’s rights, the Council
of Revision objected to the bill, for exactly the reason that the doctrine of
vested rights would predict: the bill “supposes that the . . . privileges which
were granted to John Fitch . . . had become forfeited,” but “it doth not appear
that the facts from which such forfeiture is to arise, have been found in some
due course of law.”461 Admittedly, the legislature overrode this objection and
enacted the bill anyway. But in the 1810s, the prominent lawyer and legislator
William A. Duer sided with the Council of Revision462 and pointed out that
the validity of the 1798 repeal “ha[s] never been adjudicated.”463
The contests between Fitch and James Rumsey, who claimed to have
invented a steamboat before Fitch,464 are also instructive. In 1788 and 1789,
Rumsey’s allies ﬁled petitions on his behalf in each of the ﬁve state
legislatures that had granted exclusive rights to Fitch.465 In Virginia, where
Rumsey had previously been granted exclusive rights to an unspeciﬁed type
of boat that he later claimed to involve steam,466 they asked the legislature

459 Id. at 216. These suggestions were not true. See WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 184-93, 248-56, 27791 (describing Fitch’s work on the steamboat); id. at 369-70 (noting that Fitch died in the summer of 1798).
460 N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. III.
461 JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK; AT THEIR TWENTY-FIRST
SESSION 269 (Albany, Loring Andrews & Co. 1798).
462 See WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A REPLY TO MR. COLDEN’S VINDICATION OF THE
STEAM-BOAT MONOPOLY 21-22 (Albany, E. & E. Hosford 1819) (referring to “the vested rights of
Fitch or his representatives” and indicating that questions about the validity of the original grant
“were of judicial cognizance”).
463 WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A LETTER, ADDRESSED TO CADWALLADER D. COLDEN,
ESQUIRE 79 (Albany, E. & E. Hosford 1817).
464 WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 204; see also id. at 207-47 (evaluating the evidence oﬀered
by both men).
465 Id. at 262-65.
466 See An Act Giving James Rumsey the Exclusive Right of Constructing and Navigating
Certain Boats for a Limited Time, ch. 75, 1784 Va. Laws (Oct. Sess.) 21; cf. WESTCOTT, supra note
456, at 220 (reporting Fitch’s argument that at this time, Rumsey was envisioning a boat propelled
by poles rather than steam). The Pennsylvania legislature had enacted a similar statute in 1785, but
with the proviso that “this act shall be void and of no eﬀect” unless Rumsey brought his plans to
fruition within the next twelve months. Act of Mar. 25, 1785, ch. 1144, reprinted in 11 THE STATUTES
AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 161, at 517, 518.
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simply to repeal Fitch’s grant.467 In the other four states, they asked the
legislature to grant Rumsey exclusive rights to his plan for a steamboat (along
with various other inventions)—a proposal that would have narrowed the
rights previously granted to Fitch.468 Ultimately, all ﬁve states refused to
repeal or limit Fitch’s grant.469 At least in Pennsylvania, and perhaps in other
states,470 the doctrine of vested rights was a central part of the discussion.
In September 1788, as soon as Fitch learned of his rival’s petition to the
Pennsylvania legislature, he protested that Rumsey was seeking “the very
right which, by special act of Assembly, passed the 28th of March, 1787, is
vested in [Fitch].”471 By virtue of that earlier statute, he continued, “[Fitch’s]
property in the exclusive right to all steamboats in the State of Pennsylvania
is as ﬁrmly established in him as the right of any man in the State to his house
or his farm.”472 The committee to which the legislature referred Rumsey’s
petition did not go quite so far; its report left open the possibility that “the
Legislature may have a right to repeal laws which convey grants that are
467 See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
BEGUN AND HOLDEN IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, IN THE COUNTY OF HENRICO, ON
MONDAY, [OCTOBER 20, 1788], at 48 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1828).
468 See VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF THE DELAWARE
STATE, AT A SESSION COMMENCED AT DOVER, ON [JANUARY 12, 1789], at 7-8 (Wilmington,
Frederick Craig & Co. 1789) [hereinafter DELAWARE PROCEEDINGS]; VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-JERSEY AT A SESSION
BEGUN AT TRENTON ON THE 28TH DAY OF OCTOBER 1788, AND CONTINUED BY
ADJOURNMENTS 61 (Trenton, Isaac Collins 1788); JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
OF NEW-YORK, AT THEIR TWELFTH SESSION, BEGUN AND HOLDEN AT THE CITY OF ALBANY,
THE ELEVENTH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1788, at 14 (Albany, Samuel & John Loudon 1788); 4
DEBATES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, ACCURATELY TAKEN IN SHORT
HAND, BY THOMAS LLOYD 4 (Philadelphia 1788).
469 See WESTCOTT, supra note 456, at 262-66 (providing details).
470 See Letter from John Fitch to the Honourable Legislature of the State of New Jersey (Nov.
3, 1788), trentonhistory.org/Documents/Manuscript/MS132.html [https://perma.cc/X6QV-D4PY]
(arguing that in light of Fitch’s reliance, “the property conveyed by [the earlier] Law” should be no
less secure than people’s “Houses and . . . farms,” and adding that “any limitation or restriction to
the Law not warranted by the Law itself, would be a violation of the constitution, which directs all
controversies about property to be decided in courts of Justice”). But cf. DELAWARE PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 468, at 41 (suggesting that Delaware legislators rejected Rumsey’s petition for the
threshold reason that under the new Federal Constitution, an alleged inventor’s request for exclusive
rights should be directed to Congress).
471 Petition of John Fitch to the Honorable the Representatives for the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (Sept. 6, 1788), in 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS FOR THE YEAR
1849, at 557 (Washington 1850).
472 Id. Fitch’s reference to “all steamboats” was not an exaggeration. Rather than being limited
to his speciﬁc design, the grant from the Pennsylvania legislature covered steamboats in general. See
Act of Mar. 28, 1787, ch. 1286, § 2, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
supra note 161, at 441 (granting Fitch, for fourteen years, “the sole and exclusive right and privilege
of constructing, making, using, employing and navigating . . . every species or kind of boats or water
craft which may be urged or impelled through the water by the force of ﬁre or steam, in all . . .
waters whatsoever within . . . this state”).
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highly injurious to the general welfare.”473 Still, the committee set a high bar
for such repeals: “the resuming such legislative grants ought never to be done,
unless upon the most pressing necessity.”474 The committee recommended
that the legislature grant Rumsey exclusive rights to his other claimed
inventions, but not to any design for a steamboat.475
In February 1789, when the legislature’s next session began, Rumsey’s
allies tried again.476 Their new petition and Fitch’s response were again
referred to a committee,477 which took the occasion to think more generally
about the power of “granting exclusive rights to the beneﬁts arising from new
discoveries or inventions”; ultimately, the committee recommended vesting
this power in “a body better possessed, than the Legislature can be, of the
means of enquiring and examining into their originality and merits.”478 The
legislature, however, postponed consideration of this idea and set times for
representatives of Fitch and Rumsey to argue their positions before the full
assembly.479 In a sign that important legal and constitutional issues were
involved, the legislature also requested the justices of the state’s supreme
court to attend the arguments.480 The Justices did attend,481 and the
legislature asked them to supply written opinions on the following question:
“Can this House, consistently with the principles of law, justice, and the
constitution of this state, enact a law upon the principles of the report before
this House, in the case contested between John Fitch and James Rumsey?”482
Justice George Bryan said no: Fitch’s existing grant “ought not to be
disturbed by any new proceeding whatever.”483 Bryan’s opinion focused
mostly on the bad consequences that would result from “violating the public
faith” by rescinding legislative grants.484 Still, he cast his conclusion in the
terms that the legislature’s question had suggested: a proposal that would
473 Committee Report, in 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS FOR THE YEAR
1849, supra note 471, at 558.
474 Id.
475 Id.
476 See MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR SECOND SESSION 52-53 (Philadelphia 1789) (recording the new petition).
477 See id. at 62.
478 Id. at 135.
479 Id. at 140; see also id. at 145, 150-51 (setting a diﬀerent time to hear from Rumsey’s
representative).
480 Id. at 142.
481 See id. at 145, 154.
482 Id. at 163.
483 Id. at 168.
484 See id. at 169 (arguing that such revocations would cause both “public mischief ” and
“private injustice”); see also id. at 168-69 (“[I]t is more for the interest of the community to abide by
its own legislative grants, than to resume them even in cases wherein they have been improperly
made, unless indeed there be a very great necessity for so doing . . . .”).
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limit Fitch’s grant “cannot be adopted, consistently with the principles of law,
justice, and the constitution of this state.”485
Chief Justice Thomas M’Kean’s opinion took a diﬀerent tack. M’Kean
noted that in England, letters patent granted by the king were “voidable by
scire facias” if “the King has been deceived in his grant by untrue suggestions
or otherwise.”486 Because “a House of Assembly here may be deceived, as well
as the King in Great-Britain,” M’Kean opined that the legislature could repeal
a statutory grant that had been “obtained upon untrue suggestions or
misrepresentations.”487 Thus, M’Kean apparently thought that if Rumsey
were the true inventor of the steamboat, then the legislature could properly
repeal its grant to Fitch and grant exclusive privileges to Rumsey instead. But
M’Kean added that “if any controversy should arise thereupon, the same
should be put in such a train, that it may be tried without prejudice in a court
of common law.”488 While this statement is ambiguous, M’Kean may have
thought that the validity of a repeal would depend on whether Fitch had
obtained his grant by false suggestions, and that this issue would ultimately
be for the courts to decide.
The third Justice, Jacob Rush, ducked the constitutional question in a
related way. Although the statute granting exclusive rights to Fitch had been
worded broadly,489 Rush maintained that it should not be interpreted to give
Fitch rights to anything other than what he himself had invented—and if his
representations of having invented something were false, then “the grant
itself would be merely void.”490 According to Rush, the proposal that the
legislature was considering (to grant Rumsey rights in things that Rumsey
claimed to have invented) would “leave John Fitch in the entire and exclusive
possession of such speciﬁc discovery as he has actually made,” so it would not
detract from his existing grant at all.491
The legislature postponed further consideration of the matter until its next
session.492 When the legislature returned to the subject in September 1789, a
member introduced a bill that would have granted Rumsey exclusive rights to
all of his claimed inventions, including what the bill called “Rumsey’s steam
boat.”493 Again, Fitch submitted a strongly worded remonstrance, complaining
Id. at 170.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 472.
MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR SECOND SESSION, supra note 476, at 179-80.
491 Id. at 180 (emphasis omitted).
492 Id. at 191.
493 See MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR THIRD SESSION 238, 275 (Philadelphia 1789) (emphasis omitted).
485
486
487
488
489
490
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that this bill would “invad[e] the just and legal rights granted to him by a solemn
Law of the state.”494 Fitch understood past episodes in Pennsylvania history
(including those involving the Bank of North America and the Philadelphia
academy495) to establish that a statute granting a charter created vested rights
that the legislature could not revoke, and he argued that the same was true of his
grant.496 Anticipating the Marshall Court, he also argued that the proposed bill
would violate the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution.497
Ultimately, the full legislature sided with Fitch. Before enacting Rumsey’s
bill, the legislature deleted the language about steamboats, so that the statute
did not cut back on what the legislature had previously granted to Fitch.498
Fitch was not the only person who thought that state grants of this sort
created vested rights. After the Constitution took effect and Congress enacted
the federal Patent Act, some people believed that states could not continue to
grant exclusive rights for inventions; on one view, either the Constitution itself
had transferred this power to the federal government or the Patent Act should
be understood to occupy the field.499 Still, the patents that states had granted
For a template of the bill, see AN ACT FOR VESTING IN JAMES RUMSEY, ESQUIRE, THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE OF MAKING, USING, AND VENDING, DIVERS ENGINES,
MACHINES AND DEVICES, BY HIM INVENTED, OR IMPROVED, FOR A TERM OF YEARS THEREIN
MENTIONED (Philadelphia 1789) (Evans 22051).
494 JOHN FITCH, PETITION AND REMONSTRANCE 1 (1789) (Evans 45475).
495 See supra notes 152–83 and accompanying text.
496 FITCH, supra note 494, at 1.
497 See id. (deeming it clear that “the grant by law to your petitioner of certain absolute,
exclusive rights is . . . a contract of the strongest nature,—a contract between the state on the one
part, and the citizen on the other”).
498 See MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THEIR THIRD SESSION, supra note 493, at 275-76 (recording the vote in
favor of striking this language). The statute as enacted appears in 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 161, at 361-65.
499 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 166-70 (1824) (argument of counsel);
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 362, at 437-38 (reading section 7 of the Patent Act of 1793 to suggest
that members of Congress believed in the exclusivity of the federal patent power); Hovenkamp,
supra note 433, at 277 (“The predominant early interpretation was that the Patent Clause gave
Congress the right to reward ‘inventors’ with exclusive rights, while permitting the individual states
to create such rights for other reasons, including grants to noninventor developers.”); supra note 470
(noting that after the ratiﬁcation of the Constitution, the Delaware legislature referred James
Rumsey’s request for exclusive rights to Congress); see also Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v.
Butler, 53 Ind. 454, 457 (1876) (“The power thus vested in Congress is not expressly an exclusive
power, but practically it has been so regarded and acted upon, since the adoption of the
constitution.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Brechbill v. Randall, 1 N.E. 362 (Ind. 1885); cf. 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1149
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (expressing uncertainty about whether states could grant
exclusive rights to inventors). But see Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 581 (N.Y. 1812) (opinion
of Kent, C.J.) (concluding that the states have concurrent power even with respect to inventors);
Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487,
495-96 (2013) (supporting Kent’s position).
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before ratification remained in force, because (in the words of one lawyer)
“[t]he constitution could not take away a right vested before its adoption.”500
Members of Congress apparently did not like the idea that the recipients
of federal patents might have exclusive rights under state law as well, so the
Patent Act of 1793 speciﬁed that the owners of such state-granted rights had
to relinquish them in order to receive a federal patent.501 Signiﬁcantly,
however, Congress did not purport simply to cancel the pre-existing state
grants; instead, Congress cast their surrender as a choice that the patentees
made in order to receive something better. Again, modern scholars have
attributed this formulation to the fact that “[t]he private rights in a patent
franchise were considered vested property rights,” which Congress could not
unilaterally abrogate.502
4. The Patent Oﬃce’s Role in Resolving Interferences Between New
Applications and Existing Patents
The idea that patents give rise to vested rights, and that only judicial
power can authoritatively determine that an issued patent is invalid, is
consistent with Congress’s statutes and the Supreme Court’s decisions
throughout the nineteenth century. Still, doctrines about “interferences”
require separate discussion.503
Under the Patent Act of 1793, the executive branch routinely granted most
applications for patents that seemed proper on their face, but the Act
established a special procedure to deal with “interfering applications.”504 If
two pending applications both sought exclusive rights for the same invention,
a panel of arbitrators would be convened to decide which application the
executive branch should grant.505 This type of nonjudicial adjudication was
consistent with the doctrines described in Part I because vested rights were
Livingston, 9 Johns. at 540 (argument of counsel).
See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 7, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (“[W]here any state, before its adoption
of the [Constitution] . . . , shall have granted an exclusive right to any invention, the party, claiming
that right, shall not be capable of obtaining an exclusive right under this act, but on relinquishing
his right under such particular state, and of such relinquishment his obtaining an exclusive right
under this act shall be suﬃcient evidence.”).
502 W. Howard Mann, The Marshall Court: Nationalization of Private Rights and Personal Liberty
from the Authority of the Commerce Clause, 38 IND. L.J. 117, 161 n.123 (1963); see also Hrdy, supra note
448, at 73 (agreeing that “Congress did not feel empowered to simply void the inventors’ vested
state rights without voluntary action by state patentees”).
503 See Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 377, 386-89 (2017) (observing that even before Congress allowed the Patent Oﬃce to
conduct adjudications aimed at cancelling existing patents, “the Patent Oﬃce could signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the validity of issued patents through its interferences decisions,” and treating that fact as a
precursor of administrative cancellation).
504 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 9, 1 Stat. 318, 322-23.
505 Id.
500
501

1514

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1429

not yet at stake (assuming that patent rights vested only when a patent was
granted rather than at the time of invention).
The Patent Act of 1836 expanded the scope of interference inquiries.
When someone applied for a patent but the Commissioner of Patents
believed that the application interfered either with another pending
application or with an “unexpired patent” that had already been granted, the
Commissioner would notify the other applicant or the patentee and hold a
hearing on “the question of priority of right or invention.”506 In cases of
interference between a new application and an existing patent, though, the
Commissioner had no power to cancel the existing patent.507 Instead, the
point of the hearing was to decide what to do with the new application. If the
Commissioner determined that the new applicant was the ﬁrst inventor, and
if the other statutory requirements were satisﬁed, the Commissioner would
issue a new patent, with the result that two interfering patents would both
exist. At that point, the Act allowed “any person interested in any such
patent” to bring a suit in equity to declare one of the patents “void” in whole
or in part.508 Likewise, whenever the owner of a patent sued someone for
infringement, the defendant could try to avoid liability on the ground “that
the patentee was not the original and ﬁrst inventor or discoverer of the thing
patented.”509 But one way or another, which patentee was the true inventor
would be determined by the courts, not simply by the Commissioner.
Early on, moreover, there seems to have been little idea that the courts
would defer to the ﬁndings that the Commissioner made in an interference
proceeding. According to Chief Judge William Cranch of the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia, if the Commissioner determined that an existing
patentee was not the true inventor, “the decision of the commissioner is not
only not conclusive as to [the patentee], but does not in any manner aﬀect his
legal or equitable rights.”510 In Chief Judge Cranch’s words, “as to the
patentee, a decision against him would be a brutum fulmen”—a meaningless
noise, not a judgment with any sort of legal eﬀect.511
Chief Judge Cranch used that fact to explain his interpretation of one
aspect of the then-existing statutes. If the Commissioner denied a patent
application, the Patent Act of 1836 allowed the disappointed applicant to
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 8, 5 Stat. 117, 120-21.
See, e.g., Allen v. United States ex rel. Lowry, 26 App. D.C. 8, 14 (1905) (“Of course the
patent could not be recalled or revoked should the interference result in an award of priority to the
applicant.”), aﬀ ’d, 203 U.S. 476 (1906).
508 Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24.
509 Id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123.
510 Pomeroy v. Connison, 19 F. Cas. 957, 959 (C.C.D.C. 1842) (No. 11,259).
511 Id. at 958; see also Brutum Fulmen, MERRIAM WEBSTER, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
brutum%20fulmen [https://perma.cc/86D6-NATY] (deﬁning “brutum fulmen” as a “meaningless
thunderbolt: an empty threat: an ineﬀectual legal judgment”).
506
507
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appeal. Initially, the appeal went to a board of examiners within the executive
branch;512 after 1839, it instead went to Chief Judge Cranch himself,513 whom
Congress instructed “to revise such decisions in a summary way, on the
evidence produced before the Commissioner.”514 If the applicant lost at that
stage too, he could ﬁle a freestanding suit in equity.515 Conversely, if the
applicant won in front of the Commissioner or on appeal, and if the
Commissioner therefore granted his application for a new patent despite its
interference with an existing patent, the existing patentee could ﬁle his own
suit in equity to challenge the new patent’s validity.516 But the existing
patentee did not have the option of appealing the Commissioner’s decision
to Chief Judge Cranch.517 As Chief Judge Cranch interpreted the relevant
statutes, Congress had made such appeals available only to disappointed
applicants, not existing patentees, because the one needed an appeal
mechanism more than the other: an administrative decision against an
applicant “would be conclusive, unless an appeal were given by the statute,”
but an administrative decision against an existing patentee “has no eﬀect
upon a patent already granted.”518
For unrelated reasons, Congress modified the statute in 1852 to authorize
an appeal to any member of the circuit court for the District of Columbia, not
just the chief judge.519 At first, members of the court followed Chief Judge
Cranch’s view that existing patentees could not invoke the appeal mechanism
in interference proceedings.520 Eventually, though, Judge William Matthews
Patent Act of 1836 §§ 7–8, 5 Stat. at 120.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 11, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (authorizing appeals “to the chief justice
of the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia”); Act of April 29, 1802, ch.
31, § 24, 2 Stat. 156, 166 (providing for this district court to be held by the chief judge of the circuit
court that Congress had established for the District of Columbia).
514 Act of Mar. 3, 1839, § 11, 5 Stat. at 354-55 (providing, however, that “no . . . decision of the
judge in any such case, shall preclude any person interested in favor or against the validity of any
patent which has been . . . granted, from the right to contest the same in any judicial court, in any
action in which its validity may come in question”).
515 See Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24 (authorizing suit in equity “whenever a patent
on application shall have been refused on an adverse decision of a board of examiners, on the ground
that the patent applied for would interfere with an unexpired patent previously granted”); Act of
Mar. 3, 1839, § 10, 5 Stat. at 354 (extending this provision “to all cases where patents are refused for
any reason whatever, either by the Commissioner of Patents or by the chief justice of the District of
Columbia, upon appeals from the decision of said Commissioner”).
516 See Patent Act of 1836 § 16, 5 Stat. at 123-24 (“[W]henever there shall be two interfering
patents, . . . any person interested in any such patent . . . may have remedy by bill in equity . . . .”).
517 See Pomeroy v. Connison, 19 F. Cas. 957, 957-59 (C.C.D.C. 1842) (No. 11,259) (concluding
that “I have no jurisdiction” over a purported appeal by an existing patentee in this situation).
518 Id. at 958.
519 See Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 107, § 1, 10 Stat. 75, 75; see also Federico, supra note 415, at 84950 (explaining the genesis of this provision).
520 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Barnum, 12 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D.C. 1854) (No. 6685) (treating Chief
Judge Cranch’s interpretation of the statute as “settled”).
512
513
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Merrick reconsidered this question of statutory interpretation and decided that
Congress had made appeals available to existing patentees as well as
applicants.521 Still, he did not suggest that the Commissioner’s findings against
an existing patentee would have legal effect in later judicial proceedings.
Instead, he simply noted that the Commissioner’s issuance of a second patent
would cause practical problems for the existing patentee, and the statutory
appeal mechanism could address those problems faster than a suit in equity.522
By the latter part of the nineteenth century if not before, courts were
giving some eﬀect to the Patent Oﬃce’s decisions in interference
proceedings, even when those decisions went against an existing patentee.
Ordinarily, courts applied a presumption in favor of the validity of an existing
patent.523 When one patentee was suing the owner of an interfering patent,
though, courts could not logically presume that both patents were valid. If
the Patent Oﬃce had not conducted an interference proceeding, courts
presumed (absent other evidence) that the ﬁrst applicant was the earlier
inventor.524 But courts took a diﬀerent approach if the Patent Oﬃce had
issued the second patent on the basis of an interference proceeding. The
Patent Oﬃce’s decision that the second patentee was the true inventor still
did not have preclusive eﬀect against the ﬁrst patentee’s claim of vested
rights; even in litigation between the same two parties, courts would consider

521 See Babcock v. Degener, 2 F. Cas. 293, 294-97 (C.C.D.C. 1859) (No. 698) (disagreeing with Chief
Judge Cranch’s position in Pomeroy and concluding that under section 8 of the Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat.
at 120-21, “a patentee has equal right of appeal from a decision of the commissioner in favor of an applicant
. . . as an applicant for a patent has under the same section from an adverse decision in favor of a prior
patentee”); accord Spear v. Belson, 22 F. Cas. 903, 903 (C.C.D.C. 1859) (No. 13,223) (Dunlop, C.J.).
522 See Babcock, 2 F. Cas. at 295 (observing that “the emanation of a second patent must throw
a cloud upon the title of the prior patentee and seriously impair the market value of his patent”).
523 Even in the absence of any interference, questions about a patent’s validity could come up
in ordinary suits for infringement. See Rev. Stat. § 4920, 18 Stat. 960 (1874) (listing defenses in
infringement actions). For cases articulating a presumption of validity in that context, see, e.g.,
Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U.S. 94, 96 (1882) (“The patent is prima facie evidence of both novelty
and utility, and neither of these presumptions has been rebutted by the evidence.”); Parks v. Booth,
102 U.S. 96, 99 (1880) (“[T]he patent, if introduced in evidence by the complaining party, aﬀords
him prima facie evidence that the patentee was the original and ﬁrst inventor. That presumption, in
the absence of any satisfactory proof to the contrary, is suﬃcient to entitle him to recover if he
proves the alleged infringement.”); Coﬃn v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1874) (indicating
that when the defendant in an infringement action tried to avoid liability on the ground that the
plaintiﬀ was not the ﬁrst inventor of the patented item, “[t]he burden of proof rests upon [the
defendant], and every reasonable doubt should be resolved against him”); see also John F. Duﬀy,
Reasoned Decisionmaking vs. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Oﬃce, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2351, 2370-72
(2019) (noting that in the early nineteenth century, the presumption in favor of the validity of an
issued patent was weak if it existed at all, but it was stronger by the late nineteenth century).
524 See Brooks v. Sacks, 81 F. 403, 405 (1st Cir. 1897); cf. WILLIAM P. KOOKOGEY, PATENT
LAW IN BRIEF 53 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1884) (“If there have been no interference
proceedings at the patent oﬃce, the presumption of invention is in favor of the ﬁrst patentee . . . .”).
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the question of priority for themselves.525 But the party who had lost the
interference proceeding would have the burden of proof. In the words of one
judge, “the new patent granted after a hearing . . . makes out a prima facie
case for the [new patentee], shifting the presumption that would otherwise
exist” in favor of the earlier patent.526
In 1894, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan v. Daniels527 arguably
ratcheted up the legal effect of interference proceedings. In Morgan itself, the
Patent Office had held an interference proceeding to choose between two
pending applications (rather than to decide whether to grant an application that
would interfere with an existing patent). When the losing applicant sued in
equity to challenge the denial of his application, the Supreme Court held that he
had a stiff burden of proof.528 The Court noted that even when the Patent Office
had not held an interference proceeding, the patents that it granted enjoyed a
presumption of validity.529 With respect to interference proceedings, moreover,
the Court characterized the Patent Office as a “special tribunal” that Congress
had authorized to make determinations about the priority of inventions.530
According to the Court, a suit “to set aside the conclusions reached by the
administrative department, and to give to the plaintiff the rights there awarded
to the defendant,” was “in the nature of a suit to set aside a judgment,” and the
plaintiff should not win such relief on the basis of “a mere preponderance of
evidence.”531 Ultimately, the Court laid down the following rule:
[W]here the question decided in the patent oﬃce is one between contesting
parties as to priority of invention, the decision there made must be accepted
as controlling upon that question of fact in any subsequent suit between the

525 See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Duncan, 2 App. D.C. 131, 135 (1894) (“It is not within the power
of the Commissioner of Patents, nor of this court on appeal from the Commissioner, to avoid or
vacate the patent, or any claim covered by it. The decision, whatever it might be, would be only of
prima facie eﬀect . . . .”).
526 Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Crane, 24 F. Cas. 657, 658 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 14,388);
see also, e.g., Wire Book Sewing Mach. Co. v. Stevenson, 11 F. 155, 155 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1882) (“While
[the Patent Oﬃce’s] decision is not conclusive here, it is nevertheless entitled to suﬃcient weight to
cast the burden of proof on the plaintiﬀ.” (citation omitted)); 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW
OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 249-50 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890) (noting that
despite the Patent Oﬃce’s decision in an interference proceeding, “the adverse parties still stand
upon equal ground” in court, but the Patent Oﬃce’s decision “is . . . noticed by the courts as an
indication that priority is justly claimed by the prevailing party till the contrary appears”).
527 153 U.S. 120 (1894).
528 See id. at 122-25, 129.
529 See id. at 123 (discussing the standard of proof that the Court had applied in Coﬃn v. Ogden,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1874), and Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1886), and asserting
that “[t]he plaintiﬀ in this case . . . should . . . be held to as strict proof ”); supra note 523.
530 Morgan, 153 U.S. at 124.
531 Id.
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same parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony which in
character and amount carries thorough conviction.532

As formulated, this rule potentially told courts to defer to the results of all
interference proceedings—not just those between two pending applications,
but also those between a new application and an existing patent. By the early
twentieth century, at least some lower courts were doing exactly that.533
Suppose that after issuing a patent to one person, the Patent Oﬃce received
an interfering application and held a hearing to determine whether the new
applicant was the prior inventor.534 From 1893 on, whichever party lost in the
Patent Oﬃce’s tribunals could appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia.535 But if the existing patentee lost on appeal, the Patent Oﬃce
would issue a patent to the new applicant (assuming that the Patent Oﬃce
regarded the invention as patentable). Either of the two patentees could then
sue the other in equity, seeking a judicial determination that the interfering

Id. at 125; cf. infra note 540.
See, e.g., Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 F. 288, 289-91, 304
(1st Cir. 1909) (invoking Morgan with respect to an interference proceeding that had been resolved
against an existing patentee); Reilly, supra note 503, at 388.
534 See Rev. Stat. § 4904, 18 Stat. 957 (1874) (describing this procedure); supra note 506 and
accompanying text (referring to the precursor of this provision in the Patent Act of 1836).
535 See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 9, 27 Stat. 434, 436. Before 1870, Congress had provided
for a summary appeal to a single judge. See supra notes 513, 519–21 and accompanying text; see also
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 3, 12 Stat. 762, 763 (transferring the powers previously exercised by the
judges of the circuit court of the District of Columbia to the justices of the newly created Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia). In 1870, Congress allowed other decisions of the Commissioner
of Patents to be appealed to “the supreme court of the District of Columbia, sitting in banc,” but
Congress stopped authorizing appeals in interference cases. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 48, 16
Stat. 198, 205; P.J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Oﬃce Appeals (pt. 2), 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 920, 92021 (1940). When Congress created the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1893, though,
Congress gave it jurisdiction over such appeals again. See id. at 931.
After 1927, if the Patent Oﬃce resolved an interference proceeding against an applicant (as
opposed to an existing patentee), the disappointed applicant had to choose between appealing or
instead bringing a suit in equity to challenge the denial of his application; disappointed applicants
no longer could do both in succession. See Act of Mar. 2, 1927, ch. 273, § 11, 44 Stat. 1335, 1336-37
(amending Rev. Stat. § 4915 to permit suits in equity by disappointed applicants only if no appeal
“is pending or has been decided”). Indeed, even if the disappointed applicant chose to appeal, an
adverse party to the interference proceeding could obtain the dismissal of the appeal by “elect[ing]
to have all further proceedings conducted as provided in section 4915 of the Revised Statutes”—that
is, by insisting that the applicant bring a new suit in equity rather than pursuing an appeal. Id. § 8,
44 Stat. at 1336 (amending Rev. Stat. § 4911, regarding appeals). But section 4915 was just about
suits by disappointed applicants, and so the 1927 amendment did not operate against existing
patentees. If the Patent Oﬃce resolved an interference proceeding against an existing patentee, the
patentee had a right to appeal under Rev. Stat. § 4911, and his adversary could not force him to bring
suit in equity instead. See, e.g., Preston v. White, 92 F.2d 813, 815-16 (C.C.P.A. 1937) (explaining this
interpretation and concluding that “the patentees have a right to proceed under section 4911”); cf.
infra note 563 and accompanying text (noting changes made in 1952).
532
533
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patent was void in whole or in part.536 The trial of that suit would be “de
novo” in the sense that the parties would build a new record; they were not
limited to the evidence that had been presented to the Patent Oﬃce.537 Under
Morgan, though, the party who had lost the interference proceeding would
face a challenging standard of proof: unless he could establish his priority
with evidence carrying “thorough conviction,” the court would follow the
result of the interference proceeding.538 Thus, the determination of priority
made in the interference proceeding could end up getting great weight in a
subsequent lawsuit, even when the court was relying on it to rule against an
existing patentee’s claim of vested rights.
As applied against existing patents, this aspect of early twentieth-century
practice may not be consistent with the general framework described in Part I.
But that is not entirely clear. From the year before Morgan was decided on, if the
Patent Office ruled against an existing patentee in an interference proceeding,
the patentee had a right to appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia.539 The ultimate result of the interference proceeding—that is, the
result to which later tribunals deferred—was the result reached by this court,540
which met the structural requirements of Article III and was capable of exercising
“judicial” power.541 (To be sure, the Supreme Court thought that Congress could
536 See Rev. Stat. § 4918, 18 Stat. 959 (1874) (authorizing such suits “[w]henever there are
interfering patents”); see also supra notes 508, 516 and accompanying text (referring to the precursor
of this provision in the Patent Act of 1836).
537 See Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 290 F. 565, 570 (D. Del. 1923)
(observing that in suits under Rev. Stat. § 4918, as in suits under § 4915, “all questions in issue are tried de
novo upon all competent evidence, new or old”), aff ’d, 8 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1925), aff ’d, 273 U.S. 670 (1927).
538 Id. at 571-72; see also Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Carborundum Co., 155 F.2d 746, 749 (3d
Cir. 1946) (noting that “a mere preponderance of the evidence” is not enough to satisfy Morgan).
539 See supra note 535.
540 With respect to the interference proceeding in Morgan itself, the Supreme Court had spoken
of deference to “the decision of the Patent Office.” Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894). But
the Patent Office had rendered that decision in 1889, before Congress created the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia and authorized it to entertain appeals in interference proceedings. See id.
at 121 (statement of the case). Going forward, courts understood Morgan to require deference on
questions of fact to the ultimate result of the interference proceeding—which, in cases where the party
who had lost in the Patent Office had pursued an appeal, meant the result reached by the Court of
Appeals. See, e.g., Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Miller Saw Trimmer Co., 2 F.2d 744, 745-47
(W.D. Pa. 1923), aff ’d, 6 F.2d 417, 417-18 (3d Cir. 1925) (discussing an interference proceeding in which
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia had reversed the Patent Office, and invoking Morgan
to require deference to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals rather than the conclusion
reached by the Patent Office); infra note 554 and accompanying text.
541 See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 1, 27 Stat. 434, 434-35 (providing that the court’s judges “shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold office
during good behavior”); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 544-45 (1933) (holding that both
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, as then constituted, “are
courts of the United States, vested generally with the same jurisdiction as that possessed by the inferior
federal courts located elsewhere in respect of the cases enumerated in § 2 of Art. III”); cf. Fed. Radio
Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468 (1930) (not denying that the then-existing courts for the
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give the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia not only judicial
jurisdiction but also “jurisdiction . . . over quasi judicial or administrative
matters,” and decisions in patent-interference appeals arguably fell into that
category.542 In the 1890s, though, the Supreme Court had characterized the role
that the Court of Appeals played in those cases as “judicial.”543)
Admittedly, even if the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia was
acting as a true court in patent-interference appeals, it did not preside over
the introduction of evidence; it was supposed to “revise the decision appealed
from in a summary way, on the evidence produced before the
Commissioner.”544 Still, the court could and did reach its own conclusions
about what the evidence showed. In case after case, the court reviewed the
record and formed its own opinion about whether the Commissioner had
ruled for the correct party.545
That approach reflects an aspect of the relevant statutes that modern
readers may miss. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the word
District of Columbia could exercise “judicial” power, but indicating—contrary to O’Donoghue—that
they were not Article III courts); Nelson, supra note 2, at 575-76 (noting early uncertainty about
Congress’s ability to create non-Article III courts for the District of Columbia).
542 See O’Donoghue, 281 U.S. at 545 (invoking Congress’s special authority over the District of
Columbia, and citing two patent cases and a trademark case as having upheld Congress’s ability to give
D.C. courts powers and duties “of an exceptional and advisory character”); see also Postum Cereal Co. v.
Calif. Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1927) (concluding that the decision of the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia in a trademark-interference appeal “is not a judicial judgment” but “is merely
an instruction to the Commissioner of Patents by a court which is made part of the machinery of the
Patent Office for administrative purposes”); Rousso v. First Nat’l Bank, 37 F.2d 281, 283 (6th Cir. 1930)
(“In passing upon an issue raised upon appeal in interference proceedings, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia acts as a branch or arm of the Patent Office, and not in a judicial capacity.”).
543 United States ex rel. Bernardin v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 589 (1899) (asserting that back when
Congress had authorized individual judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia to hear
appeals from the Commissioner, those judges were “called on to act as a special judicial tribunal,”
and concluding that Congress could instead give this role to “existing courts of competent
jurisdiction,” because “the nature of the thing to be done [is] judicial”); cf. Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2
App. D.C. 404, 405 (1894) (denying a motion to seal the records of an appeal, and explaining that
even if the Patent Oﬃce’s rules allowed proceedings in the Patent Oﬃce to be kept secret, “the
Patent Oﬃce is a branch of one of the executive departments of the government, and . . . this is a
public court of record, governed by very diﬀerent principles and considerations, in respect to its
records and proceedings, from those that apply to an executive department”).
544 Rev. Stat. § 4914, 18 Stat. 958 (1874).
545 See, e.g., Fagan v. Whitmore, 18 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (“[F]rom a review of the
evidence we are of the opinion that Whitmore failed to show due diligence in developing his
machine . . . . We therefore agree with the decisions of the Examiner of Interference and the
Examiners in Chief, and reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Patents.”); Tyler v. Kelch, 19
App. D.C. 180, 184-91 (1902) (noting that the Commissioner had awarded priority to Kelch, and
examining the record to answer the following question: “Was [the Commissioner] right in that
conclusion?”); Beals v. Finkenbiner, 12 App. D.C. 23, 25 (1897) (“As is quite common in this class of
cases, there is a mass of conﬂicting evidence in the record, which requires careful consideration and
comparison in order to arrive at the merits of the controversy . . . .”); id. at 25-32 (reviewing that
evidence in detail and ultimately reversing the acting Commissioner’s decision).
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“appeal” frequently had a technical meaning. At that time, the “two principal
methods known to English jurisprudence, and to the jurisprudence of the
Federal courts, by which cases may be removed from an inferior to an appellate
court for review” were “the writ of error and the appeal.”546 When Congress
authorized review by writ of error, the reviewing court could consider questions
of law but could not second-guess the lower court’s conclusions on any
“controverted question of fact.”547 (Much the same was true of the common-law
writ of certiorari, which might be used “to bring up after judgment the
proceedings of an inferior court or tribunal, whose procedure is not according
to the course of the common law”; when used for this purpose, certiorari was
said to be “in the nature of a writ of error.”548) By contrast, when Congress
authorized an “appeal” without imposing any special restrictions, the case was
brought up “for re-examination on all the merits, whether of law or fact, and
for consideration on these, as though no decree had ever been rendered.”549
Ever since 1839, when Congress first authorized an “appeal” from decisions
of the Commissioner of Patents to Article III judges, Congress did impose
some special restrictions, including the proviso that the judges were “to revise
such decisions . . . on the evidence produced before the Commissioner.”550
Between 1870 and 1893, moreover, Congress excluded interference cases from
the appeal mechanism.551 But in the 1880s, the Supreme Court described the
then-existing procedure as “a technical appeal” (that is, an appeal in the

Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 621 (1875).
Id.
Harris v. Barber, 129 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1889); see also FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF
NEW TRIALS, AND OTHER REHEARINGS; INCLUDING WRITS OF ERROR, APPEALS, ETC. 691
(Philadelphia, Kay & Brother, 2d ed. 1872) (“The office of a certiorari is to review questions of law,
not of fact; and, in examining into evidence, the appellate court does not determine the preponderance
of probabilities, but simply whether the evidence will justify the finding as a legitimate inference from
the facts proved . . . .”); HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL REMEDIES OF
MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION, HABEAS CORPUS, CERTIORARI AND QUO WARRANTO 209
(Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1880) (“[W]here the error is as to the facts the writ does not lie.”).
549 Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 621; see also, e.g., Smith v. Chase, 22 F. Cas. 478, 479-80
(C.C.D.C. 1828) (No. 13,022) (“By the civil law an appeal brings up the whole cause, fact as well as
law, to the appellate court; . . . the cause commences de novo in the appellate court, where the
plaintiﬀ . . . is allowed to make new allegations, and produce new evidence . . . .”); Wiscart v.
D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (opinion of Ellsworth, C.J.) (“An appeal is a process of civil
law origin, and . . . subject[s] the fact as well as the law, to a review and re-trial . . . .”).
550 Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 11, 5 Stat. 353, 354-55; see also Rev. Stat. § 4914, 18 Stat. 958
(1874) (setting forth a successor of this provision).
551 See supra note 535.
546
547
548
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technical sense),552 and that presumably remained true in 1893 when Congress
re-authorized the “appeal” in interference cases.553
Thus, in the early twentieth century, when courts held that Morgan v.
Daniels required them to defer to the results of interference proceedings that
had gone against existing patentees, the courts were not simply deferring to the
Patent Office’s conclusions. Unless the patentee had waived the right to appeal,
the results of such interference proceedings were determined by the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia (a true federal court that was capable of
exercising “judicial” power) on the basis of its own evaluation of the evidence
that had been submitted to the agency. Indeed, one of the leading examples of
a judicial opinion that used the results of an interference proceeding against an
existing patentee is a case in which the Commissioner of Patents had ruled in
favor of the patentee, only to be reversed by the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia.554 When later courts deferred to the results of this proceeding,
the conclusion to which they were deferring was that of the court, not the
Commissioner of Patents or any other executive tribunal.
Although the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia normally
applied the rule that “we must form our own conclusion independently of
[the Patent Oﬃce’s tribunals],”555 the court did give substantial deference to
those tribunals in one situation. By statute, multiple layers of review were
available within the Patent Oﬃce itself, and each layer could entail
independent judgment.556 From the 1890s to the early 1920s, if “the expert
552 Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 61 (1884); cf. Phillips v. Preston, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 278, 289 (1847) (contrasting “a writ of error to bring the law and not the facts here
for reexamination” with “a technical appeal, where the facts are to be reviewed and reconsidered”).
553 See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 9, 27 Stat. 434, 436 (addressing the existing provisions for
appeals and adding that “in addition, any party aggrieved by a decision of the Commissioner of Patents
in any interference case may appeal therefrom to [the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia]”);
see also Dower v. Richards, 151 U.S. 658, 663 (1894) (“In the legislation of Congress, from the foundation
of the government, a writ of error, which brings up matter of law only, has always been distinguished
from an appeal, which, unless expressly restricted, brings up both law and fact.”); The Francis Wright,
105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) (“Undoubtedly, if Congress should give an appeal in admiralty causes, and say
no more, the facts, as well as the law, would be subjected to review and retrial . . . .”).
554 See Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 290 F. 565, 572 (D. Del. 1923)
(summarizing the course of the interference proceeding), aff ’d, 8 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1925), aff ’d, 273 U.S.
670 (1927); see also Reilly, supra note 503, at 388 & n.59 (citing Victor Talking Machine as evidence that
courts deferred to the results of interference proceedings even “when the interference involved an
issued patent”); cf. Gregory Dolin, Yes, the PTAB Is Unconstitutional, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
457, 469 (2018) (“Nothing in Victor Talking serves to undermine the conclusion that in the 19th century
the courts viewed issued patents as indistinguishable from other forms of property and required that
any doubts about their validity be resolved in properly constituted Article III tribunals.”).
555 Hillard v. Brooks, 23 App. D.C. 526, 531 (1904).
556 See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Gathmann, 299 F. 702, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (“The tribunals of the
Patent Oﬃce, after independent examination of the evidence, each reached the conclusion that
Gathmann was the ﬁrst to conceive and reduce to practice the particular invention here
involved . . . .”). Before 1927, there were three relevant tribunals within the Patent Oﬃce: after an
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tribunals of the Patent Oﬃce” had considered a question of fact carefully and
had all reached the same conclusion, the Court of Appeals typically accepted
that conclusion in the absence of “a clear . . . showing of error.”557 Still, this
deference usually did not operate against existing patentees, because the
Patent Oﬃce itself usually applied a strong presumption in favor of the
validity of existing patents; to prevail against an existing patentee in an
interference proceeding, a later applicant had to establish the priority of his
invention beyond a reasonable doubt.558 Insofar as it was unusual for the
Patent Oﬃce to resolve interference proceedings against an existing patentee,
the deference doctrines applied by the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia normally would not have raised concerns about the need for fully
judicial adjudication of vested rights.
In 1929, Congress transferred jurisdiction over Patent Oﬃce appeals from
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to the newly renamed Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), but the system otherwise remained
stable.559 By contrast, the Patent Act of 1952 made important changes. Under
initial examiner rendered a decision, any party could “appeal . . . to the board of examiners-in-chief,”
and a party dissatisﬁed with the board’s decision could “appeal to the Commissioner in person.” See
Rev. Stat. §§ 4909–10, 18 Stat. 958 (1874). In 1927, Congress consolidated the second and third levels,
creating a new Board of Appeals within the Patent Oﬃce that included both the Commissioner and
the examiners-in-chief. See Act of Mar. 2, 1927, ch. 273, §§ 3, 5–6, 44 Stat. 1335, 1335-36.
557 McBerty v. Cook, 16 App. D.C. 133, 136 (1900); cf. Lindmark v. Hodgkinson, 31 App. D.C. 612,
614 (1908) (referring to the idea that “where three tribunals of the Patent Office have concurred . . . ,
this court will follow them unless a manifest error has been committed,” and suggesting that this is
especially true on a complex question “about which the experts of the Patent Office are less liable to err
than ourselves”). In 1922, the court cut back on this practice. See Bungay v. Grey, 281 F. 423, 425 (D.C.
Cir. 1922) (“[W]hile concurrent decisions of the Patent Office tribunals should be regarded as
persuasive and given due consideration and respect, nevertheless if material error has been made to
appear, it is our duty, as in any case, to enter judgment accordingly. We . . . overrule prior opinions
inconsistent with this view.”). But in 1929, after Congress redirected patent appeals from the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the practice
reappeared. See Stern v. Schroeder, 36 F.2d 515, 517 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (indicating that at least on “highly
technical” questions, “when the tribunals of the Patent Office concur in findings of fact, such findings
will not be disturbed by this court, unless the decision appealed from is manifestly wrong”).
558 See Hunter v. Jenkin, 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 157, 160 (“When one of the contestants has a
patent for the invention in dispute, and the other is an applicant for a patent, the latter, in order to
prevail, must present a case, both as to conception and as to reasonable diligence, which does not
admit of a reasonable doubt.”); see also, e.g., Dillon v. Kimball, 1892 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 9, 9 (“As Kimball
and Wirt had a patent before Dillon’s application was filed, Dillon must . . . prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt.”); cf. supra note 523 (noting the presumption of validity applied by courts).
559 See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 2(a), 45 Stat. 1475, 1476. Soon after Congress enacted
this statute, the Supreme Court held that the CCPA was not an Article III court. See Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458-60 (1929); see also United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970,
1985 (2021) (citing Bakelite and saying that the CCPA was “an entity within the Executive Branch
until 1958”). That holding may have been wrong. See Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-755, § 1, 72
Stat. 848, 848 (1958) (declaring that the CCPA is indeed “a court established under article III”); see
also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 550 (1962) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (observing that
Bakelite’s contrary conclusion had rested on a “non sequitur”). But whether the CCPA was an Article
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the 1952 statute, when the Commissioner declared an interference between
two applications or between an application and an unexpired patent, “[t]he
question of priority of invention shall be determined by a board of patent
interferences (consisting of three examiners of interferences),” which would
announce a decision on behalf of the Patent Oﬃce.560 If that decision was
“adverse to a patentee,” it would automatically “constitute cancellation of the
claims involved from the patent” once any opportunity for appeal or other
review had passed.561 Thus, the Patent Act of 1952 was the ﬁrst statute to give
the Patent Oﬃce direct authority to cancel an existing patent.
Before any such cancellation took eﬀect, though, the patentee would have
the opportunity for judicial proceedings. More generally, any party to an
interference proceeding who was dissatisﬁed with the board’s determination
of priority could choose either to appeal to the CCPA (under 35 U.S.C. § 141)
or to seek relief in a freestanding civil action (under 35 U.S.C. § 146).562 In
practice, the statute gave freestanding civil actions precedence over appeals
to the CCPA; if a party ﬁled an appeal, any adverse party could get the appeal
dismissed by making an election “to have all further proceedings conducted
as provided in section 146,” and the would-be appellant would then have
thirty days to ﬁle a freestanding civil action under section 146.563 As applied
against existing patentees, whether this system was compatible with the
traditional doctrine of vested rights therefore depended on the nature of the
proceeding that section 146 authorized.
Section 146 speciﬁed that the court could consider the administrative
record (if introduced on motion of either party), but “without prejudice to
the right of the parties to take further testimony.”564 As a result, proceedings
under section 146 were at least partially “de novo” in the sense that the parties
could introduce new evidence.565 Still, the statute did not specify which party
III court or had some other possible justiﬁcation, Congress seems to have thought that the CCPA
wielded judicial power. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 928 (enacting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1256, which allowed the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction directly over the CCPA);
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523-27 (1966) (discussing the constitutional issues raised by
§ 1256); cf. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2172-80 (2018) (discussing the constitutionality of
28 U.S.C. § 1259, which allows the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction directly over
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
560 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 801-02 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 135).
561 Id. at 802.
562 See id. at 802-03 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 146).
563 See id. at 802 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 141). In contrast to the version of the statute that had
been in eﬀect from 1927 until 1952, that was true even if the would-be appellant was an existing
patentee rather than simply a disappointed applicant. Cf. supra note 535.
564 Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. at 803 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 146).
565 See, e.g., AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 129697 (Fed. Cir. 2014). At least for a time, there was a circuit split about the nature of the new evidence
that could be introduced. See Case v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 730 F.2d 745, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Some courts
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had the burden of proof or what level of proof was necessary. For years, many
courts ﬁlled this gap by invoking Morgan v. Daniels: they held that whichever
party had lost in the Patent Oﬃce (later renamed the Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce (PTO)) bore the burden of proving its priority with evidence carrying
“thorough conviction.”566 If applied against an existing patentee, that
approach might give an executive-branch adjudication greater eﬀect than the
traditional doctrine of vested rights would have permitted. More recently,
however, the Federal Circuit concluded that “a § 146 action is a new civil
proceeding subject to de novo determination” (at least when new evidence is
introduced), and the burden of proof rested on the junior applicant rather
than on the party who lost in the PTO.567 On that understanding, the PTO’s
role in interference proceedings remained compatible with the constitutional
framework described in Part I.
C. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC
In a sense, interference proceedings under the Patent Act of 1952 laid the
groundwork for the patent-cancellation provisions in the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA)—the 2011 statute that the Supreme Court
considered in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.568
The Oil States case has already triggered voluminous commentary, and I will

noted that interference proceedings in the Patent Oﬃce normally did not include live testimony,
and they suggested that this limitation might explain the “further testimony” contemplated by
section 146; these courts suggested that although parties in civil actions under section 146 could call
witnesses whose depositions had been submitted to the Patent Oﬃce, the parties should not be
allowed to introduce other new evidence unless they had an adequate reason for not having presented
it to the Patent Oﬃce. See, e.g., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 579 F.2d 1038, 1043-46 (7th
Cir. 1978). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has rejected an analogous limitation in civil
actions brought under section 145, see Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 437-46 (2012), and the Federal
Circuit has held that “the Supreme Court’s decision . . . applies with equal force to both § 145 and
§ 146 actions.” Troy v. Samson Mfg. Corp., 758 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
566 Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894); see Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Montedison, S.p.A.,
664 F.2d 356, 361-62 (3d Cir. 1981); Velsicol, 579 F.2d at 1042; Boyce v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 818, 821-22 (9th
Cir. 1971); Kirschke v. Lamar, 426 F.2d 870, 873 n.3 (8th Cir. 1970); Tidewater Pat. Dev. Co. v. Gillette
Co., 273 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Szuecs, 240 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
567 Streck, Inc. v. Rsch. & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 659 F.3d 1186, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal
Circuit did not necessarily call for de novo review “when no new evidence has been introduced” in the
district court. See Troy, 758 F.3d at 1328 (suggesting that if the parties simply submitted a case to the
district court on the administrative record, Morgan’s deferential standard would apply). Still, live
testimony counted as new evidence for this purpose (and therefore triggered a need for “de novo factual
findings”) even if its substance mirrored testimony that had been presented to the PTO via affidavits
or deposition transcripts. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
568 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018); see Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits of the Convoluted Road to Patent Reform:
The New Invalidity Proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 390
(2012) (“[T]he[] lineage [of the new procedures] is the PTO’s patent-interference practice.”).
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not rehash more than necessary.569 As background, though, we must start with
the two statutes that are commonly seen as precursors of the AIA.
1. The Traditional Framework and Patent “Reexamination” After 1980
In 1980, Congress established a procedure by which the PTO could
“reexamin[e]” the patentability of one or more claims in patents that it had
already issued.570 Speciﬁcally, “[a]ny person at any time” could alert the PTO
to “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications” that the person
“believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular
patent,” and the person could ask the PTO to reexamine the claim on the
basis of the cited prior art.571 If the Commissioner determined that the
request raised “a substantial new question of patentability aﬀecting any claim
of the patent,”572 the Commissioner would invite a response from the patent
owner, and the PTO would conduct a reexamination according to the same
procedures used for initial examinations.573 If the examiner ultimately ruled
against the patent owner, the patent owner could appeal to the PTO’s Board
of Appeals—and if the patent owner lost there, 35 U.S.C. § 306 speciﬁed that
“[t]he patent owner . . . may seek court review under the provisions of
sections 141 to 145 of this title.”574 But after this opportunity for judicial
review, the Commissioner would “issue and publish a certiﬁcate canceling any
claim of the patent ﬁnally determined to be unpatentable” (and “conﬁrming
any claim of the patent determined to be patentable”).575
As with interference proceedings, whether this procedure comported with
the traditional doctrine of vested rights depended on the legal eﬀect of the
PTO’s determinations, which in turn depended on the nature of the judicial
review permitted under sections 141 to 145. Those provisions operated when
the PTO had denied an application for a patent, and they gave the
disappointed applicant a choice: appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (an Article III court that had replaced the CCPA) under
569 For analyses that proceed in traditional terms, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court
Tackles Patent Reform: Inter Partes Review Under the AIA Undermines the Structural Protections Oﬀered
by Article III Courts, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 188 (2018); Gary Lawson, Appointments and Illegal
Adjudication: The America Invents Act Through a Constitutional Lens, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 26
(2018); Adam J. MacLeod, Public Rights After Oil States Energy, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1281
(2020); Mossoﬀ, supra note 11; Justin Burnham, Note, Patents in the Political Branches, 16 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 559 (2018).
570 See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015.
571 Id. at 3015 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–02).
572 Id. (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 303). The Commissioner could also make such a determination
“[o]n his own initiative,” without a request for reexamination. Id. at 3015-16.
573 Id. at 3016 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 304–05).
574 Id.
575 Id. at 3016-17 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 307).
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procedures described in sections 141 to 144, or ﬁle a civil action against the
Commissioner in federal district court under section 145. By piggybacking
upon these provisions, the 1980 statute gave the same choice to patent owners
who lost a reexamination proceeding.
As interpreted by the modern Supreme Court, sections 141 to 144 do not
authorize an “appeal” in the old-fashioned sense.576 Instead of making its own
factual ﬁndings, the Federal Circuit must accept the PTO’s ﬁndings unless
they are “unsupported by substantial evidence” (or, perhaps, “arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”)—standards that are familiar from
judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),577 but that traditionally might have been regarded as inadequate when
an agency had ruled against a claim of vested rights.578
From the standpoint of the traditional framework, though, the other option
offered by the 1980 statute was better. Rather than appealing under sections 141
to 144, patent owners who lost a reexamination proceeding could bring a
freestanding civil action in a federal district court under section 145. At least as
the Supreme Court now interprets section 145, such actions can be largely de
novo.579 The parties can introduce all relevant evidence whether or not they
presented it to the PTO—and if a party does introduce new evidence on a
disputed question of fact, “the district court must make de novo factual findings
that take account of both the new evidence and the administrative record before

Cf. supra notes 549–53 and accompanying text.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (holding that
“§ 706 applies when the Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact made by the Patent and Trademark
Office” in an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 141). But see Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the
Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 172-78 (2000) (criticizing Zurko and observing that
“until the mid-1990s, no one had ever suggested that APA Section 10(e) applied to PTO review”).
578 See Evan D. Bernick, Is Judicial Deference to Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?, 16 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 27, 30 (2018) (arguing broadly that “judicial deference to agency fact-finding is
unconstitutional in cases involving deprivations of . . . core private rights to life, liberty, and property,”
and referring to “an independent model of judicial review of governmental action that was applied from
the Founding Era until the late nineteenth century” (some emphasis omitted)); cf. Nelson, supra note
2, at 618 (noting that even today, “allowing federal administrative agencies to adjudicate ordinary
criminal cases on the same basis that agencies currently handle disputes about broadcast licenses or
pilots’ certificates would violate longstanding understandings of our constitutional arrangements”).
579 See Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 433-34 (2012). Before the Supreme Court issued this
opinion, some courts had imposed special restrictions on the evidence that could be introduced in
§ 145 actions and had also deferred to the PTO’s ﬁndings of fact. See, e.g., DeSeversky v. Brenner,
424 F.2d 857, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (saying that although the plaintiﬀ “may introduce evidence not
previously presented to the Patent Oﬃce,” the plaintiﬀ “is precluded from presenting new issues, at
least in the absence of some reason of justice put forward for failing to present the issue to the Patent
Oﬃce”); Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.–Petrobras v. Comm’r of Pats. & Trademarks, Civ. A. No. 85-3743,
1987 WL 14141, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1987) (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 145, this Court may set aside factual
ﬁndings of the Board only if they are clearly erroneous, based on the record before the Board and
any new evidence presented in trial.”).
576
577
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the PTO.”580 While a party’s failure to present certain evidence to the PTO
might affect the weight that the district court itself chooses to give that
evidence,581 the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the idea “that [the]
district court should defer to the PTO’s factual findings”; in the Supreme
Court’s words, “the district court must make its own findings de novo and does
not act as the ‘reviewing court’ envisioned by the APA.”582 Because 35 U.S.C.
§ 306 allowed patent owners to bring this same sort of civil action before the
PTO’s adverse decision in a reexamination proceeding would take effect, the
1980 statute did not necessarily violate the traditional doctrine of vested rights.
In 1999, Congress gave the name “ex parte reexamination” to the
administrative procedure that the 1980 statute had created.583 Congress also
created a new administrative procedure called “inter partes reexamination”
that entailed a more adversarial presentation to the PTO and that again could
result in the cancellation of one or more claims in an existing patent.584 Before
the cancellation took eﬀect, the owner of the patent could “appeal under the
provisions of sections 141 through 144,” but Congress did not allow the owner
to bring an original civil action under section 145.585 At the same time,
Congress arguably eliminated that option in “ex parte” reexaminations as
well.586 Still, Congress did not apply these changes to any patents that had
already been granted; the provisions in the relevant subtitle of the 1999
statute operated only with respect to patents for which an original application
was ﬁled on or after the statute’s date of enactment.587

Hyatt, 566 U.S. at 444, 446.
See id. at 445 (“[T]he district court may, in its discretion, ‘consider the proceedings before
and ﬁndings of the Patent Oﬃce in deciding what weight to aﬀord an applicant’s newly-admitted
evidence.’” (quoting Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010))).
582 Id. at 438; see also Michael S. Greve, Exceptional, After All and After Oil States: Judicial Review and
the Patent System, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 26-35 (2020) (discussing the relationship among the
Administrative Procedure Act, appeals under sections 141 to 144, and original civil actions under section 145).
583 See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 (IPCORA),
Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, § 4602, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-567.
584 Id. § 4604, 113 Stat. at 1501A-567 to 1501A-570.
585 Id., 113 Stat. at 1501A-569 (enacting a new 35 U.S.C. § 315).
586 Although Congress did not modify 35 U.S.C. § 306, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 141 to say
that “[a] patent owner in any reexamination proceeding” who was dissatisfied with the PTO’s final
decision “may appeal the decision only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”
Id. § 4605(c), 113 Stat. at 1501A-571 (emphasis added); see also In re Teles AG Informationstechnologien,
747 F.3d 1357, 1361-66 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing Congress’s sloppiness in failing to amend § 306, but
concluding that “the 1999 amendments eliminated the right of patent owners to secure review under
§ 145”). In 2011, the AIA finally amended § 306 to drop the reference to § 145. See Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. 112-29, § 6(h)(2)(A), 125 Stat. 284, 312.
587 IPCORA § 4608(a), 113 Stat. at 1501A-572.
580
581
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2. The America Invents Act of 2011
In 2011, the AIA made major changes to the patent system. Most
signiﬁcantly, the AIA changed the basis on which patents would be granted
going forward.588 But apart from altering the test for granting patents in the
future, the AIA also established two new procedures for asking the PTO to
cancel patents after issuing them.
One of those procedures, called “post-grant review,” expanded
considerably upon the reasons that would have supported administrative
reexamination of a patent under prior law. Within the ﬁrst nine months after
a patent is issued, “a person who is not the owner” can now petition the PTO
to cancel some or all of the patent’s claims on the basis of any arguments
about invalidity that could be raised as defenses in an infringement suit.589 In
response to such a petition, the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) might conduct an adversarial proceeding that can result in
cancellation of one or more of the patent’s claims.590 (Before the PTO issues
588 Previous federal patent laws had used “a ﬁrst-to-invent rule”: generally speaking, “the
United States . . . award[ed] patent rights to the ﬁrst inventor to create an invention even if he or
she ﬁled a patent application later than another inventor.” Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus
Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 79 n.24 (2013). The AIA shifted to what it labeled a “ﬁrst
inventor to ﬁle” rule: as between two people who have independently invented the same thing, the
ﬁrst to apply for a patent normally wins. See AIA § 3, 125 Stat. at 285-93; Ford, supra, at 79 n.24. In
keeping with this shift, Congress also reformulated the traditional “interference” proceedings; it is
no longer necessary to determine the priority of invention, but the PTO can conduct what are now
called “derivation” proceedings to test the independence of someone’s alleged invention. See AIA
§ 3(i)–(j), 125 Stat. at 289-91 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 135 and substituting “derivation” for
“interference” in § 146). Of course, these particular changes did not apply to any existing patents.
Roughly speaking, the new system applied only with respect to applications ﬁled at least eighteen
months after the AIA was enacted. See id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.
589 See AIA § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 306 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 321).
590 See id. at 306-10 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 324, 326, 328). The PTAB is the successor to the
PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See id. § 7(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 313 (amending 35 U.S.C.
§ 6). It consists of the Director and Deputy Director of the PTO, the Commissioner for Patents, the
Commissioner for Trademarks, and many “administrative patent judges” who are “appointed by the
Secretary [of Commerce] in consultation with the Director [of the PTO].” Id. For purposes of both
post-grant review and inter partes review (the other new cancellation procedure created by the AIA),
the PTAB sits in panels of at least three members, who are designated by the Director. Id.
Recently, in a case involving inter partes review, the Supreme Court held that if the structure
contemplated by the AIA were given full eﬀect, and if a panel of administrative patent judges could
render ﬁnal decisions that were not subject to review by any superior oﬃcers in the executive branch,
then the administrative patent judges would not be “inferior” oﬃcers whose appointment can be
vested in the Secretary of Commerce; instead, they would have to be appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; United States v. Arthrex,
Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1979-83, 1985-86 (2021). To solve this perceived problem, a plurality concluded
that “[d]ecisions by [administrative patent judges] must be subject to review by the Director,” id. at
1986 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.), and the plurality further concluded that current law permits
that result. See id. at 1987 (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 6(c), as enacted by the AIA, “cannot
constitutionally be enforced to the extent that its requirements prevent the Director from reviewing
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a certiﬁcate canceling a claim, a dissatisﬁed party may appeal to the Federal
Circuit, but the court will defer to the PTAB’s factual determinations if they
are supported by substantial evidence.591) By and large, though, the AIA’s
provisions authorizing post-grant review operate only with respect to patents
issued after the AIA was enacted.592
The other new review procedure established by the AIA, “inter partes
review,” was not limited in this way; once it took eﬀect (one year after
enactment of the AIA), it applied to “any patent issued before, on, or after
that eﬀective date.”593 But “inter partes review” simply replaced the
mechanism for “inter partes reexamination” that had existed since 1999, and
the main diﬀerences between the two mechanisms were procedural rather
than substantive.594 While Congress wanted the PTAB’s procedures for “inter
partes review” to be more court-like than the prior procedures for inter partes
reexamination, Congress did not expand the grounds upon which the PTO
could cancel patents through the use of these procedures. By the terms of the
AIA, petitioners seeking inter partes review can ask the PTO to cancel a claim
in an existing patent only on the ground that the claim is obvious or lacked
novelty, and “only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications”595—the same things that would have allowed the PTO to cancel
a claim under the earlier procedure of inter partes reexamination.596
Still, the 1999 statute had made inter partes reexamination available only for
patents issuing from applications filed on or after November 29, 1999 (the date
ﬁnal decisions rendered by [administrative patent judges]”); id. (“The Director accordingly may
review ﬁnal PTAB decisions and, upon review, may issue decisions himself on behalf of the Board.”).
Although Arthrex involved “the Director’s ability to supervise [administrative patent judges] in
adjudicating petitions for inter partes review,” id., I assume that the plurality would apply the same
analysis to post-grant review.
591 See AIA § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 310-11 (enacting 35 U.S.C. §§ 328–29); id. § 7(c)(1), 125 Stat. at
314 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 141(c)); see also Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1977-78 (“The Federal Circuit reviews
the PTAB’s application of patentability standards de novo and its underlying factual determinations
for substantial evidence.”).
592 See AIA § 6(f)(2)(A), 125 Stat. at 311. But cf. id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329-31 (instructing the
Director of the PTO to issue regulations “establishing and implementing a transitional post-grant
review proceeding for review of the validity of covered business method patents,” which claim “a
method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the
practice, administration, or management of a ﬁnancial product or service”).
593 Id. § 6(c)(2), 125 Stat. at 304.
594 See H.R. Rep. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46-47 (2011) (“The [AIA] converts inter partes reexamination
from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding, and renames the proceeding ‘inter partes
review.’”); see also id. at 47 (listing some other changes).
595 AIA § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 299 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)).
596 See IPCORA, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, sec. 4604, § 311(a), 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-567 (1999)
(authorizing requests for inter partes reexamination “on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions
of section 301”); 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (permitting the citation of “prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications”); see also Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“In [inter partes reviews],
patents are reviewed on the same substantive grounds . . . as ex parte and inter partes reexaminations.”).
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the statute was enacted).597 The application for the patent involved in the Oil
States case had been filed a few months earlier,598 so that patent would not have
been subject to inter partes reexamination. From 2012 on, however, the AIA
nonetheless purported to expose the patent to inter partes review. After the
patent’s owner (Oil States Energy Services, LLC) sued Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC, for infringement, the defendant in that suit did indeed ask the PTO to
initiate an inter partes review of two of the patent’s claims, and the PTAB
concluded that the two claims were unpatentable.599 Oil States appealed to the
Federal Circuit, arguing both that the claims were patentable and that the AIA’s
provisions about inter partes review were unconstitutional. The Federal Circuit
affirmed the PTAB’s decision, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari.600
For some reason, “Oil States [did] not challenge the retroactive
application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place
when its patent issued.”601 Instead, Oil States suggested that no matter what
conditions the law might try to impose at the time the federal government
granted a patent, subsequent adjudication of the patent’s validity required an
exercise of “judicial” power, at least when the adjudication involved
adversarial proceedings between private parties.602 But a majority of the
Supreme Court rejected this position. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion
observed that “the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public
rights—speciﬁcally, the grant of a public franchise.”603 Under federal law,
moreover, patents “are granted subject to the qualiﬁcation that the PTO has
‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim’ in an inter
partes review.”604 According to Justice Thomas, “This Court has recognized
that franchises can be qualiﬁed in this manner.”605 And because Oil States had
not made any arguments about the fact that the AIA had not been in place
when the patent in question was granted, the Supreme Court refused to
consider that fact.606 Without deciding what Congress could do in the absence
See supra note 587 and accompanying text.
See U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 B1, patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/pdfs/US6179053.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B839-8YMF] (indicating that the application was filed on August 12, 1999).
599 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018).
600 See id. (summarizing the procedural posture).
601 Id. at 1379.
602 See Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712); cf. id. at 50
(conceding that the 1980 statute authorizing the PTO to cancel patents after ex parte reexamination
did not violate Article III, but suggesting that Congress could not validly authorize the agency to
conduct “an adversarial proceeding with all the trappings of litigation”).
603 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373.
604 Id. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)).
605 Id. at 1375 (citing Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470 (1882), and other cases). But cf.
id. at 1379 (“[O]ur decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property
for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”).
606 See id. at 1379.
597
598
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of a relevant reservation, the majority held that “Congress has permissibly
reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct [inter partes review].”607
3. Some Possible Limits on the Reservation Theory
The dissenters in Oil States suggested that the majority was wrong to
equate patents with “ordinary public franchises.”608 According to the
dissenters, early American courts had distinguished patents (which courts
interpreted in the same manner as “other instruments creating private
property rights, like land deeds”) from grants of “anticompetitive
monopolies” like “the . . . exclusive right to operate a toll bridge” (which
courts “view[ed] . . . with disfavor” and construed narrowly).609 As a
historical matter, moreover, “most everyone considered an issued patent a
personal right—no less than a home or farm—that the federal government
could revoke only with the concurrence of independent judges.”610
As we have seen, that is true. But perhaps it is true only because the
federal government traditionally granted patents without purporting to
reserve any authority for nonjudicial cancellation. In this respect, American
patents diﬀered from English patents. From the seventeenth century on,
virtually all English patents included a clause allowing the Crown to void the
grant upon ﬁndings made by the Crown or its Privy Council.611 By contrast,
patents issued in the United States did not contain such clauses,612 and
Congress did not purport to reserve any administrative cancellation authority
until the second half of the twentieth century.613 The key issue in Oil States
was what to make of this fact: did the federal government’s longstanding
practice of granting patents without such reservations simply reﬂect a policy
choice that Congress could change for future patents, or did the Constitution
itself prevent Congress from building nonjudicial cancellation procedures
into federal patent law (and causing all subsequently issued patents to be
granted subject to those procedures)?

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1385 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also Mossoﬀ, Jeﬀerson, supra note 369, at 999-1000 (providing additional citations in
support of this contrast).
610 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
611 See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text; Davies, supra note 325, at 102-04
(summarizing the rise and continued use of the clause); Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note
335, at 3-5 (chronicling the clause from the eighteenth century to 1908); see also Oil States, 138 S. Ct.
at 1377 (emphasizing this aspect of English history).
612 See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 349, at 685.
613 See supra text accompanying notes 560–67 (discussing the qualiﬁed authority conferred by
the Patent Act of 1952 in interference cases); supra subsection III.C.1 (discussing later provisions
about patent “reexamination”).
607
608
609
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That sort of question is not limited to patents, or even to franchises more
generally. Reservations are potentially an issue whenever the government
enters into any contract or grants any type of property. Thus, even if the
dissenters in Oil States were correct to analogize invention patents to land
grants, they still needed to think about reservations.
As Professors Gary Lawson and John Harrison have both observed, if the
federal government owns a tract of land, Congress probably can authorize the
government to convey title to a private person while retaining a reversionary
interest that allows the government to reclaim title at any time and for any
reason.614 Even under the traditional framework, moreover, Congress could put
the executive branch in charge of whether to exercise this option. Of course, if
the grantee claimed to own a fee simple absolute and denied that the
government had retained a reversionary interest, the grantee probably would
be able to raise this argument in court (unless the grantee waived that
opportunity); Congress could not give the executive branch conclusive
authority to reject a private person’s claim of vested rights. But if the
government had indeed retained the option of reclaiming title at will, the
government’s decision to exercise this option would not require judicial
involvement. In Professor Harrison’s words, “exercising the government’s own
proprietary rights” was a “characteristic executive function,” and the correlative
private interests on the other side would have been considered privileges rather
than vested private rights.615 One might say that an interest is not “vested” (for
purposes of the traditional framework) if the government can revoke it at will.
Matters were less clear when the government had retained a more qualified
reversionary interest that came into play only in certain circumstances. The
typical land grant made by the government in the nineteenth century was like
that; it could be unwound upon proof of certain facts, such as fraud on the part
of the grantee or certain kinds of mistakes on the part of the government.616
As noted above, the Supreme Court repeatedly indicated that grantees whose
titles were challenged on these grounds were entitled to judicial adjudication
of the relevant facts.617 In the various opinions that established this point,
though, the Court did not address whether the government could reserve
power to determine the facts administratively if the government included this

See Harrison, supra note 12, at 194-95, 203; Lawson, supra note 569, at 43.
See Harrison, supra note 12, at 148-49.
See supra note 428 (citing United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1865)).
See, e.g., Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1878) (indicating that once executive
oﬃcials have issued a land patent and the grantee has accepted it, “all right to control the title or to
decide on the right to the title . . . has passed from the Executive Department,” and “[i]f fraud,
mistake, error, or wrong has been done, the courts of justice present the only remedy”); see also supra
notes 428–32 and accompanying text.
614
615
616
617
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condition in the initial grant. So far as I know, the Court has not answered
that question to this day.618
In the nineteenth century, questions of this sort did come up with respect
to franchises. In 1876, for instance, the Minnesota legislature passed a statute
granting a ferry franchise but specifying that “[i]f the [franchisee] . . . fail[s]
to fulﬁl any of the conditions of this act, then the legislature may at any time
alter, amend or repeal the same.”619 Five years later, the legislature repealed
the grant.620 The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the constitutionality
of the repeal, but only after the judiciary found that the franchisee had indeed
failed to fulﬁll the conditions. The court explained that “[w]here the right
reserved to recall the grant depends on the happening of a contingent event,
the existence of the fact at the time of the recall must, of course, be a matter
for judicial investigation.”621 In the court’s words, a ﬁnal determination of the

618 In a 1963 case about a lease for drilling rights on public land, the Supreme Court did hold
that the statutes giving the Secretary of the Interior “general managerial powers over the public
lands” authorized the Secretary “to cancel this lease administratively for invalidity at its inception”—
a conclusion that the Court probably would not have reached if the Court had seen constitutional
problems. See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 476-78 (1963). Still, the Court based this conclusion
on the proprietary rights that the United States had retained with respect to both the land and the
minerals that were the subject of the lease. See id. at 477-78 (“Unlike a land patent, which divests the
Government of title, Congress under the Mineral Leasing Act has not only reserved to the United
States the fee interest in the leased land, but has also subjected the lease to exacting restrictions and
continuing supervision by the Secretary.”); id. at 478 (“[A] mineral lease does not give the lessee
anything approaching the full ownership of a fee patentee, nor does it convey an unencumbered
estate in the minerals.”); see also id. at 478 n.7 (contrasting the limited leasehold in question with the
full-ﬂedged property rights enjoyed by “a mining claimant whose location is perfected”); cf. Noble
v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893) (treating a right of way over public lands
as property and concluding that the Secretary of the Interior could not unilaterally revoke it).
Although the Supreme Court cited Boesche in Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 n.3 (2018), Boesche
may not really apply to patents for inventions. Indeed, patents for inventions might not implicate
the government’s proprietary rights at all. Although unpatented things are said to be in the public
domain, that phrase simply means that each member of the public is at liberty to make and use those
things. In contrast to other forms of public ownership, this general liberty might not give the
government proprietary rights of the sort that we expect the executive branch to manage. See United
States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 238 (1897) (observing that although patents for inventions
resemble patents for land in some respects, “the patent for an invention is not a conveyance of
something which the Government owns”); accord Marsh v. Nichols, Shephard & Co., 128 U.S. 605,
611 (1888); Att’y Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608, 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1876).
Even if patent rights did originate with the public in the same proprietary sense as rights in public
lands, moreover, the Constitution speaks of “securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive
Right to their . . . Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). That language might
prevent the government from retaining any ownership interest when it does grant a patent, and
hence might rule out the sort of co-ownership that was at issue in Boesche. See Harrison, supra note
12, at 195 (ﬂagging this issue and noting that it arose obliquely at oral argument in Oil States).
619 Act of Mar. 6, 1876, ch. 132, § 7, 1876 Minn. Spec. Laws 215, 216.
620 Act of Feb. 24, 1881, ch. 364, § 1, 1881 Minn. Spec. Laws 918, 918.
621 Myrick v. La Moure, 23 N.W. 549, 549 (Minn. 1885).
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legislature’s “right[] . . . to enforce the forfeiture” was “necessarily and
inherently a judicial question, which only the judiciary can decide.”622
At roughly the same time, though, the U.S. Supreme Court arguably
pointed in the opposite direction. In 1869, Congress had passed a joint
resolution consenting to the erection of a bridge over the Ohio River by the
Newport and Cincinnati Bridge Company.623 The resolution had speciﬁed
some minimum requirements for the bridge, but it had added:
Congress reserves the right to withdraw the assent hereby given in case the
free navigation of said river shall at any time be substantially and materially
obstructed by any bridge to be erected under the authority of this resolution,
or to direct the necessary modiﬁcations and alterations of said bridge.624

Two years later, Congress enacted a statute imposing more stringent
requirements to protect navigation.625 Aware that the company had already
begun construction according to the old plan, Congress authorized the
company to sue the United States to determine whether the government was
liable to the company because of the required changes.626 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that the United States was not liable. In the course of
its opinion, the Court indicated that although the reservation clause in the
joint resolution had allowed Congress to withdraw consent only in case of a
substantial obstruction to navigation, the existence of such an obstruction did
not have to be “judicially ascertained.”627 To be sure, “Congress can exercise
legislative power only,” and so “all its reservations of power, connected with
grants that are made, must necessarily be legislative in character.”628 But the
Court thought that identifying the due requirements for protecting
navigation along an artery of interstate commerce was indeed legislative—
and as the Court interpreted the reservation clause, “[t]he withdrawal of
assent . . . has been left to depend on the judgment of Congress in the exercise
of its legislative discretion.”629 The Court concluded that the reservation
clause “expressly” made the bridge company’s franchise “defeasible at will,”
and the bridge company could not complain about Congress’s “legitimate
exercise of the power that was reserved.”630
Id. at 550.
J. Res. 21, 40th Cong., Sess. 3, 15 Stat. 347 (1869).
Id. at 348.
Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 121, § 5, 16 Stat. 571, 572-73.
Id. at 573.
Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470, 480 (1882).
Id.
Id. at 480-82.
Id. at 481-82. But see id. at 504 (Field, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether or not the contingency
had occurred, was not a fact to be arbitrarily determined by the legislature. It was to be ascertained
judicially upon proofs and after hearing the parties, like any other disputed fact upon the
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
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Some corporate charters raised similar questions. If a legislature granted
a charter but reserved the power to repeal it at will, the legislature could
exercise this power without judicial involvement. Sometimes, though, the
legislature reserved the power to repeal a charter only for certain reasons or
in certain circumstances. Faced with statutes purporting to exercise this
power, courts divided over whether they were bound to accept the legislature’s
apparent conclusion that the required reasons had existed.631 In one case from
1846, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Iowa interpreted the reservation
clause in a bank’s charter to make the legislature the ﬁnal arbiter of whether
the conditions for repeal were satisﬁed, and the court treated the legislature’s
decision as conclusive.632 But courts in some other states later portrayed this
case as an outlier.633 According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, courts
could make their own determination of “whether the casus foederis, upon
which the authority to repeal is based, has occurred,” and the legislature’s
decision on this question was at most “primâ facie valid.”634
establishment of which rights of property depend.”). In a later case, the Supreme Court explicitly
distinguished between the reserved power to repeal a franchise “at the pleasure of the legislature”
and “the power to cancel for violation of the terms of the grant.” Pub. Serv. Comm’n of P.R. v.
Havemeyer, 296 U.S. 506, 517 (1936). The Court explained:
In the absence of constitutional, legislative, or contractual restriction, the exertion of
the ﬁrst mentioned power requires nothing more than an appropriate declaration of
the repeal. But, without consent of the holder, valid cancellation for condition broken
cannot be accomplished without giving to the holder an opportunity to have the
asserted default judicially determined.
Id. (citation omitted). Even when a franchise was being canceled for breach of a condition, though,
the Court observed that the “initial step” did not have to occur in the judiciary. See id. at 515
(“Essential requirements are satisﬁed if the withdrawal of the privilege, declared by legislative or
executive authority, may be followed by appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction in which the
rights of the holders may be determined.”); cf. id. at 511, 516-18, 520 (appearing to accept a procedure
that empowered the Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico to determine that a condition had
been violated and to cancel a franchise on that basis, with review in the insular courts being limited
to the record compiled in the Public Service Commission).
631 See WM. L. CLARK & WM. L. MARSHALL, MARSHALL ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 139
(1902) (identifying a three-way split); Horace Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under a
Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation (pt. 1), 53 AM. L. REG. 1, 17 n.23 (1905) (same).
632 See Miners’ Bank of Dubuque v. United States ex rel. Grant, Morris 482, 485-86 (Iowa Terr.
1846), writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 213 (1847). According to the
court, the power that had been reserved “amounted to an absolute power of repeal, coupled with a
legislative pledge that such power should never be exerted [except] in the cases therein provided”—
and the latter pledge did not have to be judicially enforceable. Id. at 485.
633 See Flint & Fentonville Plank-Road Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, 105-06 (1872) (saying
that the Iowa case “stands alone”); Commonwealth ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Pittsburg & Connellsville
R.R. Co., 58 Pa. (8 P.F. Smith) 26, 46-47 (1868) (referring to the Iowa case as the “one exception”
to “[t]he current of American authorities”).
634 Pittsburg & Connellsville, 58 Pa. (8 P.F. Smith) at 47-48; see also Iron City Bank v. City of
Pittsburgh, 37 Pa. 340, 348 (1861) (observing that where a state reserved the power to alter or revoke bank
charters subject to the proviso that no injustice shall be done to the corporators, “I incline to think that
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For some judges, this debate might simply have been about the proper
interpretation of the charter: should the legislature be understood not only to
have reserved the power to revoke the charter in the specified circumstances,
but also to have reserved unreviewable power to decide whether those
circumstances obtained? In a case decided on circuit in 1865, Justice Robert
Grier resisted reading a charter to reserve the latter power, but he appeared to
believe that such reservations were possible.635 On the other hand, the
distinguished judge Thomas Cooley of Michigan suggested that constitutional
principles might prevent the legislature from reserving this adjudicative
authority for itself.636 Treatises too were in conflict on this point.637
The fact that a charter took effect only if accepted by the grantee, and that
the grantee thereby consented to its terms, did not mean that legislatures had

it is for the courts and not for the legislature to decide whether the repeal or modification of a bank
charter works injustice to the corporators”); Erie & N.E. R.R. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287, 316 (1856) (“I incline
to the opinion that when the constitutional power of the legislature to pass a law depends on matter of
fact, the party to be affected by it ought to have an opportunity afterwards of showing how the fact is.”).
635 See City of Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R.R. Co., 2 F. Cas. 570, 570 (C.C.W.D.
Pa. 1865) (“[I]f this contract is that the legislature may repeal the act whenever, in its opinion, the
corporation has misused or abused its privileges, then the contract constitutes the legislature the
arbiter and judge of the existence of that fact.”).
636 See Flint & Fentonville, 25 Mich. at 112 (indicating that “the determination whether a
corporation has violated its charter is judicial in its nature,” even when the legislature has reserved
the power to repeal the charter on those grounds). In Flint & Fentonville, the Michigan legislature
had incorporated a company in 1848. The legislature had reserved the power to repeal this act, but
the act had speciﬁed that the legislature would not exercise this power within the next thirty years
“unless it shall be made to appear to the legislature that there has been a violation by the company
of some of the provisions of this act.” Act of Apr. 3, 1848, No. 271, § 4, 1848 Mich. Acts 404, 405.
Despite the phrase “to the legislature,” Justice Cooley held that “[t]he violation of the charter cannot
be legally made to appear, except on trial in a tribunal whose course of proceeding is devised for the
determination of questions of this nature.” Flint & Fentonville, 25 Mich. at 112. In his words, “It is
not to be presumed that the legislature designed to take upon itself judicial powers; and as the act
does not necessarily require that construction, it should not be given it.” Id.; cf. Report Upon the
Petitions Relative to Annulling the Charter of the Conestoga Navigation Company (Apr. 8, 1833),
in 2 JOURNAL OF THE FORTY THIRD HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA 757, 761 (Harrisburg, Henry Welsh 1833) (concluding that even when the
legislature reserves the power to repeal a corporation’s charter if the corporation abuses or misuses
its privileges or if the charter proves injurious to the Commonwealth, “still there ought to be a
competent tribunal to try the facts of abuse or misuse of the privileges, or the causes which may
have rendered them injurious,” and adding that “[i]t is . . . important to the public interests, that
the Legislature should not be involved in judicial investigations”).
637 Compare JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 803-04 (Boston, Little & Brown, 4th ed. 1852) (citing the Iowa
court’s position and appearing to accept it), with HENRY O. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS HAVING CAPITAL STOCK § 458 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1884)
(“[I]n accordance with the fundamental principles of our system of government, . . . it would seem
proper that a judicial tribunal should determine whether or not that condition of fact exists which
the legislature has declared shall forfeit the franchises of a corporation.”).
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completely unfettered discretion to include whatever terms they liked.638 For
instance, in the second half of the nineteenth century, there was widespread
agreement that although legislatures could reserve the power to revoke or alter
a corporation’s charter, they could not reserve the power to take a private
corporation’s property or to destroy other vested rights without
compensation.639 Thus, the Supreme Court observed that by virtue of a
reservation clause, Congress could “make such alterations and amendments of
the charter [of the Union Pacific Railroad Company] as come within the just
scope of legislative power”—but “[a]ll agree that [this power] cannot be used
to take away property already acquired under the operation of the charter, or
to deprive the corporation of the fruits actually reduced to possession of
contracts lawfully made.”640 In a circuit-court opinion a few years later, Justice
Stephen Field likewise noted that when a state created corporations,
[i]t cannot impose the condition that they shall not resort to the courts of law
for the redress of injuries or the protection of [their] property; that they shall
make no complaint if their goods are plundered and their premises invaded;
that they shall ask no indemnity if their lands be seized for public use, or be
taken without due process of law, or that they shall submit without objection
to unequal and oppressive burdens arbitrarily imposed upon them; that, in
other words, over them and their property the state may exercise unlimited
and irresponsible power.641

While the state could reserve the power to revoke corporate charters at the state
legislature’s discretion, so that charter rights did not vest in the first place, the
state could not necessarily reserve unusual power over rights that did vest.

638 Cf. Miller v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 21 Barb. 513, 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (“It would be
preposterous to say that the legislature has the power to make any and every requisition upon the
defendants as a condition of their retaining their corporate existence.”), disapproved of by Albany N.
R.R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 N.Y. 345, 351 (1862).
639 See Siegel, supra note 184, at 34-35.
640 Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 720 (1879); see also, e.g., Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
478, 498 (1873) (“Power to legislate, founded upon such a reservation in a charter to a private
corporation, . . . cannot be exercised to take away or destroy rights acquired by virtue of such a
charter, and which by a legitimate use of the powers granted have become vested in the
corporation . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 239, 253 (1859) (“Perhaps . . .
the rule . . . is this; that where, under power in a charter, rights have been acquired and become
vested, no amendment or alteration of the charter can take away the property or rights which have
become vested under a legitimate exercise of the powers granted.”).
641 R.R. Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 754 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), writ of error dismissed, 116 U.S. 138 (1885); cf.
Stern, supra note 631, at 25-28 (praising Justice Field’s analysis, but suggesting that “the majority of cases
reported in the books . . . are not to be reconciled satisfactorily with the principles there enunciated”).
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Ever since the 1870s, judges have discussed issues of this sort under the
rubric of “unconstitutional conditions.”642 But the fact that this label has been
around for a long time does not mean that people agree about which
conditions are unconstitutional under which circumstances. The Supreme
Court’s statements on this topic are “wonderfully inconsistent,”643 and
scholars have suggested a host of diﬀerent approaches.644
Under current doctrine, there is no doubt that Congress can authorize
decisionmakers who are not Article III judges to resolve certain disputes with
the consent of the parties to those disputes, even when authoritative
resolution would otherwise require judicial power. For instance, in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Supreme Court held that as part of
its power to execute a federal regulatory statute, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) can be given authority to adjudicate certain
disputes about private rights with the consent of the parties to those disputes,
subject only to modern appellate-style judicial review—so that if both sides
choose to proceed in the CFTC, the party who loses cannot insist upon de
novo relitigation in an Article III court.645 Likewise, in Wellness International
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, the Supreme Court held that Congress can give the
parties to bankruptcy cases the option of submitting claims for resolution by
bankruptcy judges who lack the protections of Article III, even with respect
to claims that Congress could not constitutionally authorize non-Article III
adjudicators to resolve without the parties’ consent.646
Yet while the parties’ freely given consent to alternative forms of dispute
resolution can obviate the need for “judicial” power,647 federal law restricts
642 See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1877) (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also
Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1863-66 (2008)
(describing Doyle and later cases).
643 Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability
Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 374 (1995). That has been true for a long time. See, e.g., Maurice
H. Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 879, 886 (1929) (“Although . . . dicta in
three cases . . . seem to foreshadow it, the decision in [Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926),] . . . conﬂicts with such a well-established current of adjudication
that it is diﬃcult to see how both can survive in . . . our constitutional law” (footnote omitted)).
644 Leading treatments include Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Robert
L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); and
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). For the
observation that courts should not try to articulate “a unitary unconstitutional conditions doctrine”
and that proper analysis will vary according to the particular constitutional provision in question,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 595, 621 (1990).
645 478 U.S. 833, 848-57 (1986).
646 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942-47 (2015).
647 Cf. Nelson, supra note 21, at 2511 (“[P]erhaps the power that is uniquely ‘judicial’—the
power that only true courts can exercise—is the power to adjudicate and authoritatively resolve

1540

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1429

what the government can do to extract such consent. Consider how Congress
has regulated federal agencies’ use of arbitration agreements to resolve
disputes with private parties arising out of federal programs. To the extent
that agency oﬃcials have authority to settle such disputes, Congress is happy
to let them agree to binding arbitration.648 But while freestanding arbitration
agreements that serve the interests of both parties are ﬁne, Congress has
speciﬁed that “[a]n agency may not require any person to consent to
arbitration as a condition of entering into a contract or obtaining a beneﬁt.”649
Of course, this prohibition extends well beyond disputes involving claims
of vested rights—suggesting that Congress imposed it more for policy reasons
than because of constitutional scruples. Whatever the rationale behind this
particular prohibition, moreover, scattered federal statutes do condition
government licenses or other benefits on the beneficiary’s promise to arbitrate
certain disputes about the beneficiary’s contractual rights, property rights, or
monetary liability650—disputes that, in the absence of consent, the traditional
framework would have prevented Congress from authorizing nonjudicial
decisionmakers to resolve with binding effect. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Corp.,
the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to one statute that
arguably fit this mold (though the litigants did not emphasize the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine and the Court left many questions
open).651 Other cases similarly suggest that Congress or state legislatures can
disputes about certain kinds of private rights even without the consent of the purported rightholder.”). For a critique of the relevance of consent, see F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication
Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715 (2018).
648 See 5 U.S.C. § 575. William Barr—then the head of the Oﬃce of Legal Counsel (OLC)—
testiﬁed at a congressional hearing that one version of the bill that became this statute raised
constitutional concerns under the Appointments Clause and the theory of the unitary executive. See
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt.
of the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀs., 101st Cong. 93-99 (1989). Since then, however, OLC has issued
a formal opinion rejecting those concerns. See Constitutional Limitations on Federal Government
Participation in Binding Arbitration, 19 Op. O.L.C. 208 (1995). But cf. Exec. Order No. 12,778
§ 1(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. 359, 361 (1992) (instructing lawyers who conduct litigation for the federal
government not to agree to “binding arbitration”—that is, arbitration capable of producing awards
that the agency lacks discretion to reject).
649 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(3); see also S. REP. NO. 101-543, at 13 (1990) (“This prohibition is
intended to help ensure that the use of arbitration is truly voluntary on all sides.”).
650 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (mandating arbitration of certain disputes regarding an employer’s
liability for withdrawing from a multiemployer plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act); 49 U.S.C. § 14708 (requiring motor carriers that transport household goods, as a
condition of obtaining necessary licenses from the federal government, to offer shippers the option
of binding arbitration to settle disputed claims of up to $10,000 for damage or loss).
651 473 U.S. 568 (1985). Federal law prohibits the sale of pesticides that have not been
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and companies seeking registration
normally must submit scientiﬁc data to the EPA. In 1978, Congress expanded the opportunities for
would-be registrants to use data previously submitted by another company, but only if they oﬀered
to compensate the earlier registrant. The statute provided that if the parties did not agree on the

2021]

Vested Rights, “Franchises,” and the Separation of Powers

1541

offer favorable treatment to regulated entities as part of a package, conditioned
on the entities’ consent to administrative adjudication of claims against them.652
Yet references to cases cannot really resolve the question, because the
Supreme Court’s precedents about the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine
are in conflict. Even with respect to privileges that the state could withhold
altogether and that the state also has the power to grant subject to conditions,
some cases broadly say that the state “may not impose conditions which require
the relinquishment of constitutional rights.”653 In cases about the privilege of
government employment, moreover, the modern Supreme Court has
specifically held that the Constitution insulates the procedural requirements
of the Due Process Clause against state modification. More precisely, if state
law gives government employees an interest in continued employment of the
sort that counts as “property” for purposes of modern procedural-due-process
doctrines, and if those employees are therefore entitled to a hearing before
being fired for cause, the state cannot avoid that conclusion simply by building
less generous procedures into the laws that define the terms of government
amount of compensation, the dispute would be resolved by arbitration, with limited judicial review.
In Thomas, the Supreme Court rejected an original registrant’s challenge to this provision. See
Nelson, supra note 2, at 607 (describing the majority’s analysis, but noting that unless the original
registrant had a continuing property interest in data submitted to the government, the traditional
framework would not have entitled the registrant to judicial adjudication); see also Thomas, 473 U.S.
at 585 (acknowledging that federal law had preserved trade-secret protections for data submitted
between 1972 and 1978, but observing that arbitral awards would not foreclose takings claims seeking
additional compensation from the government for any property interests that the 1978 statute
abrogated). In dicta, the Court suggested that the statute also adequately protected follow-on
applicants who chose to use an earlier registrant’s data, because they “explicitly consent[ed] to have
[their] rights determined by arbitration.” Id. at 592. Still, the Court did not decide exactly what was
at stake for these follow-on applicants. See id. at 591 (leaving open whether arbitral awards were
enforceable debts or whether the consequence of failing to pay an award was simply that the
government would not register the follow-on applicant’s pesticide).
652 Consider the early “elective” workers’ compensation statutes, which governed only those
employers who opted into the system. In Wisconsin, the Workmen’s Compensation Act empowered
the state’s Industrial Commission to adjudicate workers’ compensation claims against participating
employers, and the Act made the Industrial Commission’s ﬁndings conclusive if there was any
evidence to support them. When an employer protested that this limitation on judicial review
subjected the employer to the deprivation of property without due process of law, the Supreme
Court responded that “the elective or voluntary character of the Wisconsin Compensation Act”
supplied a “complete answer.” Booth Fisheries Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 208, 210 (1926). After
all, employers who wanted fully judicial adjudication of claims by injured employees could simply
forgo the beneﬁts of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and not participate in the system. “In view
of such an opportunity for choice,” the Court concluded, “the employer who elects to accept the law
may not complain that, in the plan for assessing the employer’s compensation for injury sustained,
there is no particular form of judicial review.” Id. at 210-11.
653 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). Although there
is contrary authority too, modern cases continue to cite Frost. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 608 (2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly rejected the argument that if
the government need not confer a beneﬁt at all, it can withhold the beneﬁt because someone refuses
to give up his constitutional rights.”).
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employment.654 States presumably cannot get around this principle simply by
requiring prospective employees to consent to less robust procedures as a
condition of government employment. And if the government cannot always
grant privileges on condition that the grantees waive the procedural safeguards
that the Constitution is understood to give that type of legal interest,655 then
perhaps the government also cannot grant franchises or other vested rights on
condition that the grantees accept nonjudicial adjudication of matters for
which the Constitution ordinarily requires judicial power.
Modern scholarship does suggest some reasons to be concerned about
conditions on grants of franchises. By deﬁnition, franchises are available only
from the government. Because people who are dissatisﬁed with the
government’s proposed terms cannot turn to an alternative supplier, the need
to obtain their consent does not constrain the government’s demands as much
as it otherwise would. In circumstances of this sort, even scholars who
ordinarily put great emphasis on consent see more room for a doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.656
Of course, the whole concept of a franchise historically revolved around a
bargain between the government and a private person, who received special
grants in exchange for doing something of value for the public. Because the
government could not simply command private people to provide ferry
service or to build and maintain turnpikes, history makes clear that the
654 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985) (rejecting the idea
that when state law bundles substantive job protections together with special procedures for
termination, employees “must take the bitter with the sweet” (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 154 (1974) (plurality opinion))); cf. United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,
282 U.S. 311, 328 (1931) (“It long has been settled in this court that the rejection of an
unconstitutional condition imposed by a state upon the grant of a privilege, even though the state
possess the unqualiﬁed power to withhold the grant altogether, does not annul the grant. The grantee
may ignore or enjoin the enforcement of the condition without thereby losing the grant.”).
655 With respect to privileges, those safeguards do not necessarily include access to a true court.
Under the traditional framework, legislatures often could authorize executive-branch actors to
adjudicate facts relevant to the enjoyment of mere privileges. That largely remains true today; while
doctrines of procedural due process guard against arbitrary deprivations of certain interests that
nineteenth-century lawyers would have classiﬁed as privileges, those doctrines can still be satisﬁed
by adjudication in administrative agencies rather than courts. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 611-12.
656 See Epstein, supra note 644, at 22 (arguing on economic grounds that “when [the state]
provides resources of which it is the sole supplier,” it “should be limited both in the concessions that
it may exact from private owners and in the conditions it may impose on them”); see also id. at 73
(“Unconstitutional conditions doctrine should be invoked only when there are structural concerns
relating to monopoly power, collective action problems, and externalities suggesting that individual
consent will generally be an insuﬃcient check against systematic government misbehavior.”); cf.
Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3,
22 (1983) (suggesting that due-process review of the government’s procedures for withholding or
cancelling beneﬁts is most appropriate when the government has either “foreclose[d] substantially
the private market substitutes on which the claimant might otherwise have relied” or “force[d] the
claimant, if he is to use a private market substitute, in eﬀect to pay twice for the same good”).
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government can grant franchises subject to some conditions that the
Constitution would not let the government impose without consent. More
generally, governments can obtain by contract some goods and services that
they could not simply conscript.
Still, history does not provide equally clear support for the idea that the
federal government can structure grants in such a way as to create property
interests that are identical in all substantive respects to traditional forms of
property, but that are exempt from the procedural safeguards normally protecting
such property. For instance, Congress generally has not tried to convey federal
land with procedural restrictions of this sort, and until the twentieth century
Congress did not impose any such conditions on patents for inventions either.
History does indicate that when the government grants a franchise, the
government can reserve the power to revoke it at will, and the executive branch
can be put in charge of whether to exercise this option. But exercising a power
of revocation is different than authoritatively resolving disputes about whether
the government has such a power, or about whether a private person’s alleged
rights ever vested in the first place. While Congress can put executive-branch
agencies in charge of managing the government’s own proprietary rights,
Congress cannot necessarily encumber franchises with procedural conditions
purporting to let executive-branch agencies adjudicate disputes of the latter sort.
At any rate, neither history nor case law definitively establishes that Congress
can use the federal government’s grant-making powers to eliminate the need for
“judicial” adjudication of private rights that derive from government grants.
Some such reservations, at least, might either exceed Congress’s enumerated
powers657 or violate affirmative limitations on those powers.658
CONCLUSION
Whether the majority opinion in Oil States was right or wrong, it was
limited.659 The Supreme Court held that when the federal government issues
a patent, the government can reserve the power to cancel the patent for
certain causes through an administrative process, subject only to appellatestyle judicial review. But the majority explicitly refrained from deciding
657 Often, Congress’s power to impose conditions on government grants would come from the
Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. On one view, though, efforts to opt out of
otherwise applicable separation-of-powers principles might not always be “proper” means of carrying
the federal government’s powers into execution. Cf. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper”
Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297 (1993)
(arguing that to be “proper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause, “executory laws must be
consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights”).
658 Cf. supra notes 654–55 and accompanying text (mentioning doctrines about procedural due process).
659 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379
(2018) (“We emphasize the narrowness of our holding.”).
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whether Congress can unilaterally modify existing patents by imposing this
reservation retroactively.660
Notwithstanding the incautious reference to “franchises” in my earlier
article,661 history answers that question in the negative. At least when the
government granted a franchise for consideration and without valid
reservations, the franchisee could claim a vested private right that sounded in
property or contract. Even if the government subsequently identiﬁed some
basis for contesting that claim, nineteenth-century lawyers would not have
thought that the executive branch could unilaterally resolve such disputes
itself. Throughout the nineteenth century, once a franchise had been granted
to a private person, authoritative adjudication of disputes about its validity
or its forfeiture normally required “judicial” power.

660 See id. Nor did the Court address the legal effect of a cancellation upon causes of action that
may already have accrued. Suppose that while a patent is apparently in force, a third party infringes
it, giving the patentee a claim for damages. Even if the government subsequently exercises its reserved
power to cancel the patent administratively, the patentee might be able to argue that the cancellation
cannot eliminate the patentee’s accrued claim for damages. See Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 721
(1879) (observing that when Congress exercises its reserved power to repeal or alter a corporate
charter, “it cannot undo what has already been done”); supra notes 639–41 and accompanying text
(discussing protections for vested rights even under the reservation theory); cf. Monaghan, supra note
7, at 41 (noting that in Oil States, the majority indicated that “the patent revocation [pursuant to inter
partes review] ‘does not make any binding determination’ regarding a then-pending patent
infringement suit between the patent holder and an alleged infringer” (quoting Oil States, 138 S. Ct.
at 1378)). Under the traditional framework, if the patentee’s cause of action for damages qualifies as a
vested right, then a court hearing the patentee’s infringement suit might ultimately have to decide for
itself whether the patent was valid at the time that the third party infringed it.
661 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 567-68 (grouping franchises together with privileges rather than
core private rights).

